This article details the unique, for Australia, oversight of oversight arrangements in place in Victoria centred around Integrity Oversight Victoria (IOV). The advantages stemming from this centralised model are discussed, particularly consistency of treatment across a broad range of oversighted agencies. How independence is balanced with accountability is explored as well as the limitation on independence caused by dependence on government for resourcing. Possible alternative arrangements are discussed. The article makes clear that the common thread running through the bodies oversighted by IOV (with one exception) is that they have access to invasive and exceptional powers that consequentially impact fundamental rights and privileges. The powers at the disposal of IOV are detailed as are the controls on their exercise, whether imposed by statute or self-imposed with the clear intention of ensuring that responses to non-compliance are proportionate.
Despite the widespread recognition of anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) as integral to Australia's integrity system, debates have raged about the appropriate powers of these bodies, including their powers to publicly report on their investigations. The recent High Court case of Crime and Corruption Commission (Qld) v Carne, subsequent Holmes independent review and the 2025 Queensland amending legislation have adopted divergent approaches to the public reporting powers of Queensland's ACA. This article develops a framework for analysing the public reporting powers of anti-corruption agencies, proposing a principles-based approach that considers the public interest objectives and collective rights associated with public reporting, and the individual rights involved, particularly the rights to privacy, a fair trial, and procedural fairness. We argue that the collective public interests in reporting should be prioritised over individual rights to privacy and reputation, provided that procedural fairness is accorded to individuals, with the Queensland outcomes holding lessons for other Australian jurisdictions and beyond.
The Robodebt program was a serious failure of public policy and governance. Robodebt occurred and continued by reason of an almost unique, failure of governance. The scheme was eventually brought undone class action, but not before several parts of the framework of administrative accountability failed to reveal the illegal foundation of the scheme. article examines one such failure that has attracted relatively less-the Commonwealth Ombudsman. That office conducted not two inquiries into Robodebt. Both inquiries were heavily criticised Royal Commission into Robodebt, which found that the Ombudsman essentially failed its mission on Robodebt. The article explains why of the Ombudsman deserved strong criticism but also questions whether Ombudsman's contentious action-the failure to publicly question foundation of Robodebt-was a mistake the Ombudsman was entitled make.
Robodebt itself may not be repeated, but large-scale systemic administrative failures will recur. There is no single cure or remedy. Administrative remedies and managerial reforms within the Australian Public Service are welcome, but not always enough. Judicial review is useful, but too easily avoided. The new Administrative Review Tribunal has innovative mechanisms for identifying and reporting on serious issues of administrative significance, but they, too, are not enough. In essence, the government must listen and respond to such reports. The responses need to be no more than words. There is room for legislating a small, incremental reform to tort law, to create an actionable, non-delegable duty of care. Triggered by credible reports of systemic issues (such as those from the ART), the duty would apply only to schemes or services as declared by Ministerial declarations, which would be disallowable instruments. Where reasonable, this would amount to a duty not just to listen, but to repair.
