There is a crisis of state theory in British legal thought because both philosophers of law and public law theorists reject or avoid thinking about legal order in terms of the state as a personne morale , an entity in whose name officials act and which the individuals subject to its power have reason to regard as legitimate. The position is quite different in German legal thought in which state theory is central. I rely on Weimar legal theorist Hermann Heller's explanation that a crisis of state theory results when one neglects one of the two dimensions of the modern legal state that interact with each other in sustaining it and maintaining its legitimacy – the social dimension or how the facts of social life affect the content of legal norms and the legal dimension or how those norms shape the facts of social life. I show that this kind of crisis manifests itself in Britain because the topic of the state and its legitimacy is displaced onto other topics in ways that result in the same neglect, including by Heller revivalists at the LSE. This neglect explains the strange character of contemporary public law debate.
In the recent case of Rukhadze v Recovery Partners GP Ltd, the UK Supreme Court was given the opportunity to reconsider the House of Lords' previous formulations of the account of profits doctrine in Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver and Boardman v Phipps. It was concluded that the position in Regal and Boardman regarding the necessary link between the fiduciary position and the profits to be accounted for should be retained. However, the four judgments issued by the Supreme Court not only revealed very different bases for this holding, but also revealed several differences in interpretation of Regal and Boardman. This note summarises the four judgments, comments on the Court's views on the character of the account of profits doctrine, and suggests ways in which future cases may further refine the doctrine.
Integration policies in the EU and the UK have over the past two decades increasingly emphasised duties and constraints for migrants. This article challenges the duty-based model and proposes an alternative legal conception: 'integration through rights', with associational rights taking a central role. It argues that migrants participate in diverse associative practices that contribute to the social, civic, and political fabric of their societies, constituting a form of integration that ought to be protected under human rights law. The article criticises the dominant model's imperative of conformity, showing how it undermines human rights and reinforces exclusion. It then develops the legal foundations of an associational paradigm of integration, highlighting the role of associational ties as expressions of belonging in a pluralist democracy. Finally, it explores how this model can be implemented through existing legal frameworks - particularly the European Convention on Human Rights by examining deportation case law through the lens of freedom of association and private life.
In X v The Lord Advocate, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom held that the Crown cannot be vicariously liable for torts committed by judges. This case note critically examines what could be viewed as two significant doctrinal shifts that were introduced by this ruling. First, it considers whether the 'five incidents test' was sidelined in favour of a functional approach through implicit use of language. I argue that the 'five incidents test' should be viewed as good law as all three courts' analyses engage with its factors and as there are rule of law reasons to reject the possibility of amending the law through implicit non-application. Second, I argue that X v The Lord Advocate is a further instance of a trend in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence of narrowing the scope of vicarious liability. This trend has an unacknowledged gendered aspect. Narrowing vicarious liability has predominantly arisen in cases involving adult women who were physically or sexually assaulted, thus restricting the reach of vicarious liability and leaving women with diminished legal recourse.
Serious harm in healthcare often results from systemic failures, yet criminal accountability remains largely addressed through homicide law, gross negligence manslaughter and health-and-safety offences, frameworks that emphasise individual culpability and are ill-suited to addressing organisational failings. The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 was intended to redress this imbalance by prosecuting organisations for management failures causing death, yet its impact in healthcare remains limited: no NHS Trust has been convicted under this legislation. Persistent barriers, including proving an organisational 'gross breach', establishing causation across care systems and satisfying the senior-management requirement, have constrained its use. While cases such as Lucy Letby have sharpened public attention on professional wrongdoing and organisational oversight, the practical and normative questions raised by system-caused harm remain distinct. The Thirlwall Inquiry report provides an opportunity to reconsider whether the current legal architecture adequately addresses organisational responsibility. This article argues that although the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 retains symbolic value, its practical limitations undermine its effectiveness in healthcare. It proposes reforms, including clarification of the senior-management requirement, closer integration of corporate liability with patient-safety governance mechanisms and enhanced use of remedial and publicity orders, to strengthen organisational accountability while preserving conditions for safe care.
