According to the Standard Model of particle physics, some gauge transformations are physical symmetries. That is, they are mathematical transformations that relate representatives of distinct physical states of affairs. This is at odds with the standard philosophical position according to which gauge transformations are an eliminable redundancy in a gauge theory's representational framework. In this paper I defend the Standard Model's treatment of gauge from an objection due to Richard Healey. If we follow the Standard Model in taking some gauge transformations to be physical symmetries then we face the “strong CP problem”, but if we adopt the standard philosophical position on gauge then the strong CP problem dissolves. Healey offers this as a reason in favor of the standard philosophical view. However, as I argue here, following Healey's recommendation gives a theory that makes bad empirical predictions.
Stein has characterized one of the central problems in accounting for our knowledge in physics as that of getting the laboratory, or observatory, inside the theory - that is, of understanding how the mathematical structures of fundamental physical theories have empirical content. He has argued that physicists respond to this problem by giving schematic representations of observers and experiments. In addition, Stein emphasizes the importance of regarding knowledge as an enterprise, with current theories providing guidance for future inquiry. I will explore some ramifications of this way of thinking about the structure of scientific theories for contemporary cosmology. One goal of observational cosmology is to measure the six basic parameters appearing in the standard model of cosmology. These parameters are well-defined if the universe is suitably approximated at some scale by a perturbed FLRW model. The enormous extrapolations involved in the standard model are often justified by the consistent determination of these parameters via a variety of methods. Here I will consider two recent debates regarding this approach to cosmology, inspired by Stein's work. The first debate regards the impact of different ways of characterizing the propagation of light through a cosmological spacetime on the determination of cosmological parameters (such as H-0). The second regards how the highly symmetric FLRW models relate to describing the real universe, at small scales where it is very lumpy. (C) 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
The concept of indistinguishable particles in quantum theory is fundamental to questions of ontology. All ordinary matter is made of electrons, protons, neutrons, and photons and they are all indistinguishable particles. Yet the concept itself has proved elusive, in part because of the interpretational difficulties that afflict quantum theory quite generally, and in part because the concept was so central to the discovery of the quantum itself, by Planck in 1900; it came encumbered with revolution. I offer a deflationary reading of the concept 'indistinguishable' that is identical to Gibbs' concept 'generic phase', save that it is defined for state spaces with only finitely-many states of bounded volume and energy (finitely-many orthogonal states, in quantum mechanics). That, and that alone, makes for the difference between the quantum and Gibbsean concepts of indistinguishability. This claim is heretical on several counts, but here we consider only the content of the claim itself, and its bearing on the early history of quantum theory rather than in relation to contemporary debates about particle indistinguishability and permutation symmetry. It powerfully illuminates that history. (C) 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
It is standardly claimed in loop quantum gravity (LQG) that spacetime both disappears, fundamentally, and emerges from spin-networks in the low energy regime. In this paper, I critically explore these claims and develop a variety of substantival and relational interpretations of LQG for which these claims are false. According to most of the interpretations I consider, including the "received interpretation", it is in fact false that spacetime emerges from spin-networks. In the process of supporting these claims, I also explain why spacetime is thought to be missing from the theory's fundamental ontology and demonstrate how this conclusion depends on our interpretation of the theory. In fact, I will argue that for a variety of interpretations spacetime survives quantization just as the electromagnetic field survives quantization. The upshot of the following analysis is a much needed clarification of the ontology of LQG and how it relates, or fails to relate, to the spacetime of general relativity.
