Linear error-correcting codes with fast encoding and high minimum distance are a central primitive across modern cryptography. They appear prominently in at least two domains: (1) pseudorandom correlation generators (PCGs), which enable sublinear-communication generation of correlations such as oblivious transfer and vector oblivious linear evaluation, and (2) zero-knowledge proof systems, where linear-time encoders underpin proof soundness and scalability. In both settings, the prover or sender must multiply by a large generator matrix G , often with dimensions in the millions, making computational efficiency the dominant bottleneck. We propose a generalized paradigm for building crypto-friendly binary codes with provable minimum distance. Roughly speaking, these codes are based on randomized turbo codes such as repeat-accumulate codes. We prove linear asymptotic minimum distance and compute the exact expected weight spectrum for concrete sizes. We observe that our codes approach the Gilbert–Varshamov distance bound and outperform prior constructions. We construct several novel codes, the most promising of which we call Block-Accumulate codes. Among codes with provable distance, our code is 8× faster than the state of the art on a CPU and 50× faster on a GPU; even against aggressive parameters with conjectured distance, it is 3× and 20× faster, respectively. Under these parameters, this yields overall PCG speedups of 2.5× on the CPU and 15× on the GPU, achieving a projected 200+ million OTs per second, or about 100 million binary Beaver triples per second, on the GPU (excluding the one-time 10 ms GGM seed expansion). We also observe a 2× encoding speedup and half the peak memory consumption in the Blaze zero-knowledge (PCS) scheme of Brehm et al. (EUROCRYPT ’25).

. Garbled circuit techniques that are secure in the adaptive setting – where inputs are chosen after the garbled program is sent – are motivated by practice, but they are notoriously difficult to achieve. Prior adaptive garbling is either impractically expensive or encrypts the entire garbled program with the output of a programmable random oracle (PRO), a strong assumption. We present a simple framework for proving adaptive security of garbling schemes in the non-programmable random oracle (NPRO) model. NPRO is a much milder assumption than PRO, and it is close to the assumption required by the widely used Free XOR extension. Our framework is applicable to a number of GC techniques. As our main goal and as an application of the framework, we construct and prove adaptively secure a garbling scheme for tri-state circuits , a recently proposed circuit model that captures both Boolean circuits and RAM programs (Heath et al., Crypto 2023). For a given TSC C , our garbling of C is at most | C |· λ bits long, where λ is the security parameter. This implies both an adaptively secure garbled Boolean circuit scheme, as well an adaptively secure garbled RAM scheme where the garbling of T steps of a RAM program has size O ( T · log 3 T · log log T · λ ) bits. Our scheme is concretely efficient: its Boolean circuit handling matches the performance of half-gates, and it is adaptively secure from NPRO.

State-of-the-art protocols that achieve constant-round secure multiparty computation currently present a trade-off: either consume an amount of communication that scales quadratically in the number of parties, or achieve better asymptotics at the cost of high constant factors (e.g. schemes based on LPN or DDH). We construct a constant-round MPC protocol where communication scales linearly in the number of parties n. Our construction relies only on OT and RO, and it leverages packed secret sharing. Due to building on simple primitives, our protocol offers concrete improvement over asymptotically-efficient LPN-based schemes. We consider security in the presence of a dishonest majority where the malicious (with abort) adversary corrupts an arbitrary constant fraction of parties. By leveraging tri-state circuits (Heath et al. Crypto 2023), we extend our protocol to the RAM model of computation. For a RAM program that halts within T steps, our maliciously-secure protocol communicates O(n · T log ^3 T loglog T ·κ ) total bits, where κ is a security parameter.

