The article examines the evolution of Romanian-Soviet disputes over the interpretation of their shared history in the 1960s–1980s. It demonstrates how historiographical debates surrounding Bessarabia, the “Moldovan nation”, and the role of Russia and the USSR in the Balkans became a significant factor in bilateral relations. Drawing on recently studied archival material from Chișinău (memoranda of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Moldavia and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, KGB records, party reports and ideological summaries) as well as from Moscow, it reconstructs the mechanisms of coordinated action by the Union republics – above all the Moldavian SSR – in shaping an alarmist perception of Bucharest’s policies in Moscow. The article shows how disputes over the interpretation of the Russo-Turkish wars, the incorporation of Bessarabia in 1812, the events of 1918 and 1940–1944, and the very existence of an independent Moldovan nation were transferred into school textbooks, encyclopaedias and works of literature, and became the object of ongoing ideological supervision, censorship and diplomatic démarches (ranging from the withdrawal of Nicolae Iorga’s works to campaigns around the novels of Marin Preda and Dumitru Popescu). Particular attention is paid to the comprehensive plan for an ideological response to Romanian propaganda developed in Chișinău, which envisaged the publication of specialised studies, the revision of curricula and the restriction of Romanian publications. The author argues that it was the persistent initiatives of the leadership of the Moldavian SSR, invoking the threat of the “Bessarabian question”, that largely determined the rigidity of the Soviet line towards Romania. At the same time, with the onset of Perestroika, these contentious historiographical issues were gradually marginalised within the agenda of high-level bilateral contacts.
The article examines the interaction between historians of the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic during the 1970s and 1980s through the prism of the author’s professional biography. From his years of study at Humboldt University in Berlin until the end of the GDR, the author was directly involved in Soviet-East German scholarly exchanges. The article demonstrates that, although the institutional structures of MarxistLeninist historiography formally reported the fulfilment of party directives in the sphere of scholarship, effective cooperation took shape primarily at the grass-roots level – within departments, research groups, and concrete collaborative projects. A central place in the narrative is occupied by the figure of Eduard Winter and the circle of his pupils and associates who turned to the study of Russian history (Peter Hoffmann, Günter Rosenfeld, Erich Donnert, among others). Drawing on the experience of academic conferences, international seminars of university teachers from socialist countries, joint work on university textbooks, and editorial practice at the Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, the article analyses the mechanisms by which research agendas were coordinated, the limits of permissible criticism, and the role of self-censorship. Particular attention is paid to key debates of the late Soviet period, including discussions on the origins of capitalism in Russia, historical alternatives, and the concept of “multistructured” socio-economic development (mnogoukladnost’). Special emphasis is placed on the impact of Perestroika on the professional selfunderstanding of historians. The final episodes – such as the author’s stay in Moscow and Leningrad in the spring of 1989, encounters with Soviet colleagues, and public revelations of Stalinist terror – mark a turning point in the intellectual climate and the dissolution of the previous model of scholarly exchange. At the same time, the article highlights the continuity of personal networks and collaborative projects beyond 1990.
The relations between Russia and Poland were historically very close and often conflict. After World War II this made it important to develop a coordinated Soviet-Polish memory policy aimed at strengthening friendly ties. The leadership of both countries emphasized the unifying moments between them in the past, especially the struggle against common enemies. The article examines the development of cooperation of historians from the mid-1940s to the end of the 1980s. 1956 and 1980 are highlighted as turning points. Among the forms of interaction of scholars, discussion of the works, publication of multi-volume documentary series, and dialogue on the platforms of bilateral commissions were of particular significance. The coordinated memory policy defined thematic priorities, forbidden zones, correct Marxist interpretations, and the composition of participants of common projects. Official version of Polish history combined a patriotic narrative with the recognition of the legitimacy of the socialist choice. The interaction between historians was not limited to the implementation of the dictates of the Soviet side. Despite obvious distortions of the past, the coordinated policy brought valuable scientific results. It did not solve its political super-task, but the experience of cooperation was important for continuing professional contacts in the postsocialist period.
This article analyses the image of the Soviet academician Boris Grekov and the reception of his scholarly legacy in Hungarian historiography. The study focuses on the period from the second half of the 1940s to the first half of the 1950s, a time closely associated with the processes of Sovietization. Special attention is paid to Grekov’s visit to Budapest and Debrecen between 5 and 17 November 1948, his public lectures, and his meetings with Hungarian scholars as well as political and public figures. For the first time, a body of documents from Hungarian and Russian archives has been introduced into scholarly circulation, making it possible to reconstruct the hidden infrastructure of the visit, including its institutional, political, and organisational dimensions. A separate group of sources consists of materials from the Hungarian press, which allow the author to trace the rhetorical strategies used to construct Grekov’s public image as a “world-renowned historian” and an “exemplary Marxist-Leninist”, as well as the ways in which his scholarly theses were politicised (anti-Normanism, “Russian feudalism”, the “second edition of serfdom”). At the same time, the study reveals the limited long-term impact of this symbolic campaign. A comparison of press enthusiasm, official assessments, and subsequent historiographical practice shows that the image of Grekov, artificially constructed in the late 1940s and early 1950s, failed to take root in Hungarian historical scholarship. In the 1960s–1980s, direct references to his ideas and concepts were rarely found in Hungarian historiography. In this way, the article contributes to the study of the mechanisms and evolution of Soviet intellectual expansion in Eastern Europe, to a better understanding of the relationship between propaganda objectives and academic practices and to an assessment of the limits of the transfer of scholarly models within the socialist bloc.
Regularly held international congresses of historical sciences regularly become venues for discussions among historians not only of different national schools but also of diverse ideological and political persuasions. The peculiarity of the 15th congress, held in Romania in the summer of 1980, lay in the fact that the well-prepared delegation of the congress hosts, tasked by the Ceaușescu regime with presenting to the global professional community the official Romanian view of the history of Romanians’ relations with their closest neighbors, faced resistance from equally well-prepared opponents from other countries. The discussions took place against the backdrop of Romania’s very complex relations with the USSR and some other Eastern Bloc partners, and the ever-increasing personality cult of Ceauşescu, the maintenance and strengthening of which required the active use of historical arguments. Archival sources introduced into scholarly circulation make it possible to trace the shift in the Soviet side’s tactics in disputes with the Romanians on historical topics, which inevitably acquired political overtones: from the dominant approach until the late 1970s of not demonstrating publicly disagreements with representatives of an allied country to a readiness to rebuff those concepts that were based on the desire to justify Romania’s historical rights to territories that were part of the USSR.
