This article examines oblast-level electoral competition in Ukraine between 2010 and 2020 during decentralization reform. Using an adapted Vanhanen Index combining contestation against the national ruling party or governing coalition with electoral turnout, and applying linear mixed-effects modeling to an original regional dataset, the study identifies a nonlinear trajectory. The index declined significantly in 2015 relative to 2010 and recovered only partially by 2020. Regional variation also compressed sharply in 2015 and partly reemerged in 2020. The findings suggest that oblast level electoral dynamics reflected incomplete decentralization, changing national ruling-party dynamics, party-system realignment, war, and regional legacies.
Azerbaijan, with its hegemonic ideological control, is an intriguing case for considering the impact of reform discourse, particularly within the context of authoritarian modernization. As there are similar proto-regimes in Russia's neighborhood, this study provides an opportunity to learn about the types of modernization that are being copied from the largest neighbor, which is constructing an image of modernization and competence for domestic audiences as well as for external observers. Given that politics in Azerbaijan exhibits personalism in the highest form - lacking strong organizational cohesion and cooperative government - its reform policies are ultimately prone to failure.
After 1991, the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and the Kremlin agreed to reestablish cordial relations while mutually committing not to interfere in each other's affairs. This model of church-state relations - referred to as symphonia - appears to be outdated under Patriarch Kirill. Drawing on the two priorities articulated by Kirill upon his election in 2009, this paper argues that the ROC has successfully penetrated the political sphere. It therefore proposes replacing the old church-state symphonia with the concept of kirillism, which more accurately captures the church's growing influence over Russian politics.
This article examines how anti-establishment parties contest Germany's Zeitenwende. It codes 184 excerpts from Bundestag debates during the twentieth legislative term (2022-2024) and reads them alongside survey evidence on eastern German political culture. Drawing on discursive institutionalism, Feldman's value-based identity theory, and ideational power, it finds that mainstream parties justify support for Ukraine through moral obligation, deterrence, and European solidarity, whereas the AfD, the Left, and BSW mobilize pacifism, economic victimhood, fear of escalation, and accommodation of Russia. Parliamentary actors thereby keep East German identity anchors politically salient, normalizing alternatives to the national consensus.