In the Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP) of a disjunctive statement, P and V agree on B fan-in 2 circuits C-0,..., CB- 1 over a field F; each circuit has nin inputs, n(x) multiplications, and one output. P's goal is to demonstrate the knowledge of a witness (id is an element of [B], w is an element of F-nin), s.t. C-id (w) = 0 where neither w nor id is revealed. Disjunctive statements are effective, for example, in implementing ZKP based on sequential execution of CPU steps. This paper studies ZKP (of knowledge) protocols over disjunctive statements based on Vector OLE. Denoting by. the statistical security parameter and let rho (sic) max{log |F|, lambda}, the previous state-of-the-art protocol Robin (Yang et al. CCS'23) required (n(in) + 3n(x)) log |F|+ O(rho B) bits of communication with O( 1) rounds, and Mac' n' Cheese (Baum et al. CRYPTO'21) required (n(in) + n(x)) log |F|+ 2nx rho+ O(rho logB) bits of communication with O(logB) rounds, both in the VOLE-hybrid model. Our novel protocol LogRobin++ achieves the same functionality at the cost of (n(in)+ n(x)) log |F|+ O(rho logB) bits of communication with O(1) rounds in the VOLE-hybrid model. Crucially, LogRobin++ takes advantage of two new techniques - (1) an O(logB)-overhead approach to prove in ZK that an IT-MAC commitment vector contains a zero; and (2) the realization of VOLE-based ZK over a disjunctive statement, where P commits only to w and multiplication outputs of C-id (w) (as opposed to prior work where P commits to w and all three wires that are associated with each multiplication gate). We implemented LogRobin++ over Boolean (i.e., F-2) and arithmetic (i.e., F(2)61(-1)) fields. In our experiments, including the cost of generating VOLE correlations, LogRobin++ achieved up to 170x optimization over Robin in communication, resulting in up to 7x (resp. 3x) wall-clock time improvements in a WAN-like (resp. LAN-like) setting.

A two-party fuzzy private set intersection (PSI) protocol between Alice and Bob with input sets A and B allows Alice to learn nothing more than the points of Bob that are "delta-close" to its points in some metric space dist. More formally, Alice learns only the set {b vertical bar dist(a, b) <= delta, a is an element of A, b is an element of B} for a predefined threshold delta and distance metric dist, while Bob learns nothing about Alice's set. Fuzzy PSI is a valuable privacy tool in scenarios where private set intersection needs to be computed over imprecise or measurement-based data, such as GPS coordinates or healthcare data. Previous approaches to fuzzy PSI rely on asymmetric cryptographic primitives, generic two-party computation (2PC) techniques like garbled circuits, or function secret sharing methods, all of which are computationally intensive and lead to poor concrete efficiency. This work introduces a new modular framework for fuzzy PSI, primarily built on efficient symmetric key primitives. Our framework reduces the design of efficient fuzzy PSI to a novel variant of oblivious transfer (OT), which we term distance-aware random OT (da-ROT). This variant enables the sender to obtain two random strings (r(0), r(1)), while the receiver obtains one of these values r(b), depending on whether the receiver's input keyword a and the sender's input keyword b are close in some metric space i.e., dist(a, b) <= delta The da-ROT can be viewed as a natural extension of traditional OT, where the condition (choice bit) is known to the receiver. We propose efficient constructions for da-ROT based on standard OT techniques tailored for small domains, supporting distance metrics such as the Chebyshev norm, the Euclidean norm, and the Manhattan norm. By integrating these da-ROT constructions, our fuzzy PSI framework achieves up to a 14x reduction in communication cost and up to a 54x reduction in computation cost compared to previous state-of-the-art protocols, across input set sizes ranging from 2(8) to 2(16). Additionally, we extend our framework to compute fuzzy PSI cardinality and fuzzy join from traditional PSI-related functionalities. All proposed protocols are secure in the semi-honest model.

SCALES (Small Clients And Larger Ephemeral Servers) (Acharya et al., TCC 2022, CRYPTO 2024) is a recently proposed model for MPC with several attractive features, including resilience to adaptive corruption. Known SCALES constructions, while offering reasonable asymptotics for large-scale MPC, incur high concrete costs both in computation and communication. As our primary contribution, we dramatically improve both asymptotic and concrete costs of SCALES for permutation branching programs (PBP), a well-motivated practical model of computation. We achieve linear cost in program length, input size, and the security parameter. Our instantiations of the building blocks may be of independent interest. Further, we present generic transformations to extend any semi-honestly secure SCALES protocol to achieve (1) guaranteed output delivery in the presence of mixed adversaries (that corrupt servers maliciously and clients semi-honestly) in the all-but-one corruption setting; and (2) protocols for computing general functionalities where each server’s computation scales sub-linearly in the function size.

