“Reason” En Masse

We can use “reason,” with its normative sense, as both a count noun (“there is a reason for her to Φ”) and a mass noun (“there is plenty of reason for her to Φ”). How are the count and mass senses of “reason” related? Daniel Fogal argues that the mass sense is fundamental: Just as lights are merely those things that give light and anxieties are merely those things that give anxiety, reasons are merely those things that give reason. In this article, I develop an opposing analysis of the mass noun “reason” that puts reasons first. Just as the detail on the Mona Lisa is composed of particular details (brushstrokes and colors) and the crime in L.A . is composed of particular crimes (pickpocketings and speeding offenses), so the reason for you to go to the dentist is composed of your reasons to go. Reasons stand to reason as parts to a whole. Such a picture makes reasons fundamental once more, but it has a cost of entry. In order to accommodate the behavior of “reason” in comparative constructions, you need to abandon the idea that reasons are facts we can count up. On the contrary: They're not facts, and you can't count them.