
Abstract In early colonial Lagos, inheritance disputes laid bare the exclusionary and discriminatory character of British jurisprudence. British judges, ill-versed in Yorùbá customary law, mimicked Indigenous Yorùbá judicial structures without recognizing their communal or spiritual foundations. By privileging written testamentary documents and civil marriages over nuncupative wills and customary unions, the colonial legal regime engendered an unstable inheritance system that marginalized numerous Yorùbá litigants. In response, Yorùbá communities and intellectuals mobilized to foreground the sacred, ritualized basis of Indigenous inheritance practices, advocating for a legal framework that could legitimately reconcile colonial authority with the spiritual dimensions of Yorùbá personhood. This article examines tensions between Indigenous African and European laws during colonial rule. It is also an inquiry into the claims and counterclaims about who had the authority to speak on behalf of deceased Yorùbá subjects in colonial Lagos.
This article contributes both methodologically and substantially to the debates on uses of justice in early modern Europe and, more specifically, about how and to what extent women asserted their rights in the courtroom. The approach is quantitative, with an analysis involving three courts in the duchies of Brabant and Limburg during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries: the princely Council of Brabant as well as the local aldermen's benches of the towns of Vilvoorde and Tienen. Systematically determining the proportion of women at the beginning of court cases (through the court rolls and distribution books) and comparing it to the proportion at the end of the proceedings (through the judgment books) reveals remarkable gender patterns: When women decided to go to court, they were more likely than men to litigate until a final judgment was rendered. Moreover, they sued on a narrower range of issues than men, with a preponderance of cases on inheritance, annuities, and debts. The explanation for this perseverance in court may be that women were less able to use informal forums for conflict resolution, or-more likely based on the sources that form the basis of this contribution-that they experienced a greater need to prove their rights than men.
Scholarship about the Chinese Question has largely understood it as a "coolie" question, but what if it was reframed in terms of merchants? Well-studied US anti-Chinese laws like the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act targeted working-class rather than elite Chinese, like merchants and students. But in 1921, the US-controlled Insular Government in the Philippines enacted a statute known as the Chinese Bookkeeping Act (Act No. 2972), marking a moment when US Chinese exclusion laws were directed toward businessowners. The act banned Chinese-language record-keeping and affected merchants ranging from small storeowners to multi-millionaire tycoons. A group of Chinese merchants in the Philippines sued the colonial government and appealed their case to the US Supreme Court, which ruled the Bookkeeping Act unconstitutional in 1926. For the "coolie" Chinese question, the US Supreme Court said "yes" to exclusion, but for the merchant Chinese question, the Court said "no." The Court's rejection of a merchant Chinese exclusion became part of the Philippines' transformation into a US colony. In relation to a patriotic Filipino capital and unmarked Euro-American capital, Chinese capital won rights even as it was framed within US law as "alien" by American and Filipino judges and politicians and, surprisingly, by the Chinese merchants themselves.
Although divorce was increasingly available through religious and civil courts in 18th-century Europe, the Catholic Church still considered marriage indissoluble. Thus, the only legal route out of a marriage was annulment. Historians have noted several strategies for annulments in premodern Europe, most often claims of lack of consent. One less common but interesting way to seek annulment was to claim affinity by fornication, in which one spouse claimed a premarital sexual relationship with a close relative of the other. Couples could also make a similar claim of a violation of public honesty, in which a person was originally betrothed to one person but then married their close relative. Both constituted impediments to marriage according to canon law. In 18th-century Venice, the Patriarchal tribunal heard a steady stream of these cases. Couples, along with their families, friends, and neighbors, provided detailed testimony to the tribunal to attain annulments. This article argues that the narrative structures and testimonies in these cases demonstrate that 18th-century Venetians thought that bad marriages should not be indissoluble, in spite of the Catholic Church's refusal to allow divorce, and were willing to push the boundaries of truth to work around the legal restrictions they faced.