An attempt is made to isolate relevant Islamic injunctions on the subject of fertility and using that as a basis to examine Sudanese practices, distinguishing between practical behavior born out of religious inclination and attitudes that might have been developed more directly in response to environmental demands. Factors considered include marriage institutions and attitudes toward family size. The purpose of marriage in Islam is to satisfy sexual desire and to protect the parties concerned and guarantee the stability of their relationship. Marriage in Islam is a sacred contract, which under ordinary circumstances every Muslim must enter. Islam is against celibacy. Divorce, although allowed, is not encouraged and is approved only under special circumstances. Muslim women marry at an early age, allowing them to spend a large part of their reproductive lives in marriage. Islam allows polygamy only in certain cases, and the consent of the 1st wife is necessary. Personal preferences and goals about family size and composition are becoming more significant as fertility gets more under control. Data from the fertility survey conducted in urban Khartoum in 1979 and from the Sudanese Fertility Survey of 1979 suggest that the traditional Sudanese values emphasize large families to a certain extent. 35% of the surveyed wives in Khartoum indicated that a large family of over 5 children was desirable. The large family concept was popular among 38% of the very religious wives and among 33% of those of average religiosity. The overall mean number of children desired as reported in the Sudan Fertility Survey was 6.4. A fairly comprehensive study of the position of Islam regarding family size was conducted by the International Planned Parenthood Federation in 1972. Islam as a religion has nothing against fertility regulation; the law of birth control or family planning is as permissive as laws relating to polygamy and divorce. Among the urban wives living in Khartoum, about 55% had tried a method of family planning at least once. The percentage of ever users was higher among the educated wives than among the illiterates. The data showed that the majority of wives who disapproved of contraceptive use were concerned about the medical problems involved, but a large proportion disapproved because of religious reasons. 46% of wives and 39% of husbands believed that Islam prohibits the use of family planning.
This paper presents the results of population projections for the Sudan based on simple estimates of the total fertility rate and life expectancy at birth. The projections were calculated through use of the POPTRAN micro-computer package that can provide projections for up to 100 years. The starting data were derived from United Nations Assessment statistics for 1985. 4 separate projections were prepared, based on different assumptions about the extent of reduction in the total fertility rate between 1985 and 2085. Under each of these 4 scenarios, however, the life expectancy at birth is assumed to rise from 49 years in 1985 to 65 years in 2085. The 2nd scenario, which assumes the total fertility rate is reduced from its present level of 6.56 to 4.00 by the year 2035 and then remains at 4.00 until 2085, is considered most likely. This model produces population increases from 21 million in 1985 to 32 million in the year 2000, 73 million in 2035, and 194 million in 2085. The annual growth rate would reach a level slightly under 2% by 2035. The generation of long-term projections dramatically underscores the social and economic changes that must take place even if the total fertility rate is reduced to 4 to meet the increased need for schools, hospitals, jobs, and services.
Hassaballa concludes that from colonial times to the present African workers have been integrated into the capitalist mode of production as producers while they actually remain outside this system in their roles as consumers. As long as African workers are consumers they are not controlling what they produce. In a system in which large segments of the population are transformed into consumers who own no means of production workers must accept whatever wages offered so they may pay for the imported goods flooding the market. This cheap labor and the continuous excess of profits and economic surplus contributes to the underdevelopment of Third World countries. At the same time it develops the central or core countries. The developing countries must break this vicious circle somehow; foreign investment aid or loans are not the answer. Hassaballa feels that only domestic savings can lead a country to integrated development to serve the masses and to cater to the masses interests and aspirations.
This study used data from the Zande Fertility Survey of 1977-78 to investigate marriage patterns among the Azande of southern Sudan. Reported mean age at marriage was 17.3 years for females and 22.8 years for males. Only 1% of females and 7% of males in the 25-29-year age group were single. Particular emphasis was placed in this study on the status of 1st marriage as an indicator of marital stability. By age 40 years, under 40% of Zande women were still in their 1st union, largely because of divorce. Even in the 20-24-year age group, 21% of respondents reported broken marriages. 75% of women whose 1st marriage was dissolved remarried; 28% of remarriages were also dissolved. Women most likely to remarry were those divorced or widowed at a young age. Since many marriages are dissolved at very young ages and 2nd marriages have a tendency to be unstable, marriage patterns can be considered to exert a negative influence on fertility in Zande. Moreover, nuptiality tables for cohorts of women born in 1928-46 and in 1947 and after suggest that divorce is even more frequent in younger cohorts and can be expected to increase in the future.
This article analyzes the causes of population distribution in various geographical regions of Sudan. Population distribution is a function of fertility, mortality, and net migration. These variables are primarily caused by changes in socioeconomic factors prevailing in each area. The analysis shows that the population distribution among the geographical regions is primarily shaped by the differential development actions during the last 2 decades. The regional variability of population growth and density largely reflects regional development. Provinces are classified into 3 groups according to stages of population growth. The 1st group is composed of the 3 southern provinces, characterized by the highest mortality, lowest fertility, a marginal volume of net migration, and the lowest overall population growth rate during the last 2 decades. These are the poorest provinces in terms of per capita income, education, communication, and health measures. The 2nd group comprises Dafur, Kordofan, Northern and Red Sea Provinces, which generally reflect an intermediate stage in the demographic evolution in the country. Fertility is positively correlated and mortality is inversely related to the level of per capita income, resulting in an inverse relationship between the 2 vital rates. Therefore, the natural growth will probably increase. However, there are also areas of out-migration. Their future population growth and density will depend on the extent to which the out-migration will affect their natural growth rates. The 3rd group is composed of Khartoum, Blue Nile and Kassala provinces. They have the highest fertility, lowest mortality and highest volume of in-migration. Therefore, they witnessed the highest population growth rate and population density during the period. They encompass the largest urban centers with the highest degree of modernization and family planning activities. It is postulated that their future fertility and mortality rates will decline in varying degrees and will depend on the pace of decline of each vital rate and the trend of migration. In conclusion, the regional patterns of population growth and redistribution are likely to be uneven in the foreseeable future, unless a genuine policy of regionalizing is effectively implemented.
