Abstract The general purpose of this article is to investigate how conflict and struggle, observed in history and experienced in one’s own being, might serve to bolster faith. Two areas are of particular significance regarding the strengthening of faith vis-à-vis conflict: facilitating assent to religious truth claims and renewing catechetical approaches. Concretely, this article is comprised of three sections. The first section briefly elucidates the terms ‘catechesis’, ‘conflict’, and ‘struggle’. The second section provides an overview of Newman’s religious epistemology and analyzes how it conceives of struggle in the process of coming to assent and certitude regarding religious truth claims, primarily treating Newman’s major 1870 work on religious epistemology, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent . The third section then analyzes how conflict and struggle are being incorporated into a variety of cognate disciplines to improve student engagement and outcomes. Case studies demonstrate the potential fruit of being forthright regarding the struggles of major figures in history, as well as the value of introducing students to manageable levels of confusion and responsibility for course content. The conclusion offers several constructive reflections while not shying away from the pitfalls that accompany any incorporation of conflict and struggle into the catechetical process.
Abstract Two forms of existential proposition are identified, one favoured by analytical philosophers, one by Thomists. It is argued, against objections, that both forms were recognized and used by Thomas. A useful way of labelling this point is to speak of the distinction between esse ut verum and esse reale : being in the sense of the true, the analytical notion, on the one hand, and the Thomist notion of actual or real existence on the other. The former is best expressed by a second-level predicable, the latter by a first-level predicable. Both express a valid notion which is fittingly called ‘existential’, and both are, indeed, analogically connected in meaning.
Abstract Tracey Rowland has recently written a chapter on Ratzinger’s view of Wittgenstein and notes that he interprets Wittgenstein as a logical positivist whose philosophy fails to seek truth itself. This reading of Wittgenstein lacks a serious engagement with the English Dominicans’ reception of him. If Ratzinger had interacted more with them, he might have had a different picture of Wittgenstein and recognized the ways in which his work encourages humanity to live in a state of wonder flowing from its creaturely existence. In particular, Fergus Kerr and others offer a compelling account of how Wittgenstein’s philosophy creates this sense of wonder and, by implication, reveal the areas of continuity between him and Ratzinger. This fact is concretized by identifying the way Ratzinger’s understanding of the clarity of scriptural and dogmatic language is enhanced by Wittgenstein’s grammatical analysis. Ultimately, this essay provides an example of how Wittgenstein and Ratzinger can be placed in fruitful dialog with one another.
Abstract Canon law forbids episcopal ordinations to take place in the Latin church without a papal mandate. I consider whether this is also a requirement of divine law. Arguments that might be used to seek to show that such ordinations could never be licit are that they are schismatic (especially in the light of the teaching of Vatican II about the episcopal office of governance and about collegiality); that they tend to produce schism; or that they are contrary to the teachings of Trent and Vatican II on canonical mission. A further argument that could be used for the same conclusion is that to claim that a state of necessity could arise in the Church that could render such ordinations lawful is contrary to the doctrine of the Church’s indefectibility. I argue that none of these reasons is probative, and that such ordinations cannot, therefore, be absolutely excluded, and I finish with a thought experiment that supports this conclusion.
