Detractors of relational value contend the concept is incoherent, unnecessary, and misleading. This article argues relational value can be conceptualized coherently and has a distinct role to play in the articulation of non-intrinsic and also non-instrumental ways that natural entities, and relationships with them, matter to people. The article builds upon Deplazes-Zemp and Chapman's (2021) account of relational value to advance a new taxonomy of environmental values, from which relational value can be coherently characterized and differentiated from other extrinsic values. The concept is defended from recent claims that it is incoherent, misleading, and redundant. The article closes with a discussion of an example, the OjibweBad River relationship, to demonstrate relational and constitutive values, taken together, can complement each other in analyses of how nature matters to people.
How should a liberal society respond to urgent ecological crises without compromising its core commitments to legitimacy and justice? This paper develops a philosophical framework for adjudicating environmental conflicts by clarifying the often-overlooked distinction between justice and legitimacy in environmental governance. It argues fully endorsing any single environmental vision (e.g., ecomodernism, restraint-oriented environmentalism, the subsistence perspective) as society's singular goal is incompatible with liberal principles. Instead, it defends a pluralist approach, which is grounded in public reason and the protection of vital interests, while remaining open to a range of environmental visions. By categorizing conflicts as involving vital versus non-vital interests, competing vital claims, or competing non-vital claims, the framework offers practical guidance for how liberal eco-states can navigate deep environmental disagreements without betraying their foundational ideals.
The anthology Plant Ethics includes arguments whose conclusion is plants deserve moral consideration. Accepting these arguments, this paper explores how we should think about weeds and the actions and attitudes of gardeners as they pursue the standard practice of weeding. The paper explores four options for dealing with the problem of weeds: 1) gardeners are morally wrong in their pursuit of the standard practice of weeding, 2) weeds are harmful plants and so are not protected by the framing arguments, 3) gardens are not nature (or not fully nature) and the framing arguments only apply to plants in non-gardened nature, and 4) gardens have purposes that necessitate the practice of weeding, and if there are occasions where we are justified in killing plants-say, for eating-then weeding in the service of maintaining a garden's purpose(s), and thereby its value, also may be justified.
