Strategic Bi-Direction Signal Sharing with Supplier Competition in a Hybrid-Channel Platform Supply Chain

Due to data source and forecast competency differences, an increasing number of enterprises in hybrid platform supply chains implement forecast signal sharing to eliminate information asymmetry. Existing studies mostly examine vertical-sharing incentive of the platform retailer with suppliers, while neglecting horizontal sharing among suppliers. This paper explores the optimal bidirection signal-sharing strategy including vertical sharing of platform retailer and horizontal sharing between two suppliers adopting reselling channel and agency channel respectively to improve supply chain performance. By analyzing the established Bayesian Stackelberg game models, the study finds that the two types of suppliers are always willing to implement horizontal sharing, while the vertical sharing strategy of platform retailers depends on channel competition and signal correlation. Specially, when channel competition intensity and signal correlations are sufficiently high, the platform retailer would like to share signal only with the supplier adopting reselling channel, which is different from previous studies. Moreover, it is found that horizontal sharing weakens the vertical-sharing incentive of the platform retailer and reduces the benefits of vertical sharing for two suppliers. This paper enriches the existing literature by combining the research on horizontal and vertical sharing within the context of hybrid-channel platform supply chains, and systematically clarifies the impacts of channel competition and signal correlation on the optimal strategy. Some managerial insights and practical schemes derived from findings may guide enterprises in making decisions on effective bi-direction information cooperation to improve supply chain performance.