This study considers the Eurasian Economic Union’s (EAEU) foreign trade trends with third countries that have signed mutual free trade area (FTA) agreements in various years. It also examines and compares the Eurasian Economic Commission’s efforts with the current economic outcomes. The quantitative analysis is based on foreign trade statistics — both national and mirror. It was found that bilateral trade between the EAEU, as a single integration bloc, and its free trade partner countries grew by 36% between 2014 and 2025, while according to mirror statistics, it grew by 16% (excluding the UAE, Indonesia and Mongolia). The EAEU’s gross exports to these countries increased by 28% during the period under review, while imports rose by 51%; according to mirror statistics, the figures were 5% and 51%, respectively. Import dynamics not only outpaces export growth but is also relatively more stable, indicating the asymmetry in the benefits for the EAEU. The intensification of trade with so-called second- and third-tier developing countries has been instrumental in enabling the EAEU to prevent a decline in trade amid direct anti-Russian sanctions and indirect sanctions against the Union’s member states. However, this does not necessarily require the signing of a free trade agreement with them. The dynamics of foreign trade with FTA partners are driven not so much by preferential trade as by global market conditions, foreign policy contexts, and the limited nature of foreign economic ties. No clear patterns were identified in the trade of individual groups of countries in 2022—2025. This indicates that the FTA agreements themselves cannot, by default, serve as a driver of foreign economic and foreign trade performance.
Could the evolution of consumption patterns and the trend toward declining average household size lead to changes in the economic benefits associated with living together? To address this question, we test for the existence of the “Deaton—Paxson paradox” using data from the Russian Household Budget Survey for 2003—2023. We employ nonparametric analysis and econometric estimation of systems of seemingly unrelated equations. We find significant economies of scale in both food consumption and service consumption, including housing and utilities. Economies of scale in food consumption are stronger among wealthier households, which have greater opportunities to adjust and optimize their consumption patterns. By contrast, economies of scale in shared consumption of services are more pronounced among poorer households, reflecting the greater importance of housing and utilities in their consumption. The magnitude of economies of scale in food consumption remained relatively stable over the study period, whereas economies of scale in service consumption tended to increase between 2009 and 2020. We attribute this pattern to the development of the service sector and the fact that services can be shared among household members or consumed to a lesser extent when household members live together. Overall, although the development of the modern consumer economy makes living alone more convenient and attractive, the economic benefits associated with living together do not diminish over time.
This article examines the conditions under which a Russian price reference for liquefied natural gas (LNG) for buyers in Northeast Asia may be formed amid the fragmentation of global energy markets. The relevance of the issue stems from rising gas competition in pricing, the declining representativeness of Western price benchmarks for Russian supplies, and the expansion of sanctions restrictions on Russian LNG. The authors distinguish four elements of pricing infrastructure: a price indicator, a benchmark, a spot hub and an exchangetraded instrument. Based on the analysis of Sakhalin-2, Yamal LNG, Arctic LNG 2 and the Russian export and transshipment bases, the article shows that Russia has a physical export base for a national price assessment, but it is not sufficient for the immediate creation of a full market benchmark. The main constraints are low spot liquidity, oligopolistic supply, heterogeneous delivery bases, limited transaction transparency and sanctions-related isolation from international clearing infrastructure. The paper proposes a four-stage model: first, a calculated netback indicator for taxation and customs administration; second, an independent FOB assessment for specific Russian export bases; third, limited contractual use with a subsequent transition to benchmark status; and fourth, exchange linkage and the development of a derivatives framework. Such an indicator should compare the actual export price with the calculated yield of a premium export destination net of costs, thus serving a fiscal and applied function but not acting as an administratively assigned contractual reference. The realistic medium-term objective is to develop a Russian FOB price assessment in which customs statistics serves as a control rather than a primary pricing source.
This study explores the relationship between economic growth and structural change in Central Asian countries countries from 2000 to 2024. Large gaps in labor productivity across sectors in these countries drive labor reallocation between economic activities. The reallocation of labor toward more productive sectors, along with intra-sectoral productivity growth, can contribute to overall economic growth. We apply a simple shift-share decomposition methodology to evaluate the contributions of these components to economic growth across four Central Asian, using data from the UN Statistics Division and the ILO database. Our analysis indicates that sectoral labor productivity growth was the primary driver of aggregate productivity growth in the region. Structural transformation accounted for 13—17% of total productivity growth in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, whereas its impact in Uzbekistan was minimal. Finally, we discuss the reasons for limited structural change and the main barriers to labor mobility in the region.
Drawing on press coverage of the 1998, 2008, 2014, 2020, and 2022 economic crises, the article examines the phenomenon of replacing economic terminology with euphemisms that mask the substance of the financial problems under discussion. The year 2025 is examined separately as a control period. The article compares how frequently economic terms are used in their original meanings with how frequently euphemisms displace those terms in publications devoted to crisis phenomena in the economy. Content analysis and thematic analysis show that the use of economic euphemisms in Russian media grows with the duration of economic crises: the longer crisis phenomena persist in the Russian economy, the more likely periodicals are to use Aesopian language to describe them. The article concludes that euphemisms play a growing role in the information discourse of Russian periodicals, primarily to conceal specific manifestations of economic crises.