This paper engages with the following closely related questions that have recently received some attention in the literature: (a) what is the status of the equivalence principle in general relativity (GR)?; (b) how does the metric field obtain its property of being able to act as a metric?; and (c) is the metric of GR derivative on the dynamics of the matter fields? The paper attempts to complement these debates by studying the spin-2 approach to (quantum) gravity. In particular, the paper argues that three lessons can be drawn from the spin-2 approach: (1) different from what is sometimes claimed in the literature, central aspects of the non-linear theory of GR are already derivable in classical spin-2 theory; in particular, 'universal coupling' can be considered a derived 'theorem' in both the classical and the quantum spin-2 approach; this provides new insights for the investigation of the equivalence principle; (2) the 'second miracle' that Read et al. argue characterises GR is explained in the classical as well as in the quantum version of the spin-2 approach; (3) the spin-2 approach allows for an ontological reduction of the metrical part of spacetime to the dynamics of matter fields. (C) 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Karl Popper published, in 1968, a paper that allegedly found a flaw in a very influential article of Birkhoff and von Neumann, which pioneered the field of “quantum logic”. Nevertheless, nobody rebutted Popper's criticism in print for several years. This has been called in the historiographical literature an “unsolved historical issue”. Although Popper's proposal turned out to be merely based on misinterpretations and was eventually abandoned by the author himself, this paper aims at providing a resolution to such historical open issues. I show that (i) Popper's paper was just the tip of an iceberg of a much vaster campaign conducted by Popper against quantum logic (which encompassed several more unpublished papers that I retrieved); and (ii) that Popper's paper stimulated a heated debate that remained however confined within private correspondence.
This essay considers an interpretation of the AdS/CFT correspondence under which the bulk and the boundary emerge from a more fundamental discrete system that realizes the structure of an erasure-protection quantum error-correcting code (QECC). I consider the extent to which this view underwrites the claim that spacetime is a QECC (as some authors have suggested), and how it fits into recent schemes of realist interpretations of dualities.
The apparent nonlocality of quantum theory has been a persistent concern. Einstein et. al. (1935) and Bell (1964) emphasized the apparent nonlocality arising from entanglement correlations. While some interpretations embrace this nonlocality, modern variations of the Everett-inspired many worlds interpretation try to circumvent it. In this paper, we review Bell's no-go theorem and explain how it rests on three axioms, local causality, no superdeterminism, and one world. Although Bell is often taken to have shown that local causality is ruled out by the experimentally confirrmed entanglement correlations, we make clear that it is the conjunction of the three axioms that is ruled out by these correlations. We then show that by assuming local causality and no superdeterminism, we can give a direct proof of many worlds. The remainder of the paper searches for a consistent, local, formulation of many worlds. We show that prominent formulations whose ontology is given by the wave function violate local causality, and we critically evaluate claims in the literature to the contrary. We ultimately identify a local many worlds interpretation that replaces the wave function with a separable Lorentz-invariant wave-field. We conclude with discussions of the Born rule, and other interpretations of quantum mechanics.
MOND is a paradigm that contends to account for the mass discrepancies in the Universe without invoking ‘dark’ components, such as ‘dark matter’ and ‘dark energy’. It does so by supplanting Newtonian dynamics and General Relativity, departing from them at very low accelerations. Having in mind readers who are historians and philosophers of science, as well as physicists and astronomers, I describe in this review the main aspects of MOND – its statement, its basic tenets, its main predictions, and the tests of these predictions – contrasting it with the dark-matter paradigm. I then discuss possible wider ramifications of MOND, for example the potential significance of the MOND constant, a0, with possible implications for the roots of MOND in cosmology. Along the way I point to parallels with several historical instances of nascent paradigms. In particular, with the emergence of the Copernican world picture, that of quantum physics, and that of relativity, as regards their initial advent, their development, their schematic structure, and their ramifications. For example, the interplay between theories and their corollary laws, and the centrality of a new constant with converging values as deduced from seemingly unrelated manifestations of these laws. I demonstrate how MOND has already unearthed a number of unsuspected laws of galactic dynamics (to which, indeed, a0 is central) predicting them a priori, and leading to their subsequent verification. I parallel the struggle of the new with the old paradigms, and the appearance of hybrid paradigms at such times of struggle. I also try to identify in the history of those established paradigms a stage that can be likened to that of MOND today.
