This study presents the results of a discrete choice experiment (DCE) to measure the willingness to pay (WTP) for rainwater harvesting systems at the household level in Mexico City. In 2020, we conducted a field survey to estimate WTP for this type of system in the boroughs of Mexico City with medium levels of marginalization. We estimated WTP using various payment options (credit cards, wire transfer, supermarkets and government offices) and considered deferred payment plans, as well as the maintenance time required for the system. We found that credit cards were the preferred payment method, that WTP through deferred payments was low, and that results regarding maintenance time were inconclusive. In addition, differences in gender and educational attainment were found to influence WTP. The mean WTP is $614 USD for a household with a typical user profile. The results indicate that rainwater harvesting systems were not cost-effective in most cases if their cost of public water supply systems. This paper contributes to knowledge of willingness to pay for rainwater harvesting systems, as well as their economic viability in Mexico City. Although the program has the potential to reduce household dependency on the public system, these systems are currently not profitable for most households. They are not a solution to water supply shortages, yet can contribute to climate change adaptation efforts. Additionally, the time required for maintenance and its associated costs are crucial factors in the continued use of the systems.
Water poverty is a global issue and it gets exacerbated by climate change-induced droughts. While the impact of drought on water poverty is well documented, we contribute to the literature by exploring the role played by political connection in shaping households' water poverty in the face of drought. We use two rounds of nationally representative household-level panel data from the India Human Development Survey (2004-05 and 2011-12) to generate a multidimensional water poverty index and a variable representing political connection. The long-term rainfall data from the India Meteorological Department is used to construct the drought variable. Our empirical findings show that drought is positively correlated with households' water poverty. However, the correlation between drought and water poverty is moderated by political connectedness: politically connected households affected by drought have lower water poverty than non-politically connected households who also face drought. An analysis with disaggregated water poverty measure indicates that politically connected households have lower deprivation from access, quality, storage and capacity dimensions of water poverty compared to their non-politically counterparts. A fractional regression analysis with district level data also provides evidence of the moderating impact of political connection proving the consistency of our empirical findings. We recommend initiating specific water poverty alleviation programmes that preclude political elite capture from the distribution of water utility services. We also recommend the Panchayat systems to become more inclusive such that the benefits of water related programmes reach the most vulnerable people to ensure water security.
In the US, environmental protection agencies conduct monitoring and enforcement to induce compliance with environmental laws. If effective, regulated facilities respond by using various environmental management methods to achieve compliance. Our study is the first to examine the collective link from several environmental monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to two fundamental forms of environmental management: environmental treatment equipment and environmental personnel. To deliver our contributions, we exploit an original survey of Clean Water Act-regulated chemical manufacturing facilities that gathers facility-level data on the use of wastewater treatment equipment and environmental personnel. We use these data to jointly estimate a system of two equations - one for environmental equipment and another for environmental personnel - to examine the effects of various monitoring and enforcement mechanisms on environmental equipment and personnel. Our results support two important conclusions. First, we find that, of the mechanisms that significantly impact the use of environmental equipment or personnel, all increase the use of both environmental management practices. Our results, therefore, suggest that environmental equipment and environmental personnel serve as complements, rather than substitutes, for responding to increased enforcement. However, the effects on environmental equipment are much larger. Second, we find that, in general, the more severe mechanisms influence environmental management within one year, while the more cooperative and flexible mechanisms shape management only after a three-year delay. Thus, facilities' responsiveness to monitoring and enforcement depends on the type of mechanism.
An agent-based model (ABM) is developed to simulate the function of lease markets for surface water irrigation rights operating at the watershed scale. The ABM examines the effect of drought on trading activity and gains from trade under three market models: bilateral trading with random matching, a “smart market” that actively matches bidders based on bids and asks, and a full-information optimization model that represents the efficient benchmark against which to assess other market models. The model allows for variation in farm characteristics, water rights seniority, diversion location, and includes a watershed accounting system as a novel component. Results suggest gains from trade and market participation are largest with moderate drought severity than with severe or weak drought. Smart markets provide larger gains than bilateral trade, but both are lower (half or less) than the efficient benchmark. We also show that higher watershed complexity and certain distributions of agents across the watershed can significantly reduce market participation and gains from trade. The applications presented in this paper illustrate the broad applicability of the framework to water resource problems under appropriative water rights systems of the Western United States.
