The nature of something is that which constitutes it most inwardly, determining and limiting it, while setting it into motion as a subject capable of performing activities and receiving actions. This nature defines a unity in the individual and realizes some totality. This unity also specifies the individual, determining it. Nature must therefore consist of (since it is not a collection of randomly interacting parts) a meaningful structure for the individual. In the natural order such structure is also material, which does not mean that, in its totality, the structure is integrally sensible. This paper explores the composition of esse in Edith Stein and Cornelio Fabro, articulating their metaphysical foundations within the classical hylomorphic structure, and establishing its relation to Bernard d'Espagnat's concept of Veiled Reality. It examines the transcendental and predicamental compositions of being and essence, arguing that these offer a coherent metaphysical framework capable of uniting philosophical ontology and modern physics by means of the hylomorphic structure. Some effort is also made from a mathematical point of view to outline in very general terms how both compositions, transcendental and predicamental, might be represented.
In this study, we will seek to justify how Karl Marx's benign concern in promoting a humanism that values the concrete, existential and historical person turns into a malignant factor of dehumanization. The reduction of reality to the material dimension, nullifying the metaphysical aspiration of the human being, imposes an ideal of social organization without the horizon of infinite freedom and the hope of plenitude. The immanentization of traditional eschatological values establishes the utopian ideal of a just historical society, transforming the hope of an esctological spiritual paradise into the political effort for an earthly paradise that has as its measure, not divine mercy, but the demonic law of totalitarian absolutism. All means begin to justify the end of a communist order established by an abstract idea that does not meet the metaphysical integrality of the human person.
The status of nature, defined by the dialectical relationship it establishes with the human element, plays a crucial role in Albert Camus's works, serving as a central axis for understanding his philosophy. Building on this premise, our study analyzes the evolution of this status by identifying three fundamental phases interconnected with his intellectual and biographical trajectory: (1) the youthful period, characterized by a nature of boundless love, exuberance, and seduction, where the Mediterranean world emerges as a source of ecstasy and plenitude; (2) the period of the absurd, marked by a primitive nature that rejects human logic, opposing with dense irrationality the nostalgia for unity and revealing the ontological fracture between humans and the world; and (3) the period of revolt, in which nature re-emerges as a critical counterpoint to history, providing an ethical foundation for the values of measure and beauty. Through a chrono-thematic approach, we explore natural imagery throughout Camus's works while intertwining it with his lived experience. We aim to reveal the profound coherence of Camusian thought, where the natural world operates simultaneously as a mirror of human contradiction and a horizon of potential reconciliation.
The icon, as a mediator between humanity and the transcendent, occupies a unique position at the crossroads of metaphysics, aesthetics, and cultural memory. Its symbolic language-particularly the semiotics of color-offers a framework through which spiritual truths are made visible and embodied in material form. This article explores the ethical significance of icons within the paradigm of sustainable development, where sacred symbolism intersects with ecological responsibility, cultural resilience, and the search for harmonious coexistence. Alongside theoretical reflection, the study also includes an empirical exploration conducted among young people, emphasizing how contemporary perceptions of icons continue to shape values essential for sustainable futures. In this sense, the icon emerges not only as a theological and aesthetic artifact, but also as a dynamic resource for rethinking humanitys ethical orientation in an age of global transformation
Artificial intelligence (AI) systems now match or surpass human performance across an expanding set of cognitive tasks, prompting a reassessment of longstanding assumptions about consciousness and moral status. This article interrogates the opposition between anthropocentrism, which treats rational agency and first-person phenomenality as uniquely human, and machine thinking, which frames cognition as a substrate-independent computational process. Using conceptual, comparative, and critical methods, and following PRISMA-style screening and thematic coding, we analysed 89 journal articles indexed in Scopus and Web of Science, alongside canonical texts by Descartes, Kant, Turing, Searle, and Dennett. Three patterns emerge. First, contemporary large-language models reinforce anthropocentric intuitions by mimicking phenomenality. Second, formal arguments for machine consciousness increasingly draw on predictive-processing, Global Workspace, and Integrated Information accounts to challenge species boundaries via substrate-neutral criteria. Third, hybrid ethical frameworks combining anthropocentric precaution with machine-oriented functional indicators offer the most coherent route for science and policy. Focusing on Ukraine, a rapidly growing AI hub, we demonstrated how this hybrid approach can inform national strategies that align with the EU AI Act while respecting local narratives of human dignity and security needs. The study clarifies conceptual gaps in current debates and outlines a philosophically grounded roadmap for inclusive, risk-sensitive AI governance. From the standpoint of the methodology of meta-anthropology of AI, it is shown that in the future a human will be able to communicate with AI not simply as a device that he owns, but as a subject, an other, who has his own existence and the right to freedom.
