We study an environment in which a decision maker has access to several expert advisers. The experts all have access to an identical set of facts. The decision maker’s utility is increasing in the number of facts that the experts reveal. The experts have (potentially) different preferences. The game in which experts simultaneously disclose information typically has multiple equilibria. When multiple equilibria exist, the decision maker’s favorite equilibrium fails to survive iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies. We characterize the set of equilibria that survive iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies. In a leading special case, only one outcome survives iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies. It is the most preferred equilibrium from the perspective of the experts. We study the outcomes that can arise when the decision maker can consult the experts sequentially. We demonstrate that if the decision maker can select the order of consultations, can consult experts multiple times, and can commit to ending the consultation process, then in leading cases he can induce the same disclosure as with simultaneous disclosure. Sequential disclosure may perform worse than simultaneous disclosure from the perspective of the decision maker when it is not possible to consult experts multiple times or if commitment is not feasible.
分享
引用
