Legal educators are beginning to wonder about the perma-poly-crisis which Western culture is said to have ended up in. In this contribution an attempt is made to read what we now know as the perma-poly-crisis as the result of a default operative logic that has been driving Western and global culture since the Second World War, i.e. the logic of flight, of which the engine, fuel and outcome can best be described as a form of subjectivity in which what Christopher Lasch once called the ‘minimal self’ takes centre stage. Today Western culture, and to an extent global culture as well, have arrived at a crossroads. Whether or not the Age of Authoritarianism is now encroaching upon us is, at the time of writing, unclear. What can be argued though is that the twilight that characterises our time should be used to imagine new social arrangements that circumvent the lure of authoritarianism. But for that to be possible a new form of subjectivity would be needed, way beyond the ‘minimal self’. There is a role here for legal educators. It is argued that the figure of what Jamie Murray has termed the ‘emergent lawyer’ might perhaps serve as a guiding image.
The relationship between the United Nations Security Council and the International Criminal Court reflects a central unresolved tension in international law. Under Articles 13(b) and 16 of the Rome Statute, the Council may trigger ICC jurisdiction over non-States Parties and suspend investigations, yet the Statute provides no legal criteria governing the exercise of these powers. This article argues that this absence is structural rather than accidental, producing asymmetry in accountability even where the Council does not act, but merely retains the option to act. The argument is developed through four cases: Darfur, Syria, and Ukraine, which illustrate referral, veto, and procedural reform, and Kenya, which demonstrates the accountability effects of the latent possibility of Article 16 intervention. Together, they show that the deficit is systemic, not episodic. The article proposes two reforms: an ICJ advisory opinion clarifying interpretive standards of necessity and good faith, and ICC reasoned opinions on Article 16 compliance before deferral is applied. Both aim to introduce legal reasoning into an area governed by political discretion, without altering the Council’s formal authority.
This paper examines how political authority can reconcile the demands of sovereign unity with the normative significance of social associations. Existing accounts of sovereignty often face a dilemma: theories emphasizing centralized authority risk reducing social institutions to extensions of the state, while theories emphasizing individual autonomy struggle to explain the authority of collective institutions that mediate between individuals and political power. Drawing on Samuel Pufendorf’s political philosophy, this paper develops the concept of conditioned absolutism as a model of embedded sovereignty. I argue that sovereignty must remain absolute in the sense that political communities require a final and unified authority over public coercion, but it is conditioned by the associative structures and moral relations that precede and justify political authority. Associations possess genuine normative significance because they embody forms of social cooperation, yet their autonomy remains conditional rather than unlimited. By reconstructing the relationship between socialitas, personae morales, and imperium, this paper shows how Pufendorf provides a conceptual framework that avoids both sovereign absorption and individualist reduction, offering new resources for contemporary debates on institutional authority and civil society.
A deceased person leaves not only tangible and intangible possessions, such as intellectual property like patents or copyrights, but also digital footprints. Search history, email, social media posts, etc., may lead to data leaks or unauthorised access by others, thereby infringing the deceased person’s right to privacy. This research aims to extend the scope of a data privacy law to include deceased persons exercising the Right to Be Forgotten (RTBF). While the RTBF for the deceased persons have gained recognition in various jurisdictions, its regulation remains amorphous in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, as it is part of the right to privacy, which is considered a personal right. This right is granted to individuals from birth until their death and does not extend after that. Even if the GCC countries’ data privacy laws include deceased persons and regulate the RTBF, emerging digital technologies, such as AI-generated content and blockchain, and the inconsistent privacy policies of tech companies, have intensified debates surrounding the RTBF for the deceased, whose digital footprints persist indefinitely. This paper examines the regulation of RTBF for deceased persons in GCC countries through an integrated framework that encompasses technological challenges, such as the permanence of deceased persons’ data and the inconsistency of tech companies’ privacy policies. The evaluation of existing GCC data protection laws to identify gaps and inconsistencies in the application of the deceased persons’ RTBF, particularly in light of advanced technology. By adopting a doctrinal and comparative approach, this study highlights the need for a coherent, unified data privacy regulatory framework across GCC countries that safeguards the dignity of deceased persons, their right to privacy and the sanctity of reputation within the GCC context.