Garbled Circuits (GC) is a foundational primitive for secure two-party computation (2PC). Garbled Private Information Retrieval (GPIR) is a GC technique for looking up a public array or database (DB) on a private index unknown to either player. GPIR immediately implies GC evaluation of functions implemented as a publicly known look-up table (LUT). GPIR is costly: it can be obtained by a linear scan, adapting Garbled RAM, stacking GC branches implementing access to table elements, and, most recently, from GC Look-up Table logrow (Heath et al., Eurocrypt 2024). For a N-row DB lookup of m-bit rows, logrow's computation is approximate to O(Nm kappa), and communication is O(m(log N . kappa + N)). logrow thus can be effectively used on tables of sizes up to approximate to 2(15). We propose Toss, a new efficient GPIR with dramatically reduced bandwidth consumption (a scarce resource in MPC!), both asymptotically and concretely. Our communication cost is O(root Nm root kappa) with a small constant, sublinear both in N and security parameter kappa. Our computation cost is O(Nm kappa + (root N/kappa m + N)c(kappa)), where c(kappa) is the computational cost of hash evaluation. This computation cost is about the same as or slightly lower than logrow's. In concrete terms, for a 2(20)-row LUT of 8-bit items, we improve over logrow by factor >31x in communication. On a laptop over 100Mbps channel, the throughput increases from approximate to 10.6 lookup/s to approximate to 81 lookup/s, achieving >7.5x improvement. For 10Mbps channel, Toss's throughput is >28x better. Communication improvement grows with N: e.g., for N = 2(25), m = 32, improvement is > 512x. Toss builds on stacked garbling (SGC) and logrow with multiple nuanced low-level optimizations, requiring reworking of their internals and interfaces. We emphasize that constructing GPIR directly from SGC incurs logarithmic overhead in computation, which actually decreases throughput in typical "laptop + LAN" testbeds. We implement our construction and report on its performance.

Syndrome decoding ( ), and equivalently Learning Parity with Noise ( ), is a fundamental problem in cryptography, which states that for a field 𝔽 , some compressing public matrix G∈𝔽 ^k× n , and a secret sparse vector e∈𝔽 ^n sampled from some noise distribution, Ge is indistinguishable from uniform. Recently, the has gained significant interest due to its use in pseudorandom correlation generators (PCGs). In pursuit of better efficiency, we propose a new assumption called Stationary Syndrome Decoding ( ). In , we consider q correlated noise vectors e _1,… ,e _q∈𝔽 ^n and associated instances G _1e _1,… ,G _qe _q where the noise vectors are restricted to having non-zeros in the same small subset of t positions L⊂ [n] . That is, for all i∈ L , e _j,i is uniformly random, while for all other i, e _j,i = 0 . Although naively reusing the noise vector renders and insecure via simple Gaussian elimination, we observe known attacks do not extend to our correlated noise. We show is unconditionally secure against so-called linear attacks, e.g., advanced information set decoding and representation techniques (Esser and Santini, Crypto 2024). We further adapt the state-of-the-art nonlinear attack (Briaud and Øygarden, Eurocrypt 2023) to and demonstrate both theoretically and experimentally resistance to the attack. We apply to PCGs to amortize the cost of noise generation protocol. For OT and VOLE generation, each instance requires O(t) communication instead of O(tlog n) . For suggested parameters, we observe a 1.5× improvement in the running time or between 6 and 18× reduction in communication. For Beaver triple generation using Ring LPN, our techniques have the potential for substantial amortization due to the high concrete overhead of the Ring LPN noise generation.

We explore Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) of statements expressed as programs written in high-level languages, e.g., C or assembly. At the core of executing such programs in ZK is the repeated evaluation of a CPU step, achieved by branching over the CPU's instruction set. This approach is general and covers traversal-execution of a program's control flow graph (CFG): here CPU instructions are straight-line program fragments (of various sizes) associated with the CFG nodes. This highlights the usefulness of ZK CPUs with a large number of instructions of varying sizes. We formalize and design an efficient tight ZK CPU, where the cost (both computation and communication, for each party) of each step depends only on the instruction taken. This qualitatively improves over state of the art, where cost scales with the size of the largest CPU instruction (largest CFG node). Our technique is formalized in the standard commit-and-prove paradigm, so our results are compatible with a variety of (interactive and non-interactive) general-purpose ZK. We implemented an interactive tight arithmetic (over F261-1) ZK CPU based on Vector Oblivious Linear Evaluation (VOLE) and compared it to the state-of-the-art non-tight VOLE-based ZK CPU Batchman (Yang et al. CCS'23). In our experiments, under the same hardware configuration, we achieve comparable performance when instructions are of the same size and a 5-18x improvement when instructions are of varied size. Our VOLE-based tight ZK CPU (over F261- 1) can execute 100K (resp. 450K) multiplication gates per second in a WAN-like (resp. LAN-like) setting. It requires = 102 Bytes per multiplication gate. Our basic building block, ZK Unbalanced Read-Only Memory, may be of independent interest.

