
This contribution to a Symposium in honor of Francis McGovern's life and accomplishments is a natural occasion on which to assess some of the normative arguments for and against private claims resolution facilities (CRFs). He was one of the most prominent figures in the world of multi-claimant litigation and settlements. We were privileged to work alongside him in various matters and to consider him a friend. We miss him dearly. The Article begins, in Part II, by describing three core models of private CRFs that are commonly observed in mass tort settings, often in combination: individual settlements by in-house counsel, victim compensation funds, and group settlements (inventory and global). Our view is that variations in the design of CRFs often have functional explanations as responses to the desires and needs of the parties. When the parties differ in their preferred arrangements, the design of a CRF will inevitably reflect inequalities in bargaining power between the parties. That is expected, as each CRF is the product of compromise. With regard to each of the three core models, this second Part will discuss when and why the defendant might prefer it, then go on to discuss its benefits and costs to the plaintiffs (and plaintiffs’ counsel). Part III then addresses two criticisms that scholars have levied against one or more of these types of private CRFs: that private CRFs deny claimants corrective justice, and that judicial supervision is needed to protect claimants’ autonomy and to police agency failures on the plaintiffs’ side. We argue that the first criticism is mistaken because it wrongly contends that corrective justice requires the use of courts, and that the second is erroneous because market forces should encourage plaintiffs’ attorneys to protect claimants’ autonomy as fully as claimants want and tend to reduce agency costs to an efficient level in multi-claimant settlements no less than in single-client matters. The Article concludes in Part IV with some final thoughts on the limited potential of judicial review to improve private CRFs.
The problems governments face in regulating consumer finance fall into two categories: normative and cognitive. The normative problems have to do with the way that some governments, particularly those adhering to an American model of household finance, have financed social mobility and intergenerational welfare through debt, a tenuous and socially risky policy choice. Credit has a substantial social aspect to it in the United States, where the federal government has in some way engaged in subsidizing about 1/3 of consumer credit, particularly in the residential mortgage market, feeding into a substantial capital markets dimension through government-guaranteed securitization. Most Americans think they “choose” and “earn” their wealth only through their own efforts, but in fact a substantial institutional apparatus of government assistance supports wealth creation, particularly for higher income households, including substantial disguised subsidies supporting home mortgage credit. Access to credit in such a system becomes a social primary good in need of regulation to ensure compliance with equality principles appropriate to the society in question. Governments have poor records in regulating access to credit and in some cases enact law or support social structures going in the opposite direction, towards injustice, substantially impairing the life chances of persons and families in historically disadvantaged groups, compounding status and material inequality. No government has as yet developed appropriate policy tools to evaluate the effects of financial regulation on equality. Rather, most policies have historically entrenched and even promoted inequality. The cognitive problems have to do with the dilemma of trading off between paternalism and autonomy in consumer financial regulation. Disclosure approaches fail because they do not adequately take the cognitive limitations of persons into account. Debtors do not read or understand terms and conditions. Paternalism can fail because capital can freely exit a market and engage in regulatory arbitrage in seeking out the best returns. If credit is what in a Rawlsian framework can be understood as a social primary good in a society then all of these problems are all the more serious. The solutions to these twin normative-cognitive problems are in either taking the distributive justice of access to credit seriously or in decoupling debt from its role in producing social mobility when this cannot be done. Debt can be ill-suited for allocating basic means to a good life in a society. It converts collective duties of justice owed to individuals to private duties of contract owed by individuals, aggravating power and domination dynamics in a society and worsening inequality.
It can be safely considered common knowledge that it is difficult to consistently predict a judicial outcome. The term by which these situations are best described is legal uncertainty. Professor Anthony D’Amato defines legal uncertainty in a mathematical sense, as meaning that a legal rule is expected by informed attorneys to have an official outcome at or near the 0.5 level of predictability, which means that the outcome is barely indistinguishable from random prediction. Other definitions have been introduced, but they all refer to legal uncertainty as a vice. Legal uncertainty is routinely blamed for undermining both the rule of law in general and the law’s ability to achieve specific objectives, such as deterring anti-social conduct or encouraging trade and investment. Research has pointed to diverse explanations for this lack of predictability, such as the inherent ambiguity of human language that is used to describe legal rules, the use of open norms (for example, the reasonable person standard in tort