
Clinical encounters are shaped by diagnostic reasoning and explicit judgement, and by how patients are affectively received. Empirical studies in psychiatry and related fields indicate that liking and disliking can influence clinical judgement, management, and treatment choice, yet they say little about the experience through which a patient comes to appear likeable or unlikeable. I develop a phenomenological account of likeability as a sedimented interaffective orientation formed between patient and clinician. Embodied interaction and prior experience are themselves socially and institutionally structured, shaping the affective significance of another person’s conduct. Such reception may orient attention and interpretation, though not in the direction commonly assumed: an easy consultation can reduce interpretive effort precisely because little presses the clinician to clarify what remains unresolved, while a strained one can sustain careful inquiry. How smoothly an interaction proceeds is therefore no measure of epistemic participation. I argue for a two-stage assessment. These affective dynamics of the interaction disadvantage a patient when the resulting restriction, credibility deficit, or withdrawal of interpretive effort is not supported by reasons specific to that patient and clinical task; the disadvantage constitutes an affective or epistemic injustice when it is connected to prejudice or to a patterned allocation of attention across patients already devalued through racialisation, psychiatric labels, or other social hierarchies. The account also explains why clinicians must be able to examine these responses and revise them in light of the patient’s experience.
Software as a Medical Device (SaMD) can influence diagnosis, triage, monitoring, and treatment even when technically valid and epistemically reliable. The unresolved ethical question is how a trustworthy output becomes answerable once it gains practical force in care. This conceptual article develops a workflow-signal account that treats the score, label, alert, or classification in use as the unit of review. Reliability concerns the process producing an output; answerability concerns the clinical arrangement through which it acquires authority. Dignity supplies a status constraint against objectification and exclusion from reason-giving care; answerability requires reasons and a consequential route to correction or revision. The account distinguishes SaMD from broader medical AI and non-device clinical decision support and assesses five affordances: visibility, explainability, auditability, contestability, and revisability. A worked case of computer-aided detection for tuberculosis screening shows how ethical stakes arise through threshold selection, confirmatory testing, human review, and monitoring. The account locates where empirical and institutional work must attach if technically valid SaMD is to remain answerable to persons.
Physician burnout is usually explained by excessive workload and institutional pressure, while the bodily dimension of the experience has received little attention. This conceptual paper develops a phenomenological account of the embodied mechanisms through which physician burnout can be interpreted and proposes a phenomenological path of resolution. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the lived body and on phenomenological work on embodiment, illness, and burnout, we distinguish the “lived body,” the “objective body,” and the “instrumental body,” and analyse three modes of disciplinary power—cognitive, affective, and temporal—that drive the transformation from lived body to instrumental body. On this basis we construct the heuristic concept of the “field” and a triadic model of self-perception, field, and other-perception. Our analysis suggests, rather than demonstrates, that burnout can be read as an ideal-typical alienation of the physician’s own body, unfolding in three stages: perceptual numbing, emotional detachment, and meaning depletion. The “field”—a bodily anchored, perceptually bounded practice space with protective, perception-amplifying, and ethically transformative functions—is offered as a conceptual resource through which this alienation might be partially reversed. Three time-efficient practices are proposed as tentative instantiations; their efficacy and limits remain to be tested. Reclaiming the lived body is not merely private self-care but an important, though not sufficient, existential and ethical condition of sustained clinical presence, and a phenomenological prelude to systemic reform rather than a substitute for it.
Illness is often understood as a disruption of ordinary temporality, fracturing narrative continuity, constricting horizons of possibility, and immersing sufferers in the slow, uncertain rhythms of waiting. Drawing on phenomenology, existential philosophy, pathography, and East Asian wisdom traditions, this article examines the relationship between growing ill and growing still, being a patient and developing patience. While contemporary accounts of illness have richly described experiences of temporal distortion, boredom, loss, and desynchronization, less attention has been given to the possibility that illness may also cultivate forms of composure, attentiveness, and moral endurance. We argue that the temporal disruptions associated with illness, disability, and aging, by interrupting the accelerated rhythms of late modern life, can create opportunities for stillness, presence, and renewed responsiveness. For this we coin the term st/illness. We also distinguish between being a patient, insofar as it connotes passivity and dependence, and being patient, an active virtue that allows one to meet the temporal demands imposed by bodily limitation and breakdown. While not minimizing or romanticizing the physical and emotional suffering often associated with illness, the article explores how illness can also function as a pharmakon in the Greek sense—both poison and remedy—revealing possibilities for resonance, contemplative presence, and existential transformation. This offers a framework for understanding how patients may sometimes flourish within, rather than despite the altered temporalities of illness.
The article examines the role of imagination in verbal communication of physical pain. Linguistic research shows that the verbal communication of pain is based on figurative language, including metaphor. Drawing on Conceptual Metaphor Theory, the theory of grounded cognition and phenomenology I argue that imagination – understood as an embodied and socially situated capacity for exploring possible experience – plays a crucial role in interpreting and contextualizing pain metaphors. I believe that imagination functions as a bridge between subjective experience and intersubjective communication. The paper develops a non-reductionist account of empathy with people who experience pain.