AIM: to evaluate results of rectal resection in metastatic rectal cancer. PATIENTS AND METHODS: a retrospective analysis of the results of treatment of 84 patients with symptomatic rectal cancer at stage IV, who underwent rectal resection in 2015-2020. RESULTS: anastomotic leak developed in 5 (5.9%) patients. Postoperative mortality rate was 1 (1.2%). Ileostomy closure was performed in 66 patients (78.6%) 17.9 months after initial surgery. Progression of the disease was detected in 60 (71.4%) patients at following organs: liver (42.9%), peritoneum (19%), lungs (15.5%). Stabilization was significantly higher after systemic chemotherapy before and after perioperative chemotherapy comparing to patients who had preoperative radiation (p = 0.013). Proportional Cox regression model risks showed that the chances of death in patients with advanced rectal cancer after surgery was 4.1 times higher for peritoneal carcinomatosis, 2.9 times for liver metastases and 1.5 for multi organ metastasis. CONCLUSION: low anterior resection with defunctioning ileostomy is associated with acceptable anastomotic leak rate (5.9%) and mortality (1.2%). Systemic chemotherapy in combination with target agents is preferable initial treatment in patients with metastatic rectal cancer.

SCALES (Small Clients And Larger Ephemeral Servers) model is a recently proposed model for MPC (Acharya et al., TCC 2022). While the SCALES model offers several attractive features for practical large-scale MPC, the result of Acharya et al. only offered semi-honest secure protocols in this model. We present a new efficient SCALES protocol secure against malicious adversaries, for general Boolean circuits. We start with the base construction of Acharya et al. and design and use a suite of carefully defined building blocks that may be of independent interest. The resulting protocol is UC-secure without honest majority, with a CRS and bulletin-board as setups, and allows publicly identifying deviations from correct execution.

Data-dependent accesses to memory are necessary for many real-world applications, but their cost remains prohibitive in secure computation. Prior work either focused on minimizing the need for data-dependent access in these applications, or reduced its cost by improving oblivious RAM for secure computation (SC-ORAM). Despite extensive efforts to improve SC-ORAM, the most concretely efficient solutions still require $$\approx $$ 0.7 s per access to arrays of $$2^{30}$$ entries. This plainly precludes using MPC in a number of settings. In this work, we take a pragmatic approach, exploring how concretely cheap MPC RAM access could be made if we are willing to allow one of the participants to learn the access pattern. We design a highly efficient Shared-Output Client-Server ORAM ( $$\textsf {SOCS}\hbox {-}\textsf {ORAM}$$ ) that has constant overhead, uses one round-trip of interaction per access, and whose access cost is independent of array size. $$\textsf {SOCS}\hbox {-}\textsf {ORAM}$$ is useful in settings with hard performance constraints, where one party in the computation is more trust-worthy and is allowed to learn the RAM access pattern. Our $$\textsf {SOCS}\hbox {-}\textsf {ORAM}$$ is assisted by a third helper party that helps initialize the protocol and is designed for the honest-majority semi-honest corruption model. We implement our construction in C++ and report its performance. For an array of length $$2^{30}$$ with 4B entries, we communicate 13B per access and take essentially no overhead beyond network latency.

