The logical problem of evil challenges the coherence of theism by claiming that the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God is incompatible with the presence of evil. Within classical logic, such an incompatibility would entail triviality, since any contradiction triggers the principle ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet. This paper investigates the problem by focusing on the logical relation between contradiction, triviality, and theological reasoning. It begins by examining the role played by explosion in classical logic and by tracing the historical development of non-explosive approaches to inconsistency, culminating in contemporary paraconsistent logics. Against this background, a first-order classical system is presented in which omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence are defined in a minimal but precise way and combined with the empirical premise that evil exists. It is shown that, under these assumptions, no contradiction follows, and thus the logical problem of evil does not succeed in its strongest classical form. At the same time, the analysis highlights the vulnerability of such classical solutions: once stronger theological assumptions are introduced, contradiction again threatens to trivialize the theory. The paper then argues that paraconsistent logic provides a robust framework for formal natural theology, allowing tensions between divine attributes and evil to be articulated without collapse.
This article sketches a particular vision of what it means for a religious community to flourish that is predicated upon an interpretation of the Christian narrative influenced by Augustine of Hippo. Within this vision, it argues, flourishing is inherently communal but ultimately eschatological as the attainment of perfect community awaits the kingdom of God. This orientation renders the Christian community a critic of all historical accomplishments, which remain marked by domination and injustice. Simultaneously, however, it should impel the Christian community to nurture the goods of this world by creating communities of soulcraft that cultivate Christ-like virtues and undertaking social action that advances justice for the oppressed and marginalized.
In this essay we describe ways that empirical measurement, when theologically informed, can deepen the pursuit of truth and flourishing in religious communities, particularly Christian congregations. By drawing on recent epidemiological and social-scientific work linking religion, spirituality, and human flourishing, we commend careful, tradition-sensitive use of surveys and quantitative tools while acknowledging the limits of measuring sacred realities. We then undertake brief theological reflection on a number of empirical tools, including the nature of data, the sacred potential of technical labor, and potential for both vice and virtue in empirical activities. We close by suggesting five ways empirical data can potentially serve the church: witness, preaching, accountability, discipleship, and financial stewardship. Properly ordered, empirical methods can be a resource for congregations to better understand and nurture flourishing while remaining primarily oriented toward worship, wisdom, and the love of God and neighbor.
This article focuses on providing an elucidation of a particular conception of the Christian doctrine of the atonement. The specific account of the atonement that is at the centre of the analysis of this article is that of the Revolution Account, proposed by N.T. Wright. This account faces the Explanatory Gap Problem, which highlights the need for one to further explicate its inner workings. This end will thus be achieved by utilising certain theses from contemporary metaphysics, philosophical theology and ethics, which will provide a more robust construal of the Revolution Account in a manner that allows the Explanatory Gap Problem to be successfully dealt with.
This paper develops an epistemic argument for aspirational theism, the view that for agents who regard theism as a live epistemic possibility, there exist defeasible reasons to rationally hope that God exists. The argument begins from the fact that finite epistemic agents must economize their cognitive resources, and thus should seek sources of substantive, rather than trivial, epistemic goods. If God exists, He would be uniquely well-positioned—given His omniscience and moral perfection—to deliver epistemic goods that are personally fitting and epistemically valuable. The paper distinguishes aspirational theism from pro- and anti-theism and aspirational atheism, situating the favored view within broader debates concerning rational hope, epistemic value, and the ethics of belief. And it engages with several objections from divine hiddenness, privacy, and pessimistic meta-induction, concluding that even under skeptical theist constraints, theistic hope remains epistemically appropriate for many.
