
In this paper, I clarify how the ‘quality’ of judgments of taste affects the emergence of the aesthetic experience in every human mind and its ‘deduction’ as problematized in §38 of the Third Critique. I argue that the representation of the beautiful is relational by nature, i.e., the result of the relationship between the harmony of cognitive faculties, on the one hand, and the representation of an object derived from ‘observation,’ on the other hand. The human mind is ‘able’ to ‘derive’ the representation of the beautiful only from the latter relation. To clarify my standpoint, I argue that Hannah Ginsborg’s ‘One Act-View’ is a more plausible reading than Guyer’s ‘Two Acts-View’ among contemporary scholars because it reinforces the latter inference. However, by addressing Ginsborg’s ‘perceptual normativity’ and her ‘correlation’ of spontaneous and empirical ‘self’ in the First and Third Critique, I argue that the latter side issues, although very insightful, are inconsistent with the relational nature of the product of judgments of taste.