Strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) are abused to suppress legitimate free expression and have significant chilling effects. Anti-SLAPP statutes weaken the chilling effects by enabling the courts to quickly dismiss frivolous suits and recover legal costs for defendants. The improved protection of free expression reduces the public's concerns about revealing bad news about firms, which decreases managers' abilities and incentives to hide bad news. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that the anti-SLAPP statute of a state reduces stock price crash risk for firms headquartered in that state. The effect is stronger when the local public has more information, discovered bad news can be widely disseminated, and managers face a higher cost if withheld bad news is revealed by a third party. Anti-SLAPP statutes increase negativity in the media and decrease earnings management and overinvestment. Our study has policy implications for legislators considering adopting or improving anti-SLAPP laws.
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