This article draws on the cross-disciplinary literature on risk, uncertainty and precaution to address a central dilemma put forward against precautionary principles. According to this dilemma, weak versions of precautionary principles, which hold that policymakers can justifiably adopt precautionary measures even when they lack certainty of impending harm, fail to justify adopting any precautionary measures. Conversely, strong versions of precautionary principles, which hold that policymakers must adopt precautionary measures whenever they face significant risks of harm, yield contradictory policy prescriptions. The article argues that the proffered defences of precautionary principles provide only a partial solution to this dilemma. The article then demonstrates that a meta-precautionary approach, which applies precautionary reasoning to the prescriptions of precautionary principles, can resolve the dilemma and successfully address further prominent objections put forward against precautionary principles.
Autobiographical memory and the self are closely connected. Autobiographical memories provide the information needed to form and maintain a stable self-model (memory-to-self). The self, in turn, modulates the construction of autobiographical memories during retrieval (self-to-memory). Past research has mainly focused on the former direction of influence. However, self-to-memory dynamics are being increasingly investigated both in neurotypical and neurodivergent individuals. We contribute to this line of research in two ways. First, we elaborate on the self-memory system framework focusing on self-related processes involved in autobiographical memory retrieval. In particular, we distinguish between long-term and situationally activated aspects of the self, as well as between its representational and agentive aspects. Second, we propose a general framework for understanding self-to-memory dynamics in major depressive disorder based on four dimensions of the self: self-coherence (comprising self-coherence proper and self-congruence); self-valence; self-knowledge; and self-control. Based on the characteristics of the self in depression, we propose an outline of the self-to-memory dynamics in individuals with depression, drawing on existing empirical evidence. Additionally, we suggest that our framework, adjusted as needed, could be employed to describe self-to-memory dynamics in other mental health conditions.
The question who (or which things) are the agents has attracted a very wide range of different answers. For some, only humans can satisfy the necessary conditions for agency; others extend the concept to a wide range of animals or even plants; and some believe there are also agents outside the biological realm. Do these different answers constitute substantively different views about the same question? Or are the disagreements really terminological ones, at root, owed to different ‘definitions’ of agency? In this paper, I try to provide examples both of disputes which do, and disputes which do not seem amenable to this sort of terminological deflation. I then try to diagnose the difference, by offering a view about how we must think about the concept of agency if it is to play a role in genuinely substantive disagreement, combining Susan Carey’s idea that agency is a ‘core concept’ with an externalist account of how the concept must work, if it is to figure in thoroughly substantive disputes about who the agents are.
In the field of mental health, the role of Experts by Experience (ExE) has been gaining increasing attention. However, theoretical research on this topic remains limited, leaving it unclear how ExE can contribute to improving psychiatric research and services. In this paper, I propose two explanations for the contributions of ExE, drawing on perspectives from feminist philosophy of science. The first explanation focuses on the epistemic capabilities of ExE, grounded in standpoint theory. This approach highlights the unique individual potential of ExE as a factor that enhances psychiatric research and services. The second explanation underscores the epistemic diversity between ExE and professionals in research and/or service contexts, focusing on the value of epistemic diversity within teams and communities. The main difference is that epistemic capabilities focus on the individual, while epistemic diversity focuses on the collective. I argue that these two explanatory models should be chosen based on research design, but in the context of psychiatric PPI, considering ExE participation not only in terms of standpoint but also in terms of epistemic diversity may suggest a more inclusive approach to PPI.
Metaphors in science communication do more than simplify complex ideas; they impose certain epistemic frameworks with the potential to steer public attitudes and behavior. In this paper, we investigate the effects of metaphorical framing on public understanding and evaluation of de-extinction, a field where dominant metaphors (“resurrection,” “bringing back to life”) have been criticized for mischaracterizing the technology and fostering undue optimism. We presented a nationally representative sample of the Spanish population (N = 1,522) with popular science descriptions of de-extinction that varied only in metaphorical framing and assessed its downstream effects on misinformation, perceived scientific rigor, attitudes, funding preferences, and sharing intentions. Promotional metaphors increased misinformation relative to the neutral condition, while critical metaphors reduced it. These effects occurred without altering readers’ perception of the text’s scientific rigor—a dissociation we characterize as credibility without comprehension. Critical metaphors also reduced support for de-extinction, whereas promotional metaphors did not boost support above baseline levels in the neutral condition. Funding allocations and sharing intentions, though related to misinformation, were unaffected by metaphorical framing. We propose that metaphors function as epistemic conditioning devices: they influence downstream judgments not through direct persuasion, but by structuring the understanding upon which those judgments are formed. These findings bear on philosophical debates about the role of metaphors in science, the epistemic preconditions of democratic engagement with emerging technologies, and the limits of lexical precision as a remedy for public misinformation.
