This editorial contextualises by reference to prior appellate case law the important decision of the Australian High Court in Lang v The Queen (2023) 278 CLR 323; [2023] HCA 29 in relation to the admissibility of expert opinion evidence. It chronicles the convergence of statutory and common law requirements for the reception of evidence by experts and analyses the requirement for clear delineation of the bases of expert evidence, assumptions made and reasoning utilised. This approach prioritises presentation of expert opinions in such a way that they can be evaluated effectively by the trier of fact. However, it does not incorporate the yardstick of reliability of expert opinions as a precondition for expert evidence to be admitted, in spite of international precedents for not just requiring such a precondition but providing useful indicia for evaluating reliability. There are good reasons for following precedents such as those existing in the United States, England and Wales and Canada. However, it appears that such a reform to Australian evidence law is only likely after a clear miscarriage of justice that provides an irresistible fillip to statutory amendment to admissibility criteria.