In response to the unprecedented environmental pressures on the Arctic marine cryosphere, sea ice geoengineering (SIGE) has recently emerged as a potential strategy to restore the Arctic marine environment. The restoration of the environment has been affirmed by international courts as part of states' due diligence obligations or as a form of reparation deriving from state responsibility. Yet, technological interventions in the Arctic marine cryosphere can be perceived as efforts to expand exploitative uses of ocean spaces, which could result in profound socio-ecological consequences. Against this background, this article investigates whether SIGE could legally qualify as a measure to restore the Arctic marine environment. To do so, this article employs the theoretical lens of cryopolitics, which explores the governance and manipulation of frozen environments via various means. In the context of sea ice restoration, this article observes that international law operates as a conduit for cryopolitics to unfold icewards, providing the legal obligation for states to restore the Arctic marine cryosphere. At the same time, international law holds the potential to act as a resistive force against cryopolitics by constraining the boundless expansion of climate interventions, as it arguably disqualifies SIGE from being considered a restoration measure in its current state of development. Even with future technological advancements towards the feasibility of SIGE, this article showcases that the potential of geoengineering to restore the Arctic marine cryosphere is limited by international law, owing to scientific uncertainty regarding its impacts and the application of the precautionary approach.
Article 11(7) of the BBNJ Agreement provides that activities with respect to marine genetic resources and digital sequence information on marine genetic resources of areas beyond national jurisdiction "shall be carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes." However, it is unclear what "peaceful purposes" in Article 11(7) means and referring to UNCLOS, as required under Article 5(1) of the BBNJ Agreement, does not provide clarity as there are similar uncertainties surrounding the meaning of "peaceful purposes" in UNCLOS. In light of these uncertainties, this article attempts to first, interpret the meaning of "peaceful purposes" in Article 11(7) of the BBNJ Agreement; and second, consider how the interpretation of Article 11(7) allows rethinking of the principle of "peaceful purposes" and informs the meaning of "peaceful purposes" in UNCLOS.
Coastal ecosystems are affected by pressures from both land and sea. Ensuring good ecosystem conditions therefore requires ecosystem-based management (EBM) that addresses pressures at their source, regardless of where they originate. The EU Water Framework Directive and Marine Strategy Framework Directive both employ EBM approaches. Yet despite their complementary aims, they fall short of enabling holistic source-to-sea management. Incoherences in scope, scale, and legal force hinder achieving their environmental objectives, while sectoral economic policies often prevail. Case studies from Norway, Finland, and France illustrate varied national responses to these design challenges in EU law. Despite their efforts, none of the cases achieved good coastal water quality. Revisions of EU legislation and policy are needed. Coherence in objectives and measures should be strengthened across the Directives, enabling clearer and better coordinated roles; procedural alignment should reduce duplication and enhance synergies; and stronger legal and financial steering is needed to influence sectoral policies.
A popular misconception holds that piracy is a crime confined to the high seas. However, Article 101(a)(ii) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) also regulates an act that fulfills the common requirements of piracy and is committed in "a place outside the jurisdiction of any state" as an act of piracy. Furthermore, for this type of piracy, the well-known two-ship requirement does not apply. These two differences from common piracy have paved the way for the development of views supporting the applicability of this distinct and hitherto largely neglected form of piracy to actions damaging submarine cables and pipelines in areas beyond territorial sovereignty. In this article, it is put forward that in order to apply Article 101(a)(ii) of UNCLOS in line with its teleological and historical interpretation, the act should be carried out in a place that could be defined as terra nullius. In this regard, since piracy on the high seas already has an established legal framework in Article 101(a)(i), it cannot be considered as "a place outside the jurisdiction of any state", meaning that Article 101(a)(ii) cannot be applied to such unlawful acts on the high seas.