Garbled Circuit (GC) is a basic technique for practical secure computation. GC handles Boolean circuits; it consumes significant network bandwidth to transmit encoded gate truth tables, each of which scales with the computational security parameter κ . GC optimizations that reduce bandwidth consumption are valuable. It is natural to consider a generalization of Boolean two-input one-output gates (represented by 4-row one-column lookup tables, LUTs) to arbitrary N-row m-column LUTs. Known techniques for this do not scale, with naïve size- O(Nmκ ) garbled LUT being the most practical approach in many scenarios. Our novel garbling scheme – – implements GC LUTs while sending only a logarithmic in N number of ciphertexts! Specifically, let n = ⌈log _2 N ⌉ . We allow the GC parties to evaluate a LUT for (n-1)κ + nmκ + Nm bits of communication. is compatible with modern GC advances, e.g. half gates and free XOR. Our work improves state-of-the-art GC handling of several interesting applications, such as privacy-preserving machine learning, floating-point arithmetic, and DFA evaluation.

Мета-анализ был направлен на оценку связи между полиморфизмами rs2107425, rs2839698, rs217727, rs3741219 гена H19 и риском развития рака молочной железы. Поиск публикаций проводили в базах данных Google Scholar и PubMed за последние 13 лет. Ассоциацию оценивали по статистическим критериям отношения шансов (ОШ) с 95% доверительным интервалом (ДИ). Для проведения мета-анализа использовали программное обеспечение RevMan (Cochrane Collaboration, 5.3. Копенгаген). Для оценки связи четырех полиморфизмов rs2107425, rs2839698, rs217727, rs3741219 с риском развития рака молочной железы в мета-анализ были включены 9 исследований случай-контроль с общей выборкой из 6572 пациентов с раком молочной железы и 6968 доноров в контрольной группе. В результате исследования мы наблюдали связь между rs2839698 H19 и риском развития рака молочной железы в аллельной модели (ОШ = 1,33, 95% ДИ: 1,00- 1,76, Pz = 0,005, Pi2 = <0.00001). Кроме того, в рецессивной модели риск развития рака молочной железы также был ассоциирован с мутантным аллелем rs2839698 (ОШ = 1,33, 95% ДИ: 1,03-1,71, Pz = 0,03, Pi2 = 0,05). Значимых ассоциаций с риском развития рака молочной железы полиморфизмов rs2107425, rs217727, rs3741219 не обнаружили. Настоящий мета анализ показал, что полиморфизм rs2839698 H19 ассоциирован с риском развития рака молочной железы. The meta-analysis was aimed to evaluate the association between polymorphisms rs2107425, rs2839698, rs217727, rs3741219 of the H19 gene and the risk of developing of breast cancer. Publications were searched in the Google Scholar and PubMed databases until August 2023. The association was assessed by statistical odds ratio (OR) criteria with a 95% confidence interval (CI). RevMan software (Cochrane Collaboration, 5.3. Copenhagen) was used for the meta-analysis. To assess the association of polymorphisms rs2107425, rs2839698, rs217727, rs3741219 with the risk of developing breast cancer, 9 case-control studies with a total sample of 6572 patients with breast cancer and 6968 donors in the control group were included in the meta-analysis. As a result of the study, we observed an association between rs2839698 H19 and the risk of developing breast cancer when calculating the allelic model (OR = 1.33, 95% CI: 1.00-1.76, Pz = 0.005, Pi2 = <0.00001). In addition, analysis of the recessive model also showed that the risk of developing breast cancer was significantly associated in individuals with a mutation in the polymorphic allele rs2839698 (OR = 1.33, 95% CI: 1.03-1.71, Pz = 0.03, Pi2 = 0.05). When calculating genetic models for the rs2107425, rs217727, rs3741219 polymorphisms, no statistically significant associations with the risk of developing breast cancer were found. The present meta-analysis showed that the H19 rs2839698 polymorphism associated with the risk of breast cancer.

