The split-brain literature offers a unique perspective on theories of consciousness. Since both the left and right hemispheres of split-brain patients remain conscious following split-brain surgery, any theory that attempts to explain consciousness in neurotypical individuals must also be able to explain the dual consciousness of split brain patients. This commentary examines illusionism the theory that phenomenal properties are illusory through the lens of the split-brain literature. Based on evidence that both hemispheres of split-brain patients are capable of introspection and both hemispheres can experience and maintain illusions, it is theoretically possible that phenomenal properties are illusions created by distorted introspection, in accordance with illusionism. However, in order to appropriately evaluate whether illusionism is a valid explanation of consciousness in split-brain patients, it is imperative that neural mechanisms are proposed that explain how introspection gives rise to illusory phenomenal properties.
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