Abstract We collect 2,848 instrumental variable (IV) regressions from 391 papers published in top economics and finance journals and show that estimated IV coefficients are often much larger than their OLS counterparts, even when theory suggests they should be smaller. We derive meta-regression estimators that distinguish measurement error bias from omitted variable bias and simultaneity bias; applying our estimators to a set of 1,040 comparable regressions from 139 papers, we find that measurement error shrinks reported coefficients by about two to four times. Measurement error remains quantitatively important even after accounting for weak instruments, publication bias, instrument invalidity, and heterogeneous treatment effects. Our results suggest that measurement error is a severe, pervasive, and understated source of bias in economics and finance.
Abstract We study competition between two payment instruments: bank deposits and digital platform tokens. Using a Hotelling model that integrates the theory of two-sided markets and payment economics, we assess how this competition is affected by a public payment infrastructure that makes private payment instruments interoperable. We show that interoperability, whether implemented as a fast payment system (FPS) or a central bank digital currency (CBDC), may eliminate payment access exclusion and increase trade volumes and social welfare, but at the cost of some disintermediation. When new payment service providers (PSPs) enter and compete for consumers, they soften competition for merchants: incumbent intermediaries then charge merchants higher fees and earn higher profits. This contrasts with entry of PSPs on the merchant side, which disciplines incumbent fees instead.
Abstract What are the consequences of making central bank deposits accessible to actors beyond the banking sector? We collect novel micro data on deposit accounts historically held with the Bank of England by individuals and firms other than banks to study their role in the financial panic of 1866. We document that the use of deposit accounts at the central bank soared during the crisis, while commercial banks permanently lost funding. The expansion in the number of active accounts was fueled by individuals, but the intensive margin increase in balances came almost entirely from firms. Recourse to central bank deposits was heterogeneous and persisted well beyond the panic, reflecting easy access, low opportunity costs, and positive network externalities. At the same time, retail borrowers seeking liquidity support from the Bank during the crisis preferred receiving loan proceeds in the form of cash rather than deposits. JEL Classification: E58, G01, G11, G20, N13, N23
Abstract We study the interaction of expansionary rate-based monetary policy and quantitative easing, despite their concurrent implementation, by exploiting heterogeneous banks and the introduction of negative monetary-policy rates in a fragmented euro area. Quantitative easing increases credit supply less when banks’ funding costs do not decrease simultaneously. Using administrative data from Germany, we uncover that among banks selling their securities, central-bank reserves remain disproportionately with high-deposit banks that are constrained due to sticky customer deposits at the zero lower bound. Affected German banks lend relatively less to firms while increasing their interbank exposure in the euro area.
Abstract Startups face a trade-off between short-term profitability and long-term growth. Their cash flows are said to follow a so-called J-curve. The shape of the curve depends on investors’ financing capacity: their ability to sustain prolonged periods of negative cash flow. US venture capitalists are often believed to have greater financing capacity. We examine a large Swedish dataset with detailed cash flow information. Swedish startups backed by US venture capitalists experience deeper J-curves, with larger short-term losses and higher long-term sales, relative to those backed by non-US venture capitalists. These results are consistent with US venture capitalists having greater financing capacity: they can provide more funding directly and have better access to later-stage investors.
