
Abstract This paper studies whether participation in global value chains (GVCs) is associated with smaller productivity costs of economic sanctions. Using a panel of 111 countries over 1990–2018, we estimate fixed-effects and stacked event-study models linking total factor productivity (TFP) to sanctions exposure and GVC participation. The results show that sanctions are negatively associated with TFP only when measured along the intensive margin, using the number of sanctions received. The interaction between sanctions intensity and GVC participation is positive and significant, consistent with a buffering role of GVC integration against the productivity costs of more severe sanctions regimes.
Abstract Full-scale armed aggression against Ukraine has caused extensive destruction of social infrastructure in de-occupied territories, which, given limited funding and high security risks, has highlighted the need for effective tools for the initial screening of investment projects. The aim of the study was to develop a tool for the rapid assessment of the viability of investment proposals based on a composite indicator that takes into account security threats, social needs and the acceptable unit cost relative to the benchmark of reconstruction projects. The study was based on a comprehensive approach utilising methods of descriptive statistics, comparative analysis, mathematical modelling and multi-criteria analysis. It was found that only 10.6 % of local authorities from the official list of affected areas had approved recovery plans as of early 2025, and none of the analysed plans fully utilised the project prioritisation methodology. A multiplicative feasibility index has been developed, calculated as the product of a security coefficient, a current-utilisation indicator and an economic coefficien. For the Slatyn Lyceum, a feasibility index of 0.3 was calculated, reflecting the impact of security risks due to the facility’s location in a potential combat zone, despite high social need and unit-cost reasonableness; this result was consistent with the actual postponement of works. For the pre-school education facility in Voznesensk, an index of 0.4 was obtained due to low current utilisation despite a safe location and economic efficiency, which was broadly consistent with the project’s non-implementation due to the absence of an acute social need. In contrast, an index of 0.7 was calculated for the Irpin Lyceum, reflecting an optimal combination of all three factors and corresponding to the successful implementation of the project. The practical significance lies in the creation of a standardised tool for the initial screening of investment proposals for local authorities, regulatory bodies and international donors, which could potentially be integrated into the state digital ecosystem for recovery management after additional testing of administrative usability, interoperability with DREAM and performance across a wider project portfolio, to support rather than automate project selection and to inform, rather than determine, the allocation of limited public resources.
Abstract The decline of war question has generated sustained debate, with global analyses reaching conflicting conclusions. We argue that framing matters: a comparative regional perspective finds substantial evidence of decline in some parts of the world even as bellicosity has held steady or increased elsewhere. Using Lyall’s Project Mars data on conventional war from 1800 to 2011, we test for changes in participation rates across eight world regions at a 1950 break point, using methods that account for overdispersion in annual counts. Participations are assigned to the belligerent’s home region rather than to the location of the fighting, so we measure who has been fighting rather than where. Europe, Latin America and East and Southeast Asia decline significantly; the Middle East and North Africa increases; four regions return nulls. The global decline is attributable to European belligerents: excluding them, it is not significant in any specification. This is not the familiar observation that Europe has been peaceful since 1945: European states have also cut their participation in conventional war outside Europe by roughly 80 percent, a decline more securely established than the near-disappearance of fighting on European soil. Two limits qualify these findings. Outside Europe no region has the statistical power to detect a 30 percent change, so our nulls are undetermined rather than evidence of stability. And three regional verdicts turn on a disputed coding question: whether a group of civil wars omitted from Project Mars, which critics say belong in it, count as conventional warfare.
Abstract In the context of increasing global geopolitical instability, this study examines the association between worldwide armed conflict exposure and household energy market outcomes in Europe. Using annual panel data for 29 European countries over 1995–2021, household energy supply and demand are estimated within a two-stage dynamic panel framework employing the Difference Generalized Method of Moments estimator. Global armed conflict exposure is measured as the annual count of armed conflicts worldwide, serving as a common external conflict exposure metric for European energy markets. The results indicate that higher global conflict exposure is negatively and statistically significantly associated with household energy supply. Consequently, an equilibrium displacement model translates these market responses into consumer welfare effects. In the short term, assuming a one-year dynamic adjustment, each additional armed conflict worldwide is associated with a consumer surplus loss of approximately EUR 11.1 million for a representative European country, with cumulative panel losses reaching approximately EUR 31 billion by 2021.
Abstract This article reconceptualizes military expenditure as a macro-financial commitment rather than as an isolated annual budgetary outlay. Using a balanced annual panel of 25 countries over 2005–2021, it examines how the defense burden is linked to price dynamics, real exchange-rate conditions, and import dependence. The empirical strategy explicitly accounts for cross-sectional dependence and combines Dumitrescu–Hurlin predictive information-flow tests, CIPS/PANIC unit-root diagnostics, benchmark and bootstrap cointegration checks, a system-based Vector Error Correction Model, generalized impulse responses, variance decompositions, and CCE-type robustness checks. The results indicate that exchange-rate and import-capacity conditions contain predictive information for the defense burden, while military expenditure contains predictive information for the consumer price level. Cross-sectional dependence is pervasive, and the long-run evidence becomes more cautious once common factors are considered: Johansen diagnostics support one system-based relation, whereas Westerlund bootstrap tests do not reject the null of no cointegration. The VECM is therefore interpreted as evidence of dynamic adjustment rather than definitive proof of cross-sectionally robust panel cointegration. The defense-burden equation displays weak short-run self-correction, consistent with the fiscal rigidity of procurement, personnel, and maintenance commitments. Adjustment appears more visible through price, exchange-rate, and import-capacity channels. CCE-type robustness checks preserve the relevance of price dynamics and import dependence. The findings suggest that defense sustainability should not be evaluated solely through the military-expenditure-to-GDP ratio. Imported content, foreign-currency exposure, procurement timing, maintenance dependence, and price-level pressures should also be incorporated into a macro-financial risk framework.