Spectre attacks have drawn much attention since their announcement. Speculative execution creates so-called transient instructions , those whose results are ephemeral and not committed architecturally. However, various side-channels exist to extract these transient results from the microarchitecture, e.g., caches. Spectre Variant 1 , the so-called Bounds Check Bypass , was the first such attack to be demonstrated. Leveraging transient read instructions and cache-timing effects, the adversary can read secret data. In this work, we explore the ability of intraprocess memory isolation to mitigate Spectre Variant 1 attacks. We demonstrate this using Executable and Linkable Format-based access control (ELFbac) which is a technique for achieving intraprocess memory isolation at the application binary interface (ABI) level. Additionally, we consider Memory Protection Keys (MPKs) , a recent extension to Intel processors, that partition virtual pages into security domains. Using the original Spectre proof-of-concept (POC) code, we show how ELFbac and MPKs can be used to thwart Spectre Variant 1 by constructing explicit policies to allow and disallow the exploit. We compare our techniques against the commonly suggested mitigation using serialized instructions, e.g., lfence. Additionally, we consider other Spectre variants based on transient execution that intraprocess memory isolation would naturally mitigate.
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