Abstract This is a critical commentary on S. Levinson ‘On why speech acts can't be reduced to matters of context change.’ It agrees with the central thesis of Levinson's paper, and gives my own reasons for thinking that while a theory of speech acts should explain the way they change contexts, they cannot be defined in terms of that role alone. But it also argues against some of Levinson's broader criticisms of the role of the notion of common ground in the pragmatics literature for explaining the dynamics of discourse.
Abstract The target paper claimed that notions of common ground are over-simplified and under-developed, and that it seems unlikely that speech act force could be captured purely in terms of context update. The dozen responses all agree that there is more to be said about common ground, but the proffered solutions point in many different directions, while further difficulties with reducing speech acts to context change now emerge. The exchange reveals that this is a lively area of unresolved research.
Abstract In order to assess the significance for theories of context of Levinson’s many observations, it is important to get clear on the theoretical concepts involved. In these comments I clarify a number of distinctions: context versus common ground; common ground (publicity) versus the Stalnakerian characterization of it; context as background versus context as target. I point out that debates about the structural complexity of context have consequences for how to think about its epistemic status. Finally, I point out that the “actionhood” of speech acts is nicely accommodated in a plan-based model of language use, and discuss some consequences.
Abstract This commentary argues that, although the Austinian theory of speech acts does not by itself provide a comprehensive model of conversational dynamics, it can nevertheless illuminate important aspects of conversational structure when integrated with conversational analysis. Building on Marina Sbisà’s notion of objective requirements, I claim that speech-act types are defined not only by felicity conditions but also by standards of objective assessment, which determine how conversational moves may be challenged and thereby reveal participants’ uptake. Through analyses of three examples discussed by Stephen Levinson, I show that notions such as felicity conditions, objective requirements, uptake, and perlocutionary objects help explain double-barrelled conversational turns, proposal–challenge relations, and the recognition of unvoiced requests within conversational interaction.
Abstract This commentary argues that Stephen Levinson’s target article fails to consider certain new developments of the idea that speech acts can be analyzed as common ground changers. First, representing the social effects of illocutionary acts in the notion of common ground itself, and extending the common ground model to include possible continuations, allows for a promising representation of conflicting contributions and negotiations. Second, modeling speech acts, including assertions, as updates that do not just add information about the world but change the world captures their performative nature, and avoids the traditional problem of superfluous truth values. Third, analyzing speech acts as common ground changers is not a “category mistake” but rather is the inevitable gap between the real-life phenomena and their theoretical modelling.
