ABSTRACT Symmetrical universes, such as Max Black's famous “two‐sphere” world, are often taken to pose a serious challenge to the universal‐based bundle theory. In response, metaphysicians have either developed more sophisticated versions of the universal‐based account or simply converted to the trope‐based bundle theory. I argue that neither approach is fully satisfactory, for there is a different kind of symmetrical universe, or an alternative interpretation of such universes, that generates comparable challenges to these views. It turns out that neither universal‐based nor trope‐based accounts can fully accommodate symmetrical universes. In light of this, I propose a novel bundle‐theoretic account based on what David Lewis calls “amphibians”—qualities that are neither universals nor tropes—and argue that it accommodates both kinds of symmetrical universes without incorporating unwanted entities, making it preferable to the universal‐based and trope‐based accounts.
ABSTRACT In “The Case for Comparability,” we argue that every comparative expression “” obeys Comparability: if two things are at least as as themselves, then one of them must be at least as as the other. One of our arguments appeals to the apparent validity of the Strong Monotonicity schema: is ; is not ; so, is more than . In a recent reply to our paper, Erik Carlson and Olle Risberg claim that this argument is not valid, that it begs the question, and that the appearances favoring Strong Monotonicity—at least, for the adjective “good”—can be explained away. This paper defends our argument against these objections.
How should you decide what to do? Orthodox decision theory offers attractively simple advice: Do whatever has the most expected value. In what follows, I argue that this is not always good advice for agents like us. Agents like us are susceptible to error: Sometimes, we do not succeed at doing what is recommended by the advice we are trying to follow. For agents susceptible to error, there can be situations in which trying to do what they expect to produce the most value will be expected to leave them worse off. I will discuss why situations like this arise and give some concrete examples. I will also identify a condition on agents' credences, which is both necessary and sufficient for maximizing expected value to be the best advice for them to try to follow. However, crucially, this condition will not always be satisfied by agents like us.
Causalists contend that you see a specific object (rather than a lookalike, or no object at all) because that object sits at the beginning of an appropriate causal chain that terminates in your visual experience. We argue that neither standard causalists nor their non-causalist opponents can adequately accommodate a striking asymmetry between perception and thought. The asymmetry concerns the conditions under which a thought or sensory experience can inherit its object from another thought or sensory experience. Accommodating this asymmetry instead requires adopting a new and radical causalist view with important implications for the metaphysics of sensory experience.
Epistemic reasons matter for what you should believe. But then, some think there are practical reasons that matter, too. How could both sorts of reasons be weighed together to determine the doxastic states you ought to hold, all things considered? I argue for general constraints on any way of understanding such combinations and offer a well-motivated decision-theoretic model that, unlike its competitors, meets them. When epistemic reasons are conceived of as arising from the value or disvalue of a true or false belief, they can be weighed with practical reasons on a common scale.
