Metaphysics traditionally presumes a fundamental distinction between kinds (properties, classes, abstract universals) and particulars (concrete individuals). Whereas kinds and classes have members, for example, individuals have parts. This article contrasts the kind/individual distinction with a different but equally fundamental distinction between explainers and nonexplainers. It is often presumed that kinds are explainers and individuals are nonexplainers. This article defends a contrary thesis-explanatory individualism-according to which some explainers are concrete individuals, and it explores how this thesis is connected to the thesis of biological species individualism, according to which biological species are concrete individuals rather than kinds or classes.
Abstract The contemporary debate over scientific progress is fragmented into four competing, independent approaches, making systematic comparison difficult. To resolve this, we propose a formal meta-theory of progress, within which the different approaches can be represented and compared. Generalizing the formal core of truthlikeness theory, we develop a neutral meta-theory of “target-likeness.” We demonstrate how to represent the competing approaches as alternative measures of target-likeness. We conclude by discussing the implications and applications of our theory both inside and outside the current debate on scientific progress.
Abstract Scientific models can be performative: Their uptake may alter the phenomena they represent. Existing debates on performativity have not provided a criterion for model selection when models perceived to be in admissibility parity differ in their foreseeable performative effects. Using game-theoretic models of proenvironmental behavior as a test case, I introduce the One-Step Principle: a conservative constraint on performative model selection. The principle permits replacing a pessimistic model with a more optimistic alternative only under conditions of salience, favorable conditions for self-fulfilling performativity, and proximity to the model it replaces.
Abstract This article examines how biological models are combined in biomedical research. It analyzes the notion of epistemological space, understood not as an abstract space of epistemic possibilities but as a framework for coordinating heterogeneous models through zones of partial compatibility structured by shared features, biological constraints, and research objectives. It also questions the ways in which models are combined, highlighting the methodological choices and epistemic commitments that guide pluralistic modeling practices. Finally, it proposes a representation of these modalities as a heuristic tool for comparing and reflecting on strategies of model combination.
Abstract Camouflage is a ubiquitous phenomenon in nature, yet most researchers in animal communication have overlooked it because it does not typically qualify as a signal. I argue against this prevailing view and show that at least one type of camouflage, masquerade , can be regarded as a signal. I then introduce two notions— information-transmitting signals and information-masking signals —and characterize them in such a way that typical signals fall into the former category and camouflage into the latter, drawing on an information-theoretic approach to animal signaling. Lastly, I compare information-masking signals with misinformation and deception.
