This article examines the notion of ‘irreparable harm’, (Irreparable harm is also sometimes referred to as irremediable harm) which is generally a requirement that needs to be satisfied in the context of interim measure applications in international arbitration. Although a showing of irreparable harm is typically central for the granting of interim measures, the notion remains elusive and unevenly applied in practice. The first section of the article outlines the legal framework governing interim measures by analysing how this requirement has been articulated across doctrinal interpretation and arbitral rules. It highlights that the prevailing view supports a flexible approach to irreparable harm, namely whether the final award would provide adequate relief in the absence of interim measures. The second section examines arbitral practice and provides a structured analysis of investment and commercial decisions, organized according to the nature of the interim measures sought. Through these case studies, the article identifies recurring patterns in the reasoning of tribunals and emergency arbitrators and illustrates how the irreparable harm requirement operates in various contexts. Ultimately, the purpose of this article is to provide a practical framework for understanding how irreparable harm has been interpreted in theory and in practice, and to offer guidance to both counsel and arbitrators in assessing applications for interim measures.
The proliferation of international investment agreements (‘IIAs’), the widespread invocation of claims under these IIAs by private investors, and the subsequent issuance of arbitral awards that tended to favour investors have led many to believe that IIAs have unduly curtailed the regulatory flexibility of states. While the earlier generation of investment treaties were designed to incentivize foreign investment and prioritize the rights of the investors, newer-generation IIAs have begun to incorporate general public policy exception clauses (PPE clauses) intended to preserve states’ ability to regulate in the public interest while maintaining meaningful investor protection. This article focuses on the challenges associated with interpreting these clauses by examining recent treaty awards and ultimately proposes an analytical framework for interpretation of these clauses which can more effectively balance states’ regulatory autonomy and investor rights.
The rapid expansion of digital asset markets has transformed commercial exchange while exposing structural tensions between private dispute resolution and mandatory public regulation. As English law has evolved to recognize cryptoassets as property, disputes concerning ownership, fraud, platform governance, and regulatory compliance have proliferated, with arbitration emerging as a preferred mechanism for their resolution. However, the deployment of arbitration in consumer-facing digital asset markets raises difficult questions about the limits of party autonomy where statutory rights and public policy are engaged. This article critically examines those limits through a close analysis of Payward, Inc. d/ b/a Kraken, Payward Ventures, Inc. & Payward Ltd v. Chechetkin, situating the decision within the broader framework of the Arbitration Act 1996 (as amended in 2025) and the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958). It argues that Payward reveals three interrelated constraints on arbitral autonomy: the non-derogable character of statutory consumer protection, the principled operation of public policy at the enforcement stage, and the heightened scrutiny applied to standard-form arbitration clauses in cross-border digital transactions. Far from signalling hostility to arbitration, the decision reflects a recalibration of arbitral autonomy in regulatory contexts. The article concludes that, in an increasingly mature and regulated digital asset market, arbitration remains viable only to the extent that it operates consistently with mandatory consumer and financial regulatory norms
This article examines the First Procedural Order (PO 1) in arbitral proceedings through the lens of national jurisprudence. In recent years a growing body of national case law has emerged that delineates the limits of party autonomy, the minimum standards for party participation in issuing a PO 1, and the enforceability of jurisdictional determinations and other procedural aspects contained within it. This article surveys and contextualizes these judicial decisions within the broader practice of arbitral tribunals under various international arbitration rules. The article concludes that decisions taken in the PO 1 may affect the interpretation of the arbitration agreement, the scope of the arbitrators’ Kompetenz-Kompetenz (and thus the competence of national courts to review arbitrability), the powers of the arbitrators during the proceedings, and the enforceability of the final award. In essence, the PO 1 sets the ‘tone’ of the arbitration.
Disputes concerning ‘just energy transition’ have grown in both number and significance. Such disputes arise both from the impact of energy transition projects on local communities and from claims by foreign investors affected by fossil fuel phase-out policies. At their core, these disputes concern the balance between the needs of the transition to low-carbon energy and its negative impacts. Just energy transition disputes typically involve multiple stakeholders, overlapping legal regimes, complex scientific questions, a strong public interest, and considerations of human rights. Against this background, this article explores the potential of mediation as a mechanism for managing and resolving just energy transition disputes. It highlights mediation’s potential to accommodate diverse stakeholders and normative frameworks, engage with scientific expertise, and maintain stakeholder relationships. This article also discusses the concerns over the use of mediation for just energy transition disputes involving public interest, regarding confidentiality, accountability, and power imbalances between the parties. It considers how mediation processes can be designed to realize mediation’s potential while addressing these concerns. It proposes key principles for mediation, including transparency-enhancing measures and default co-mediation. Fostering mediation as a forward-looking dispute settlement mechanism is essential to supporting a smooth energy transition. Providing a carefully tailored design for the mediation processes represents a crucial step towards achieving this goal.
