Abstract We study how fatal and nonfatal health shocks affect households’ ability to meet their financial obligations. We find that fatal shocks substantially increase the likelihood of default and that housing wealth plays a key role as a self-insurance mechanism. Surviving spouses who experience the largest income losses are more likely to sell their homes, and those without housing wealth face a sharply higher risk of debt collection. In the most financially vulnerable families, these shocks even generate intergenerational spillovers. In contrast, nonfatal health shocks lead to only modest increases in default risk. Taken together, our findings suggest that strengthening survivors’ benefits for households with limited resources could improve welfare across generations.
Abstract The sensitivity of the external finance premium to firms’ net-worth-to-capital ratio is central to the strength of the financial accelerator, yet direct firm-level evidence remains scarce. We estimate this elasticity using balance sheet and income statement data for Swiss nonfinancial firms over 1998–2016. To address the endogeneity of net worth, we employ two complementary instrumental variable strategies: one based on firms’ non-operating income and the other a shift-share design that interacts predetermined exposure to financial income with aggregate dividend returns. Mapping the estimated elasticity into the costly state verification framework as implemented by Bernanke et al. (1999) yields structural monitoring costs of about one quarter of firms’ gross return on capital, with estimates ranging from 0.15 to 0.35 across specifications. Our results provide direct firm-level support for the financial accelerator mechanism and imply monitoring costs of the same order of magnitude as the benchmark calibration of Bernanke et al. (1999).
This study estimates analyst-level stickiness in forecast updating and investigates its underlying determinants. Consistent with recent experimental findings on belief updating under cognitive noise, analysts often compress their forecasts toward an intermediate default, such as prior forecasts, when uncertain about forecast precision, leading to forecast stickiness. This tendency is more evident among analysts with characteristics associated with higher cognitive noise, including lower forecast accuracy, limited experience, and complex portfolio coverage, and during periods of heightened macroeconomic uncertainty. A model incorporating sticky updating behavior shows that the consensus revision by sticky analysts exhibits stronger return predictability than the traditional consensus revision by all analysts, with this predictability increasing with the proportion of sticky analysts covering a stock. Empirical evidence supports these predictions. Additionally, the return predictability of sticky revisions is especially pronounced when forecast difficulty is elevated. Analyst-level stickiness provides more information about the cross-section of stock returns than firm-level stickiness.
In over-the-counter markets, dealers facilitate trade by providing liquidity and acting as intermediaries. We use proprietary data on US single-name credit default swap trades and positions to study how dealer intermediation networks shape liquidity. For each reference entity, we reconstruct interdealer and dealer-to-client networks and introduce Shapley value-based measures of dealer and market connectivity. We present a cooperative game framework that links these measures to predictions for the liquidity that dealers provide at both individual and market levels. Empirically, we find that Shapley values are strongly associated with trade volumes, inventory management, execution costs, and bid-ask spreads.
Using the adoption of Zombie Property Laws (ZL) across several US states, we show that requiring lenders to maintain properties in the foreclosure process affects mortgage lending decisions and standards. Difference-in-differences estimations using a state border design show that ZL incentivizes lenders to screen mortgage applications more carefully: they deny more applications and impose higher interest rates on originated loans, especially risky loans. In turn, these loans exhibit higher ex post performance. ZL also affects lender behavior after borrowers become distressed, causing them to strategically keep delinquent mortgages alive. Our findings inform the debate on policy responses to foreclosure crises.
Should banks be transparent during a bail-in? Banks suffering losses may bail-in creditors to optimally allocate resources between early and late withdrawers. However, if losses are private information, then bail-ins may signal asset quality. In the absence of signaling, banks can sell assets at a pooled price, effectively insuring creditors against asset risks. However, when bail-ins signal quality, banks may delay bail-ins and sell assets at higher prices than otherwise, but this incentive can trigger inefficient bank runs. To prevent such runs, banks should choose to be either fully transparent or entirely opaque, ensuring asset quality is not private information.
We show that the transmission of a monetary policy tightening varies in the cross-section of banks when central bank reserves are abundant. Specifically, the net worth of reserve-rich banks may display a boost when the interest rate paid on reserves increases strongly. Focusing on the European Central Bank's 2022 rate hiking cycle, we show that reserve-rich banks' credit supply is less sensitive to the monetary policy tightening compared to other banks. The effect varies in the cross-section of both banks and firms. The results are binding at the firm level, indicating the presence of real effects.
Many initial public offerings (IPOs) are priced at exactly the high-end of the pricing range. Investing in IPOs priced at the high-end leads to first-day returns that are substantially higher than investing in IPOs that are priced just below or above the high-end. We argue that these results are in line with issuing firms settling for positively perceived salient pricing points in negotiations with underwriters.
We exploit unexpected corporate data breaches to study the loss and repair of corporate reputation. Reputation loss decreases equity and brand values, increases customer churn, and prompts more negative media coverage. Firms repair their reputation by increasing their charitable donations and have CSR scores that are more than 0.5 standard deviations higher. They increase political contributions, employee wages, and IT investment. These actions are targeted to stakeholders that are particularly important or in situations that are particularly salient to their stakeholders. We observe similar dynamics of reputation loss and repair following the release of negative news about firms' social behaviors.
