Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explore whether law enforcement agencies (LEAs) in England and Wales are appropriately trained and equipped to deal with the asset recovery of cryptocurrencies. Design/methodology/approach Primary qualitative data were collected through semi-structured interviews with 15 cryptocurrency investigators from the private and public sectors. Participants were recruited using purposive sampling, and the data were analysed using thematic analysis. Findings Three themes emerged from the analysis: Asset Recovery Enablers, Organisational Challenges and Training Opportunities and Challenges. The findings of this study highlight the importance of public–private collaboration, blockchain analytical tools and open-source intelligence (OSINT) in supporting cryptocurrency asset recovery. However, participants identified challenges relating to organisational capability, communication, staff retention and frontline preparedness. The findings suggest that effective cryptocurrency asset recovery requires a tiered training approach, combining frontline awareness training with specialist investigative capability. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study provides one of the first empirical examinations of the enablers and challenges associated with cryptocurrency asset recovery within LEAs in England and Wales, contributing to the growing literature on cryptocurrency investigations, law enforcement capability and training.
Purpose This study aims to examine how money laundering risks are produced and normalized in tourism-driven property markets, focusing on Bali’s real estate sector, where foreign ownership restrictions and uneven enforcement shape informal ownership practices and anti-money laundering (AML) vulnerabilities. Design/methodology/approach The study adopts a qualitative research design based on semistructured interviews with key actors involved in real estate transactions and governance, complemented by document analysis and court case review. An ecological analytical framework is used to analyze how economic pressures, regulatory constraints, informal ownership practices and gatekeeper power relations interact to shape money laundering vulnerabilities in the property sector. Findings The findings show that money laundering risk arises not only from loopholes, but from regulatory limitations, uneven enforcement, normalized informal practices and weak gatekeeping. Nominee arrangements, undercapitalized corporate vehicles and sham marriages function as ownership-substitution mechanisms that obscure beneficial ownership and weaken source-of-funds verification. These practices are reinforced by uneven know your customer implementation, limited AML coverage of nonfinancial professionals and trading influence by politically exposed persons. Originality/value This study reconceptualizes real estate-based money laundering as a systemic phenomenon embedded in tourism economies, rather than as a linear or bank-centric compliance failure. Because money laundering operates through multiple sectors and asset classes, this study examines real estate as one strategic channel within a broader ecosystem of illicit financial flows. It provides one of the first ecological analyses of laundering risk in a tourism-dependent property market in the Global South and highlights the need for ecosystem-level AML interventions that extend beyond the financial sector.
Purpose This paper aims to examine how legal protections vary across United Nations Security Council (UNSC) counter-terrorism financing (CTF) and counter-proliferation financing (CPF) sanctions regimes and why this variation persists. It argues that this unevenness reflects institutional design: preventive financial restraints are administered through committee-based, non-judicial mechanisms rather than a common rights-based review framework.Design/methodology/approach The paper adopts a doctrinal and comparative institutional approach, analysing UNSC resolutions, sanctions committee guidelines and associated procedural mechanisms across CTF- and CPF-oriented targeted sanctions regimes. It compares the availability and operation of exemptions, de-listing procedures, Ombudsperson review and ancillary listing and review safeguards. The analysis is limited to publicly available UNSC materials and focuses on institutional design rather than domestic implementation or empirical practice.Findings Legal protections across UNSC CTF and CPF sanctions regimes are increasingly formalised but unevenly distributed. Regimes addressing ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida incorporate comparatively developed procedural mechanisms, including Ombudsperson review, while others rely on more limited forms of review. This unevenness reflects differentiated institutional development and the path-dependent evolution of safeguards. Even the most developed arrangements lack independent judicial determination.Originality/value The paper provides a systematic comparative analysis of legal protections across CTF and CPF sanctions regimes. It advances financial crime scholarship by applying a legal protection perspective to preventive financial restraints, showing how asset freezes operate as instruments of governance and control while affording uneven procedural protection. It clarifies why formalisation of safeguards does not necessarily produce uniform, rights-based or judicial legal protection.
Purpose Money laundering (ML) risks in the fast-growing luxury goods market fall largely outside the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) framework, which imposes anti-money laundering (AML) obligations on dealers in precious metals and stones but not to dealers in other high-value items. Focusing on cash transactions for portable luxury goods, this study aims to ask how four major jurisdictions - China, the EU, the UK and the USA - address these risks under domestic AML frameworks.Design/methodology/approach The study uses a theory-informed comparative legal methodology drawing on three analytical frameworks - situational crime prevention theory, regulatory theory and the theory of transnational legal order - operationalized through comparative legal analysis of primary sources and a quantitative review of FATF Mutual Evaluation (ME) data.Findings Significant inconsistencies emerge between jurisdictional approaches. All four jurisdictions formally comply with FATF requirements for precious metals and stones dealers but treat dealers of other high-value goods very differently, from comprehensive coverage to near-complete exclusion. These yield four supervisory models varying in regulatory breadth, reporting depth, enforcement feasibility and vulnerability to abuse. FATF ME ratings suggest that technical compliance does not consistently align with ML risk mitigation effectiveness.Originality/value The study addresses a research gap by examining ML risks across the luxury goods sector, beyond the well-studied precious metals and stones segment, in four jurisdictions representing the largest share of the global market. It develops an original typology illustrating how divergent approaches emerge under common FATF standards and suggests that technical compliance can obscure underlying weaknesses in sector-specific ML risk mitigation.
Purpose This paper aims to compare Ghana's Virtual Asset Service Providers Act, 2025 (Act 1154), with the USA's anti-money laundering (AML) framework for virtual assets. It asks whether a unified statute can give an emerging economy advantages over a fragmented, path-dependent regime.Design/methodology/approach The study uses functional and institutional comparative legal analysis. It reviews statutes, supervisory notices, sandbox materials and enforcement documents through a six-dimensional matrix mapped to Financial Action Task Force Recommendations 10, 12, 15, 16, 20, 26, 27 and 35.Findings Ghana's Act offers statutory coherence, and early implementation steps show movement beyond a purely prospective regime. However, enforcement capacity for virtual asset service providers (VASPs) is still developing. The US framework is institutionally fragmented yet operationally mature. Ghana's licensing model more closely resembles a banking charter than a money services business (MSB) registration, increasing demands on supervisory expertise, verification systems and technical infrastructure. Both frameworks also leave gaps around decentralized finance.Research limitations/implications Implementing regulations remain incomplete and Ghana does not yet have a mature enforcement record specific to VASPs. The analysis, therefore, combines legal design with early operational evidence rather than a full account of law in action.Practical implications Emerging-economy regulators need more than statutory clarity; they need credible supervisory capacity. VASPs in Ghana should expect operational requirements to evolve as implementation matures.Originality/value The paper offers an early comparative analysis of Ghana's Act and contributes to debates on regulatory leapfrogging, implementation gaps and compliance capacity in the Global South.