•The Frauchiger and Renner (F-R) argument must be formulated only in terms of quantum propositions.•The F-R argument does not require the hypothesis of collapse.•The contradictory conclusion of the F-R argument results from making classical conjunctions between incompatible contexts.•What is the relation between a theory and the system of logic by means of which agents draw their own conclusions?
In this paper I examine the extent to which recent work in information-theoretic foundations of quantum mechanics can be thought to facilitate understanding, either of quantum phenomena or quantum theory. To do so I utilize the modal view of understanding phenomena. I extend this view to develop an analysis of understanding of theories. The extended modal view of understanding provides a unified view of recent work in information-theoretic foundations of quantum mechanics and explains how it facilitates understanding.
We undertake a detailed analysis of three ‘epistemic’ approaches to symmetries, due, respectively, to Ismael and van Fraassen, Caulton, and Dasgupta. Finding faults with each, we proceed to develop our own epistemic approach to symmetries. Having done so, we present a concern regarding all epistemic accounts: they render the notion of a symmetry transformation redundant as a tool for metaphysical theorising about scientific theories.
This paper bridges a historiographical gap in accounts of the prediction and discovery of the positron by combining three ingredients. First, the prediction and discovery of the positron are situated in the broader context of a period of 'crystallisation' of a research tradition. Second, the prediction and discovery of the positron are discussed in the context of the 'authentication' of the particle. Third, the attitude of the relevant scientists to both prediction and discovery are conceptualised in terms of the idea of 'perspectives'. It will be argued that by examining the prediction and discovery of the positron in the context of authentication within a period of crystallisation, we can better understand disagreements regarding the positron between relevant scientists (Dirac, Bohr, and Pauli) in the period 1931-34.
In this work we show the equivalence between Hamiltonian mechanics and conservation of information entropy. We will show that distributions with coordinate independent values for information entropy require that the manifold on which the distribution is defined is charted by conjugate pairs (i.e. it is a symplectic manifold). We will also show that further requiring that the information entropy is conserved during the evolution yields Hamilton's equations.
This is one of a pair of papers that give a historical-cum-philosophical analysis of the endeavour to understand black hole entropy as a statistical mechanical entropy obtained by counting string-theoretic microstates. Both papers focus on Andrew Strominger and Cumrun Vafa's ground-breaking 1996 calculation, which analysed the black hole in terms of D-branes. The first paper gives a conceptual analysis of the Strominger-Vafa argument, and of several research efforts that it engendered. In this paper, we assess whether the black hole should be considered as emergent from the d-brane system, particularly in light of the role that duality plays in the argument. We further identify uses of the quantum-to-classical correspondence principle in string theory discussions of black holes, and compare these to the heuristics of earlier efforts in theory construction, in particular those of the old quantum theory.
Newton's metaphysical picture of space and time provides the conceptual background for his theory of motion. Philosophical discussions of absolute space and time, however, underemphasize Newton's concern with the relativity of motion. From a modern perspective, this is usually seen as a concern that Newton himself did not take seriously enough, especially in comparison with contemporaries such as Huygens and Leibniz. In one sense, however, Newton pursued the problem of the relativity of motion further than his contemporary critics. In fact, while they defended the relativity of motion as a general principle, only Newton tried to develop what may legitimately be called a theory of relativity: a systematic theoretical account of what is objective in the description of physical interactions, and a principled distinction between the objective properties and those that depend on the choice of a frame of reference. On this basis Newton articulated, more clearly than any of his contemporaries, the conceptual revisions imposed by the relativity of motion on prevailing notions of force, inertia, and causality. We can see this from the history of his use of the Galilean relativity principle, which became Corollary V to the Laws of Motion. Moreover, while his critics demanded a mechanistic alternative to his theory of gravitation, Newton not only saw the empirical power of his theory, and its exemplary power for the theory and practice of physics in general; he also saw that the peculiar nature of gravity placed the problem of the relativity of motion in a dramatically new light. This is seen in his development and use of Corollary VI. By studying the progress of Newton's thought about these relativity principles, and the profound