Abstract We use the concept of causal dynamic systems to define causal transition models and demonstrate how they meet the requirements for a reductive theory of causality. Highlights include a graphical analysis of common causal counterexamples including resolving current cases of isomorphic causal models. We also address their relationship to major schools of causality – Counterfactual Theory, Manipulationist/Interventionist Theory, and Mechanism accounts of causality.
Abstract Ambivalence is a state in which a subject simultaneously holds two contradictory statements as true. It is commonly experienced in eating disorders and can become an obstacle to recovery. Early recognition and behavioral changes are crucial for recovery. However, making lasting changes is easier said than done, and ambivalence can intensify these challenges. That is why it is crucial to explore and develop new perspectives on how ambivalence could support the recovery from eating disorders. While there is a substantial body of research on ambivalence in the context of eating disorders, it lacks a philosophical approach that could complement existing frameworks by analyzing how interactions with artifacts constitute ambivalence and facilitate recovery. In this paper I will employ postphenomenology to investigate how ambivalence, as a technologically mediated phenomenon, opens a possibility for recovery.
Abstract This study argues that there is an internal inconsistency in Badiou’s treatment of art, particularly in how he applies his ontological investigations to literary works. This inconsistency complicates the use of a literary theory derived from his philosophy. By examining Badiou’s encounters with specific literary works, we reveal two distinct yet unexamined descriptions of artistic truth that coexist within his writings. Understanding these dualities allows us to explore how Badiou’s concept of ‘truths’ transcends both temporal and local knowledge systems – such as postmodernism – which may be influential for a time but ultimately fade. The very inconsistency within Badiou’s framework is a strength, as it opens the possibility for two distinct ontological modes of reading literature. This approach broadens the potential for declaring universal ‘truths’ that are both ‘singular’ and ‘immanent’, while applicable to both an infinite “configuration” of literary works and a finite individual work as “pertinent units” of literary criticism. This inconsistency not only helps to challenge and blur the clichéd boundaries between literary schools and epochs but also infuses literary theory – drawn from Badiou’s philosophy – with an anti-identitarian, trans-linguistic, trans-historical, and trans-topological resonance.
Abstract This article develops an epistemological and representational analysis of theoretical particle-like constructs in modern physics, using a triad-structured framework that distinguishes between referential grounding (Base), symbolic representation (Representation), and procedural-institutional linkage (Linkage). While virtual particles in quantum field theory and condensed matter serve as our primary case study, we extend our analysis to encompass the so-called quasiparticles, e.g., Bloch electrons, phonons, plasmons, and excitations renormalized by Cooper pairing in Bardeen–Cooper–Schrieffer (BCS) superconductors. Rather than interpreting these constructs as either ontically real entities or mere calculational fictions, we conceptualize them as epistemic-mediating constructs embedded within the representational infrastructure of their respective physical theories. Our comparative analysis demonstrates that the scientific effectiveness of such constructs derives from their functional integration into modeling practices, computational techniques, and community standards, rather than from strong ontic commitments. By situating our investigation within contemporary debates on scientific representation and model-based reasoning, this paper contributes to a broader epistemology of theoretical entities across different domains of physics.
Abstract This review compares two recent books, One True Logic: A Monist Manifesto, by Owen Griffiths and A. C. Paseau; and Essay on the Principles of Logic: A Defense of Logical Monism, by Michael Wolff, both professing to be defenses of logical monism. Logical pluralism is the view that differing systems of logic may be equally defensible, even though they differ on which arguments should be judged valid; logical monism is the view that only one logic is ultimately “correct.” Despite their shared conclusions, the two books reach that conclusion in strikingly different ways. The review is critical of One True Logic for dismissing “non-classical” logics out of hand, as if it were a foregone conclusion that the one correct logic is truth functional. That book is also criticized for giving specious arguments against logical pluralism. The review praises Essay on the Principles of Logic for having a more satisfactory approach. That book begins by distilling out what Kant would call a canon of pure logic. It then shows that the various logics motivating the argument for pluralism (including truth functional logic) can be explained as special applications (organons) subsumed under that broadly general canon.