We study the impact of ring-fencing on bank riskiness using short-term money markets. Ring-fencing is when the government restricts some banking activities to a subsidiary of the group whilst restricting intra-group transfers. Exploiting confidential data on sterling-denominated repo transactions, we document that banking groups subject to ring-fencing are perceived to be safer-repo investors lend to ring-fenced groups at lower rates-and that the safety perception is amplified during times of market stress. We show that ring-fenced groups also intermediate more cautiously. Our article suggests that structural reforms can create a "safe-haven" bank in the financial system.
Information-theoretic methods recover investors' subjective beliefs by minimizing the statistical discrepancy between beliefs and the data-generating process, subject to assets' Euler constraints. We show that the estimated beliefs converge in probability to their pseudo-true value. Comparing estimators in the Cressie-Read family, we show that the exponential tilting and empirical likelihood estimators produce qualitatively similar estimates of the risk aversion levels and beliefs. The quadratic divergence estimator leads to negative subjective probabilities, implausibly large risk aversion levels, and underestimation of left tail risk. Our results suggest that large institutional investors, like pension funds, have countercyclical beliefs about the market return, while extrapolative investors have procyclical beliefs. Our results offer an alternative explanation of the momentum effect in stock returns, help reconcile procyclical beliefs reported in individual investor surveys versus countercyclical beliefs implied by rational expectations representative agent models, and establish the information-theoretic approach as a powerful methodology for the recovery of beliefs.
This article studies how cash holdings at the onset of the global financial crisis affected the investment behavior of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) after the shock. Using balance sheet data for UK SMEs, we find that cash-rich SMEs maintained their capital stock during the global financial crisis, while cash-poor rivals reduced theirs. This gave cash-rich SMEs an advantage when the economy rebounded, resulting in a persistent investment gap that grew over the recovery period. Competition dynamics, borrowing constraints, and adjustments in cash balances contributed to this amplification effect. The amplification effect was more pronounced for younger and smaller firms and in industries for which credit conditions tightened more. We do not observe a persistent effect of cash in non-crisis periods or for publicly listed firms. Our findings show that when financial constraints tighten after crises, cash holdings are a key determinant of investment by SMEs in the long term.
The Fama-French factors are ubiquitous in empirical finance. We find that factor returns differ substantially depending on when the data were downloaded. A large portion of these retroactive changes appears to be driven by modifications to the factor construction methodology rather than by revisions to the underlying data. Changes to the factors have large effects in two widely studied contexts: mutual fund performance and cross-sectional equity pricing. Model evaluation tests suggest that more recent vintages do not perform better.
We investigate the role of strategic security design in the market for retail investment products. Focusing on a dominant yet understudied design feature, we provide evidence consistent with issuers' strategic increase of product complexity to mitigate price competition. Complexity facilitates product differentiation, thereby impairing investors' ability to compare products. Because more complex products entail greater markups, imply higher tail risk, and are first-order stochastically dominated by simpler products, the empirically observed rise in market complexity increases uncompensated risk-taking, particularly among less sophisticated investors. Overall, our findings indicate that complexity is shaped by issuers' deliberate design choice to preserve product rents.
We utilize the Eurosystem securities lending facilities as a laboratory to investigate the impact of collateral scarcity on market functioning. The reduction of securities lending fees, implemented in November 2020, provides a quasi-natural experiment for our analyses. This policy change results in a surge in the utilization of securities lending facilities, particularly for bonds with limited supply elasticity in the repo market. We find no evidence of substitution effects; instead, the overall activity in the repo market expands through the collateral multiplier. The improved pricing conditions alleviate collateral scarcity and enhance market quality in both the repo and cash markets.
We document widespread use of personal financial advice among retail investors. Individuals seek competent and trusted sources for financial advice among their family and friends. Investors who provide advice to family and friends are positively selected and emphasize the reputational costs of giving risky financial advice. While previous studies have shown that advice shared on social media promotes active trading, we show that personal financial advice encourages investing in funds over single stocks. Our evidence complements the existing literature on financial advice in online social networks by highlighting differences in incentives and outcomes of advice to close personal connections.
Corporate scandals cause employee sentiment to fall sharply and persistently, driven by diminished perceptions of firm culture and management. Workers are not compensated for this loss in job satisfaction, as neither base nor variable pay rise. In fact, employees are six percentage points less likely to receive variable pay and those who do see it decline by an average of 10 percent. We also find suggestive evidence that corporate scandals induce voluntary turnover, particularly for longer-tenured workers. Together, our results demonstrate that rank-and-file employees are not insulated from organizational wrongdoing.
The idea of separating retail and investment banking remains controversial. Exploiting the introduction of UK ring-fencing requirements, we show that this separation has a range of previously undocumented side effects for credit supply, competition, and risk-taking in credit markets not directly targeted by the reform. By redirecting the benefits of deposit funding toward retail activities, ring-fencing incentivises universal banks to expand mortgage lending. This rebalancing reduces the cost of household credit, without eroding lending standards. But it also increases mortgage market concentration, pushes smaller banks toward riskier lending, and is mirrored by a reduction in syndicated loans and credit lines.
