Abstract This article examines the normative spread of the French model of secularism, following the European Court of Human Rights’ judgment in the case of SAS v. France . It analyses, in particular, the role of key actors in this process, as well as the reasoning employed by the European judges in that judgment. More broadly, it highlights the fragility of the protection afforded to religious minorities in the face of the “security shift” in secularism that is being observed in Europe and which appears to be specific to this continent.
The revival of religion in post-war Yugoslav countries has reshaped the social and legal landscape, raising critical questions about the balance between secularism and religious freedom. In Kosovo, a former UN-administered entity, this dynamic is particularly complex, as the state navigates its commitment to secular governance while ensuring the protection of religious rights. This article argues that Kosovo's legal framework reflects an uneasy reconciliation between secularism and freedom of religion, often resulting in legal ambiguities and social tensions. By analyzing constitutional provisions, court decisions, and policy measures, the article demonstrates how the state's approach oscillates between strict secularism and implicit accommodations of religious influence. The contribution of this article is twofold: first, it provides an empirical analysis of the interaction between legal norms and religious identity in Kosovo, examining how individuals exercise their religious freedoms within a secular constitutional framework; second, it identifies specific legal and institutional barriers that hinder the coexistence of secularism and religious pluralism in a democratizing post-conflict society.
In the West, Catholic religious orders function within liberal political systems, yet are founded on a radically different set of values: they are communitarian rather than individualistic, rely on strong authority, and create total social structures with permanent control of behaviour. As a consequence, it is often charged that the monastic environment is inconsistent with human rights, because of its oppressive disciplinary practices and unacceptable self-deprivation of dignity it entails. Using IDI s conducted in Polish monastic institutions, I provide an empirical account of the extent to which they restrict freedoms and explain how members make sense of their situation. Is the monastery a human rights-exempted, "exterritorial" social space -a kind of Foucauldian heterotopia? Is living there an oppressive or a liberating experience? Sociologically, religious orders, especially contemplative, are total and greedy organizations, seriously restricting members' freedom of movement, correspondence, private property etc. However, the members' self-perception is shaped by different considerations, such as voluntariness of joining and remaining in the organization; striving for supernatural goals to which monastic discipline leads; the considerable political agency they enjoy; and the emancipatory character of monastic life many, especially women report. These accounts suggest that, cases of abuse and violations of basic rights notwithstanding, monasticism as such does not contravene the subjects' interests and, thus, the human-rights critique is not entirely justified.