changes in his views between early manuscripts such as De Gravitatione and the first drafts of the Principia, we can see why Newton did not regard them as undermining his aim to determine "the true motions" in the solar system. On the contrary, he saw it as enabling him to separate the local problem of "true motion" for a given system of bodies, from the global problem of how that system might be moving with respect to absolute space. In other words, Newton, having acknowledged that absolute space is unobservable, and motion with respect to it therefore unknowable, nonetheless could solve the problem of "the system of the world." Indeed, the history of his thinking shows that Newton introduced the theory of absolute space precisely in order to articulate his theory of relativity. Newton's use of relativity principles sheds light on the relation between mathematical principles and causal explanation in physics. (c) 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
When David Bohm published his alternative theory of quantum mechanics in 1952, it was not received well; a recurring criticism was that it formed a reactionary attempt to return to classical physics. In response, Bohm emphasized the progressiveness of his approach, and even turned the accusation of classicality around by arguing that he wanted to move beyond classical elements still inherent in orthodox quantum mechanics. In later years, he moved more and more towards speculative and mystical directions. This paper aims to explain this discrepancy between the ways in which Bohm's work on quantum mechanics has been received and the way in which Bohm himself presented it. I reject the idea that Bohm's early work can be described as mechanist, determinist, and realist, in contrast to his later writings, and argue that there is in fact a strong continuity between his work on quantum mechanics from the early 1950s and his later, more speculative writings. In particular, I argue that Bohm was never strongly committed to determinism and was a realist in some ways but not in others. A closer look at Bohm's philosophical commitments highlights the ways in which his theory of quantum mechanics is non-classical and does not offer a way to avoid all 'quantum weirdness'. (C) 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
The microscopic state counting of the extremal Reissner-Nordström black hole performed by Andrew Strominger and Cumrun Vafa in 1996 has proven to be a central result in string theory. Here, with a philosophical readership in mind, the argument is presented in its contemporary context and its rather complex conceptual structure is analysed. In particular, we will identify the various inter-theoretic relations, such as duality and linkage relations, on which it depends. We further aim to make clear why the argument was immediately recognised as a successful accounting for the entropy of this black hole and how it engendered subsequent work that intended to strengthen the string theoretic analysis of black holes. Its relation to the formulation of the AdS/CFT conjecture will be briefly discussed, and the familiar reinterpretation of the entropy calculation in the context of the AdS/CFT correspondence is given. Finally, we discuss the heuristic role that Strominger and Vafa's microscopic account of black hole entropy played for the black hole information paradox. A companion paper analyses the ontology of the Strominger-Vafa black hole states, the question of emergence of the black hole from a collection of D-branes, and the role of the correspondence principle in the context of string theory black holes.
The current state of particle physics is conflicting. One has a marvellously working theory, the Standard Model, that leaves many questions open. This tension has led to a variegated landscape of models of physics beyond the Standard Model that is guided by epistemic and pragmatic values of model preference. Whereas these preferences are shared by experimentalists and theorists, their use of models within research practice differs. Experimentalists focus on event signatures that have many-to-many relations to models. We argue that physicists’ three-pronged approach distinguishing raw data, signatures, and models resembles the analysis of Bogen and Woodward, establishing the autonomy of phenomena. Using signatures opens the door for explorative experimentation, which becomes crucial for managing the uncertainty about the direction of particle physics that has emerged after the discovery of the Higgs boson.
We start by surveying the history of the idea of a fundamental conservation law and briefly examine the role conservation laws play in different classical contexts. In such contexts we find conservation laws to be useful, but often not essential. Next we consider the quantum setting, where the conceptual problems of the standard formalism obstruct a rigorous analysis of the issue. We then analyze the fate of energy conservation within the various viable paths to address such conceptual problems; in all cases we find no satisfactory way to define a (useful) notion of energy that is generically conserved. Finally, we focus on the implications of this for the semiclassical gravity program and conclude that Einstein's equations cannot be said to always hold.