In the Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP) of a disjunctive statement, 𝒫 and 𝒱 agree on B fan-in 2 circuits 𝒞 _0, … , 𝒞 _B-1 over a field 𝔽 ; each circuit has n_ in inputs, n_× multiplications, and one output. 𝒫 ’s goal is to demonstrate the knowledge of a witness ( id ∈ [B] , w∈𝔽^n_ in ) , s.t. 𝒞 _ id (w) = 0 where neither w nor id is revealed. Disjunctive statements are effective, for example, in implementing ZKP based on sequential execution of CPU steps. This paper studies ZKP (of knowledge) protocols over disjunctive statements based on Vector OLE. Denoting by λ the statistical security parameter and let ρ≜max{log |𝔽|, λ} , the previous state-of-the-art protocol Robin (Yang et al. CCS’23) required (n_ in +3n_× )log| 𝔽| + 𝒪(ρ B) bits of communication with 𝒪(1) rounds, and 𝖬𝖺𝖼'𝗇'𝖢𝗁𝖾𝖾𝗌𝖾 (Baum et al. CRYPTO’21) required (n_ in +n_× )log| 𝔽| + 2n_×ρ + 𝒪(ρlog B) bits of communication with 𝒪(log B) rounds, both in the VOLE-hybrid model. Our novel protocol LogRobin++ achieves the same functionality at the cost of (n_ in +n_× )log| 𝔽| + 𝒪(ρlog B) bits of communication with 𝒪(1) rounds in the VOLE-hybrid model. Crucially, LogRobin++ takes advantage of two new techniques – (1) an 𝒪(log B) -overhead approach to prove in ZK that an IT-MAC commitment vector contains a zero; and (2) the realization of VOLE-based ZK over a disjunctive statement, where 𝒫 commits only to w and multiplication outputs of 𝒞 _ id (w) (as opposed to prior work where 𝒫 commits to w and all three wires that are associated with each multiplication gate). We implemented LogRobin++ over Boolean (i.e., 𝔽_2 ) and arithmetic (i.e., 𝔽_2^61-1 ) fields. In our experiments, including the cost of generating VOLE correlations, LogRobin++ achieved up to 170 × optimization over Robin in communication, resulting in up to 7× (resp. 3× ) wall-clock time improvements in a WAN-like (resp. LAN-like) setting.

OBJECTIVE:To evaluate surgical and oncological results of standard and extended lymph node dissection (D2 and D3) in patients with colon cancer. MATERIAL AND METHODS:We analyzed treatment outcomes in 74 patients with colon cancer stage T1-4aN0-2M0 who underwent right- and left-sided hemicolectomy, resection of sigmoid colon with standard and extended lymph node dissection (D2 and D3). RESULTS:Surgical approach and level of D3 lymph node dissection did not increase intra- and postoperative morbidity. Laparoscopic interventions were followed by significantly lower intraoperative blood loss and earlier gas discharge. Metastatic lesion of apical lymph nodes was observed in 5 out of 36 patients who underwent D3 lymph node dissection (13.8%), and metastases in regional lymph nodes rN1-2 were found in all these patients. Overall 5-year survival was 86%. Disease-free and overall 5-year survival were similar after D2 and D3 lymph node dissection. CONCLUSION:D3 lymph node dissection is safe for colon cancer. Metastatic lesions of apical lymph nodes during D3 lymph node dissection were detected only in patients with lesions of regional lymph nodes (rN1-2). Disease-free and overall 5-year survival were similar after D2 and D3 lymph node dissection.

SCALES (Small Clients And Larger Ephemeral Servers) model is a recently proposed model for MPC (Acharya et al., TCC 2022). While the SCALES model offers several attractive features for practical large-scale MPC, the result of Acharya et al. only offered semi-honest secure protocols in this model. We present a new efficient SCALES protocol secure against malicious adversaries, for general Boolean circuits. We start with the base construction of Acharya et al. and design and use a suite of carefully defined building blocks that may be of independent interest. The resulting protocol is UC-secure without honest majority, with a CRS and bulletin-board as setups, and allows publicly identifying deviations from correct execution.

Two patients with metastatic colorectal cancer underwent R0 large bowel resection followed by surgery liver and lungs metastases, retroperitoneal lymph nodes and post-op chemotherapy. The total follow-up period of the first patient was currently 12 years, the recurrence-free period was 5 years. In the second patient, stabilization of the disease was observed for 12 years, and the total follow-up period – 18.5 years. An integrated treatment approach to metastatic CRC with active surgery for removable distant metastases or perioperative use of the most effective drug therapy for potentially resectable metastases can control the disease even with an aggressive course.

СРАВНИТЕЛЬНАЯ ОЦЕНКА МЕТОДОВ СОЗДАНИЯ ОРТОТОПИЧЕСКОЙ МОДЕЛИ РАКА ПЕЧЕНИКечерюкова Т.М. 1 , Гурова С.В. 1 , Гончарова А