DP-MPC: Offloading Secure Multi-Party Computation to Programmable Data Planes

With the growing demand for data privacy, secure multi-party computation (MPC) has been widely adopted across various applications. However, existing frameworks incur substantial communication overhead due to their inherently multi-round interactions and remain vulnerable to man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks. To address these limitations, this paper introduces DP-MPC, a framework that offloads MPC to the programmable data plane with low-overhead communication and lightweight security verification. Specifically, (1) we design a DP-MPC protocol that transforms multi-round MPC interactions into a single round of in-network aggregation, drastically reducing communication overhead; (2) we implement line-rate execution of three fundamental MPC operation types and maintain per-session state directly within the data plane pipeline, achieving high-performance MPC offloading; (3) we integrate a lightweight hash-based verification mechanism to proactively defend against MitM attacks. Experimental results demonstrate that DP-MPC reduces communication overhead by two orders of magnitude, achieves microsecond level end-to-end latency, and effectively mitigates MitM attacks.