On the Politics of Pandemics: Theory and Evidence

I discuss politically optimal restrictions on citizen movement in a pandemic. To find the political equilibrium, a standard voter preference framework is extended with features of a society where citizens make choices under pandemic conditions. Specifically, their vaccine choice is endogenous and they are vaccine-hesitant, they do not readily comply with restrictions, lockdowns tax their available time for work and leisure, and access to vaccines is unequal. Citizens also vote for their preferred level of restrictions. In a median-voter equilibrium the majority will choose zero restrictions, unless the government offers some positive income support, or a subsidy, which depends on the severity of restrictions. Voters will tolerate stricter restrictions when the subsidy grows. The minimum subsidy and additional conditions for the existence of majority support for non-zero restrictions are discussed. Large-scale evidence using Google’s citizen mobility data from the COVID-19 pandemic supports the theory. A set of policy implications completes the analysis, which could help governments build political support for their planned containment measures in future pandemics.