ABSTRACT This study examines a neglected aspect of industrial relations: workplace disputes in which workers are incidentally made idle because of strike actions of others. These spillover effects have received little systematic attention despite potentially accounting for a substantial share of the employment consequences of industrial conflict. The analysis uses a comprehensive dataset of company strikes compiled by the UK Engineering Employers' Federation (EEF) between 1920 and 1970, recording both workers directly involved in disputes and non‐striking employees made idle. During the interwar and wartime periods, relatively few workers were made idle compared with those directly on strike. In contrast, the post‐war period saw a substantial rise in the likelihood and scale of incidental idleness. By the late 1960s, the number of EEF workers made idle by strikes nearly matched the hundreds of thousands on strike. Incidental idleness was especially likely when strikes were caused by non‐pay disputes, most notably those involving a demarcation disagreement about how workers from different unions or with different trades were assigned to tasks in the plant. These findings highlight wider employment consequences of industrial conflict, especially where there are production interdependencies.
ABSTRACT This study examines the relationship between employees' gender biases, defined as the belief that men are better suited for managerial positions than women are, and promotion aspirations using online survey data ( N = 939). Probit and instrumental variables approaches are used to address the potential endogeneity of gender bias. The results suggest that this relationship may differ between men and women: gender bias is negatively associated with women's promotion aspirations and could be positively associated with men's. These findings are consistent with the self‐stereotyping hypothesis and suggest that employees' gender bias may be associated with gender differences in promotion aspirations.
ABSTRACT Social insurance coverage is low and declining in Egypt. This paper uses panel data, spanning 1998–2023, to assess the dynamics behind these trends in social insurance coverage. The results highlight not only the decline of social insurance coverage but an informality trap: over time workers are less likely to gain social insurance at entry or while remaining employed, and they are increasingly likely to lose social insurance. One reason for the decline in social insurance may be the low value workers place on coverage; the unemployed average the same reservation wages for jobs with and without social insurance coverage.
The right to strike is protected under both EU and Norwegian law, reflecting the principle that participation in collective action should not have long-term consequences for workers' careers. Following a major strike in 2016, the Norwegian hotel and restaurant sector introduced rights to local wage bargaining, which had previously been negotiated only at the central level. Using Norwegian administrative linked employer-employee data for 2015-2019, we compare outcomes for hotel and restaurant workers with those in retail trade, where wages remained centrally determined. We find that, among workplaces covered by collective agreements, hotel and restaurant workers experienced little change in average wages but increased wage compression at the top. However, the striking workers themselves faced lower hourly wages, weaker labour market attachment, and a higher likelihood of receiving welfare benefits. These findings suggest that, for participants, the strike entailed lasting economic costs beyond those incurred during the dispute itself.
