ABSTRACT Following Arthur Prior, some philosophers have thought that English allows predicate quantification, as exemplified by a sentence like ‘Carlos is something Diana is not‐kind’. This paper both defends this conclusion and argues that if the second‐order reading of Prior sentences is correct, English also admits of self‐applicative predication (SAP): cases in which a predicate applies directly to itself, not to a reified variant of itself. The presence of SAP in English is used to argue for the use of a SAP‐friendly language for the purposes of metaphysics, based largely on grounds analogous to those on which some philosophers have recently defended the use of higher‐order languages.
ABSTRACT There is an essential connection between the concept of an ability and various forms of practical and cognitive success. In particular, it is in virtue of exercising their abilities that agents’ general practical and cognitive endeavors, their doings and believings, become achievements—intentional actions or instances of knowledge. Abilities enable success. In this paper, I challenge the ubiquitous idea that when agents succeed, they are exercising the ability to succeed , that is, that abilities enable success as abilities to succeed. My argument is that while achievements are highly specific, the content of what an ability is an ability to do (its prejacent) is always general. Hence, the relevant achievements never appear in the prejacents of abilities exercised in achievement; there are no abilities to succeed. I draw out some general lessons for the philosophy of abilities.
ABSTRACT Most people are suspicious of conspiracy theories. The claims that water fluoridation is mass poisoning, that the UN deliberately released the COVID‐19 virus, and that George Bush was responsible for 9/11 are, to many of us, obviously absurd. Nevertheless, it has proven surprisingly difficult to explain why we should be suspicious of conspiracy theories as a class , in any general way. In this article, I present a solution to this problem. I identify a general feature of conspiracy theories and argue that this feature makes it impossible for high credences regarding conspiracy theories to be rationally justified. More specifically, I argue that conspiracy theories are claims that, if true, imply that certain skeptical‐hypothesis‐like claims “cover‐up claims” are extremely likely to be true. As a consequence, if we think that high credences regarding skeptical hypotheses cannot be rationally justified, we should also think that high credences regarding conspiracy theories cannot be justified.
ABSTRACT A morality of recognition maintains that moral norms have their authority in virtue of the ways in which those norms enact an ideal moral relationship. T. M. Scanlon argues that this approach can yield an account of the distinctive force of morality and an attractive account of moral motivation. We find this approach to theorizing about morals extremely promising. However, we argue that Scanlon's own account of it—recognition as justifiability, conceptualized as adherence to principles no one could reasonably reject—cannot deliver what he claims for it. Such justifiability is compatible with indifference to actual people, cannot explain what it is to wrong someone, and cannot accommodate the specific reasons that recognizing another person requires. Developing Scanlon's own analogy between morality and friendship, we argue that mutual recognition instead consists in living in caring solidarity with others as human. This more positive alternative retains the advantages of a morality of recognition while avoiding these concerns with justifiability. We close by addressing three outstanding questions, concerning moral responsibilities toward strangers, the boundaries of moral community, and the relationship between these two moralities of recognition.
ABSTRACT What is the epistemic role of valenced experience in justifying our beliefs about value? According to the perceptual model, valenced experience justifies beliefs about value in much the same way that perceptual experience justifies beliefs about color, shape, and motion. In some cases, the perceptual model generates plausible verdicts: for example, feeling aversion to the painful condition in your foot justifies believing that this painful condition is bad for you without needing any justification itself. In other cases, however, the perceptual model is implausible: feeling moral admiration towards an act of wanton cruelty cannot justify believing that the act is morally admirable, as this moral emotion is itself unjustified. There is a puzzling asymmetry here that needs to be explained. Why do some valenced feelings justify beliefs about value without needing any justification, whereas others need to be justified in the same way as our evaluative beliefs? We cannot solve this puzzle just by restricting the perceptual model, as this fails to explain why it applies in some cases but not others. Instead, I explain the puzzling asymmetry by combining an inferential model of the epistemology of value with plausible assumptions about the metaphysics of value.
