In the literature on capitalism-its development and the diversity of its institutional forms-there is broad agreement on the fact that it rests on deeply conflictual social relations. While such conflicts may at times generate institutionalized forms of violence, they are more commonly mitigated through rules whose origins call for explanation. This article examines two influential hypotheses that seek to account for the emergence of these rules. According to the first, capitalism and democracy are linked by a relationship of special affinity; according to the second, the rules of capitalism are determined by the most powerful actors. Both theses stand up poorly to detailed examination of the facts they attempt to explain. We advance an alternative, dual proposition: the rules result from arbitration between conflicting interests, and this arbitration depends on the unequal access of social groups to the state. Au sein de la litt & eacute;rature portant sur le capitalisme, son d & eacute;veloppement et l'h & eacute;t & eacute;rog & eacute;n & eacute;it & eacute; de ses formes, l'id & eacute;e selon laquelle il repose sur des relations profond & eacute;ment conflictuelles fait consensus. S'ils peuvent engendrer des formes de violence parfois institutionnalis & eacute;es, ces conflits sont aussi att & eacute;nu & eacute;s par des r & egrave;gles dont il faut expliquer la gen & egrave;se. L'article discute deux hypoth & egrave;ses qui s'efforcent d'en rendre compte. Selon la premi & egrave;re, capitalisme et d & eacute;mocratie entretiendraient des relations d'affinit & eacute;s privil & eacute;gi & eacute;es ; selon la seconde, au contraire, les r & egrave;gles du capitalisme seraient fix & eacute;es suivant les int & eacute;r & ecirc;ts des acteurs les plus puissants. Ces deux th & egrave;ses r & eacute;sistent mal & agrave; l'examen circonstanci & eacute; des faits dont elles essaient de rendre compte. Nous proposons une double hypoth & egrave;se alternative : les r & egrave;gles r & eacute;sultent de l'arbitrage entre des int & eacute;r & ecirc;ts contradictoires, et cet arbitrage d & eacute;pend de l'acc & egrave;s diff & eacute;renci & eacute; des groupes & agrave; l'Etat.
Neoliberal defenses of markets are often said to institutionalize authoritarianism, both through technocratic states and “private governments” in firms, and thus to be incompatible with democracy. This paper asks whether a defense of competitive markets can be reconciled with democratic commitments to social justice and non-domination. Focusing on some neoliberal thinkers (Eucken, Lippmann, Hayek), it offers a rational reconstruction of the “competitive order” as a privilege-free institutional framework whose point is to disperse power and secure individuals’ status as non-dominated equals. On this view, markets and democracy appear as complementary anti-power devices that rely on general, impersonal rules to prevent public and private actors from entrenching arbitrary authority. The paper, first, develops a competition-based conception of social justice, according to which a market order is just when its rules eliminate legal and economic privileges, broadly distribute opportunities, and stabilize democratic support. Second, it confronts the critique of “private government” and argues that neoliberalism can integrate concerns about workplace domination through instruments such as competition policy and robust exit options, without abandoning the competitive order itself. JEL Codes : B15, B25, B31, B41.
This article examines the relationship between market freedom, economic expertise, and democratic government in contemporary liberal societies. Over the past decades, certain ideas developed within economic science have gradually been incorporated into institutional arrangements - independent central banks, fiscal rules, and the multilateral architecture of international trade - that structure the governance of market economies. While this institutionalization of economic knowledge is often presented as a way of shielding certain decisions from the contingencies of politics, it also tends to transform contested analytical assumptions into seemingly technical constraints. Drawing on Tocqueville's intuition of the risk of a "soft despotism," the article shows how this dynamic may contribute to a gradual depoliticization of collective choices. For liberal democracies, the challenge is therefore to preserve a living articulation between the freedom of markets and democratic deliberation. Cet article interroge les relations entre libert & eacute; des march & eacute;s, expertise & eacute;conomique et gouvernement d & eacute;mocratique dans les soci & eacute;t & eacute;s lib & eacute;rales contemporaines. Depuis plusieurs d & eacute;cennies, certaines id & eacute;es issues de la science & eacute;conomique ont & eacute;t & eacute; progressivement incorpor & eacute;es dans des dispositifs institutionnels - ind & eacute;pendance des banques centrales, r & egrave;gles budg & eacute;taires, architecture multilat & eacute;rale du commerce - qui structurent la gouvernance des & eacute;conomies de march & eacute;. Si cette institutionnalisation du savoir & eacute;conomique est souvent pr & eacute;sent & eacute;e comme un moyen de soustraire certaines d & eacute;cisions aux al & eacute;as de la politique, elle tend aussi & agrave; transformer des hypoth & egrave;ses analytiques discutables en contraintes apparemment techniques. En mobilisant l'intuition tocquevillienne du risque d'un & laquo; despotisme doux & raquo;, l'article montre comment cette dynamique peut contribuer & agrave; une d & eacute;politisation progressive des choix collectifs. Pour les d & eacute;mocraties lib & eacute;rales, l'enjeu est alors de pr & eacute;server une articulation vivante entre libert & eacute; des march & eacute;s et d & eacute;lib & eacute;ration d & eacute;mocratique.
Drawing on data from the World Values Survey and the European Values Study (which covered 156,658 individuals surveyed across 92 countries between 2017 and 2022), this article identifies three opinion clusters: Democrats, Authoritarians, and Distrustful people. Each cluster exhibits a consistent perspective on the role of the state, individual freedoms, and economic regulation. However, the distribution of these clusters is based on sociodemographic and geographic criteria, particularly in light of the political and economic contexts. A focus on a sample of ten comparable Western countries reveals that individuals who favor economic competition or private ownership of businesses place greater emphasis on freedom, while those who oppose these economic principles attach greater importance to solidarity and equality. In all cases, freedom takes precedence over equality, but neither is sacrificed. Consequently, market development is thought to be necessarily accompanied by social protection stemming from democratic demands. In other words, a market democracy is required rather than a simple market economy.
This article is a review of the book by Demin Duan, Tocqueville Between East and West. Cardiff, UK: University of Wales Press (2025). Duan has developed an interesting approach to engaging Tocqueville by imagining an alternative model of governance for China with many unanswered questions.
