Contrary to the dominant literature on autocracies, this article argues and demonstrates that dictators, in addition to being office-seeking, often are driven by policy-seeking motivation-that is, broader beliefs and ideology. The empirical investigation enlists new original data, based on obituaries, about dictators' political motives. The dataset contains information on 297 deceased dictators who held power at some point during the period 1945-2008. The results reveal that the dictators had a variety of different motives for being in power. Many were strongly ideologically motivated, several were primarily motivated by money and power ambitions, and others held power to create stability and democratize. Thus, dictators' motives seem to be substantially more diverse than typically assumed, and the data make it possible to measure motivation. This is key to investigating the direct as well as the conditional impact on political dynamics in autocracies.
German federal elections have long drawn international attention due to the country’s economic influence and its pivotal role in the European Union. Over time, forecasting these elections has evolved into a sophisticated discipline, incorporating diverse models and refined methodologies to improve accuracy. Since 2013, PS: Political Science & Politics has played a key role in tracking these developments by publishing three special symposia dedicated to forecasting German elections (Jérôme 2013, 2017; Jérôme and Graefe 2022). This 2025 symposium marks the fourth installment, continuing a tradition of providing scholars with a platform to share insights and reflect on the field’s ongoing expansion.
Using a rolling cross-section survey of 54,000 voters conducted between mid-October and mid-December, a panel survey of 6,000 voters interviewed in both October and December, and surveys of 1,400 local political elites and officials conducted in both October and December, this study characterizes how confidence in the accuracy of national elections changed with the projected election of President Trump on Election Day. Among voters, Republican confidence immediately increased by 31 percentage points (123% change) and Democrats' confidence declined by 12 percentage points (16% change) such that the confidence among partisan voters was almost identical by mid-December. The most polarized partisans exhibited the largest confidence changes. Among local political elites, the increase in Republicans' confidence mirrored the increase among Republican voters (106% change), but the confidence among Democratic political elites remained high throughout. These findings highlight troubling concerns for sustaining a shared confidence in the accuracy and legitimacy of future elections.
This article analyzes how Poland's Law and Justice (PiS) weaponized migration anxiety as a populist strategy during the 2023 general elections. Using a comparative qualitative case-study approach (George and Bennett 2005), the article examines how PiS leveraged anti-immigration rhetoric to mobilize voters, deepen social polarization, and legitimize its governance. The study draws comparisons with Hungary's 2016 referendum on European Union (EU) refugee quotas to explore how populist governments in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) use fear-based narratives to consolidate power. It also demonstrates how PiS emulated Viktor Orb & aacute;n's 2022 strategy of holding a referendum alongside parliamentary elections to retain power. The study finds that PiS framed migration as an existential threat, using the referendum as a tool to divert attention from democratic backsliding. This strategy mirrored Orb & aacute;n's use of anti-immigration campaigns to strengthen his electoral support and resist EU pressures. By expanding on the concept of "populist polarizing referendum," the study contributes to research on populist electoral strategies, institutional manipulation, and the role of migration-related fear in political mobilization. It highlights the broader implications of such tactics for democracy and governance in the CEE region, demonstrating how populist leaders instrumentalize migration crises to sustain electoral dominance.
This article examines the pedagogical challenges and opportunities of teaching the Israeli-Palestinian conflict amid rising global polarization and campus tensions. We report on a cross-institutional course taught concurrently at Middlebury College (United States) and Yeditepe University (Turkey) after October 7 that was designed to address affective polarization and dehumanization through dialogic education. Drawing on mixed methods including pre- and post-semester surveys, student reflections, and podcast projects, we assess the impact of dialogic practices such as structured dialogue, active listening, and engagement with Israeli and Palestinian peace activists. Our findings indicate that dialogic classrooms (1) deepen historical and analytical understanding of the conflict, (2) foster empathy and curiosity, (3) mitigate polarization even in politically divided contexts, and (4) humanize opposing perspectives without erasing convictions. These results underscore the value of dialogic pedagogy for teaching contentious topics across sociopolitical boundaries and suggest its adaptability to other polarizing issues in political science.
