This paper examines how Ecuador can develop a sustainable space ecosystem under limited institutional, fiscal, and technological autonomy. Rather than treating space development as a linear progression toward launch or full satellite sovereignty, the study combines a historically grounded Ecuador capability baseline with established space-power and technology-development frameworks and a transparent, literature-derived pathway-screening method. The revised baseline shows a dual structure: a long public-sector lineage in remote sensing and geoinformation through CLIRSEN, the Ecuadorian Space Institute (IEE), and the Military Geographic Institute (IGM), alongside non-state engineering capabilities demonstrated by the Ecuadorian Civilian Space Agency (EXA), including nanosatellite missions and small-satellite subsystem development. Nevertheless, Ecuador lacks a sustained national space program, independent launch capability, and full-mission industrial autonomy. A regional benchmark using verifiable criteria confirms that Ecuador is best characterized as a limited-capability, low-autonomy actor with meaningful user-segment and niche subsystem capabilities. A structured qualitative multi-criteria screening then evaluates alternative development pathways in terms of capability fit, public value, autonomy effects, capital and scale requirements, and opportunities for networked cooperation. The analysis identifies Earth-observation and data-service applications in agriculture, environmental monitoring, and maritime domain awareness as near-term priorities, while treating upstream manufacturing and launch as conditional, longer-term options. The resulting policy recommendations emphasize institutional coordination, resource sharing, ground and data infrastructure, targeted human capital, and demand-led public-private cooperation.
This article examines NATO's evolving approach to space security in the context of renewed great-power competition. It argues that Russia's counterspace posture, along with the space and counterspace dynamics surrounding the war in Ukraine, has served as an immediate operational catalyst, accelerating NATO's efforts to integrate space into planning, exercises, and multi-domain operations. However, the longer-term institutionalization of NATO's space policy–particularly its focus on resilience, interoperability, and coordination with commercial and national providers–is more consistently explained by allied perceptions of China as a long-term structural competitor with expanding capabilities and growing global influence. Drawing on constructivist insights into norms, identity, and practice, the article demonstrates how NATO's policy statements and emerging coordination mechanisms shape shared threat perceptions, even as they remain constrained by the Alliance's institutional authorities and its reliance on national and commercial space assets. The paper concludes that NATO's governance effects are primarily indirect, shaping allied narratives and coordination without determining global space rules, which continue to be driven mainly by states and multilateral processes.
Space mining is increasingly an area of intense competition between firms and nations. It is also an industry that relies on scientific knowledge of asteroids. Knowledge generated through scientific research of asteroids can contribute to the future competitive advantage of firms and hegemony of nations seeking to secure leadership in the space mining sector. This makes scientific knowledge of asteroids valuable to market participants, conferring an advantage for them when accessed in a privileged form. We discuss the implications for policy and research of scientific efforts to learn more about asteroids given heightened geo-political tensions and polarizing national interests on Earth. At the core of this is a moral tension between greater global openness in the interests of Mertonian science and greater secrecy in the interests of nations that fund scientific capabilities.
The growing dependence on space infrastructure for global communication, navigation and defence has made it a critical target for cyber threats. This paper explores strategies to enhance cyber resilience in space systems by examining the critical intersection between space infrastructure and cybersecurity and proposes an improved space systems design approach that is more cognisant of the growing threat landscape. Drawing on two rounds of structured interviews with space designers, this research highlights the security risks exacerbated by governance challenges and uncertain legal protections for space systems, while examining how cyber resilience strategies can be employed to mitigate those risks. The study emphasises that there is a need to align legal standards and technical practices, because of the increasing potential of cyber threats that target satellites, ground stations, and communication links. By identifying key themes such as integration and adaptability, this paper provides insights into how legal protection, standards and technical measures can work together to protect critical space assets. These findings underscore the urgent requirement for robust, interdisciplinary solutions that bridge the gap between existing engineering approaches and the emerging cybersecurity landscape in space operations. The proposed new cyber resilience strategy for safeguarding space infrastructure is novel and significant in an era of increasing reliance on these essential systems.
