While naval warfare has occupied a prominent place in the history of conflict and diplomacy, it tended to be waged between states with strikingly different political, economic and strategic views of the sea in national strategy. Sea power states tended to share inclusive political structures that enable trade, capital and commerce access to the levers of power. That access was used to promote naval power and identity. They fought for sea control and economic advantage, while continental powers sought security and additional profitable territory. Continental navies were primarily used to limit the ability of sea powers to exploit the ocean. Since, as maritime strategist Julian Corbett observed in 1911: 'men live upon the land and not upon the sea,' it has always been easier to secure a strategic decision ashore than at sea. However skilfully handled, naval power has exerted enormous influence on conflicts as varied as the Napoleonic wars and the Falklands conflict of 1982.

This essay examines the recovery and development of strategic leadership as an educational aid for senior officers and statesmen. Between 1902 and 1914 Julian Stafford Corbett (1854–1922) provided history and strategy lectures for the Royal Navy's senior level war course, an educational programme designed to prepare the navy's leadership for future conflicts through in depth study of strategy, technology, intentional law, historical and contemporary experience, and national policy. Corbett, a lawyer by training, was wealthy and politically engaged. In the less than a decade he developed his limited initial brief, providing historical content, into a programme to capture and define national strategy, and disseminate it as doctrine. He worked closely with service leaders, including First Sea Lord Admiral Sir John Fisher (1904–1910) and successive directors of naval intelligence, the navy's chief war planner, and the officer responsible for the war course. Not only did he teach almost all the middle and senior level naval officers who served in the First World War, but his extensive publications ensured national strategic doctrine was widely understood, by service leaders and civilians.

Examines how the Channel Islands have been crucial to Britain's successful maritime superiority in the English Channel. The Channel Islands have played a key role in both naval warfare and Anglo-French diplomacy, but this has not always been highlighted sufficiently even though Britain and France were at war for most of the period 1689-1815. This book considers a wide range of maritime subjects where the role of the Channel Islands has been significant, such as intelligence gathering, piracy and privateering, and naval strategy and control of the Channel. It also examines topics in relation to the Channel Islands specifically, such as surveying and hydrography, fortifications, trade and Channel Islands societies. It charts changes over time, including the impact of technological changes, from the wars of Louis XIV and William III, through the many Anglo-French wars of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and includes planning for wars which were anticipated but avoided. Throughout the issues are discussed from the perspectives of Britain, France and the Channel Islands themselves, equal weight being given to all three perspectives. Andrew Lambert is Professor of War Studies at King's College, London and one of Britain's foremost maritime and naval historians. Colin Partridge is a former consultant to the States of Guernsey's 'Fortress Guernsey' programme for the restoration and interpretation of Guernsey's fortifications. Jean de Préneuf is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Lille and Head of the Research, Teaching and Studies Unit at the Historical Branch of the French Ministry of Defence at Vincennes.

The maritime aspects of the wars of the French Revolution and Empire were asymmetric, between a British seapower empire of oceanic connectivity and a French dominated European system that focussed on territorial control and economic restriction. The inclusive British political system privileged naval strength, the defence of trade, and sea control. This position was based on battle fleet dominance, which remained undefeated across two decades. British identity became ever more closely linked to naval success as Nelson, the Nile and Trafalgar added new names to national culture. This sustained long-term funding for major infrastructure projects, new ships, and high levels of skilled manpower. Superior ships and men enabled the Royal Navy to defeat naval rivals, and attacks on commercial shipping by national warships and privateers. Naval dominance sustained a hard-line economic war that broke the Russian economy, and seriously damaged that of France, while the City of London and the British economy more generally continued to support the national war effort through extensive capital loans, and private measures, such as those of Lloyds Patriotic Fund. Seapower could not defeat Napoleon, it supported a grand alliance that would achieve that aim. By 1815 Britain had become a global seapower empire of unrivalled wealth and influence.

completely objective accounts, as they were often framed by and included alternative views that were beneficial to their authors. The questionable feasibility of the research is also evidenced by the somewhat lacking conclusions within the contributions, which mostly close only with preliminary notes or minor summaries, admitting that the research is still a work in progress or emphasizing the need for additional research. While each contribution is fascinating in its own right, the notion of the ‘long eighteenth century’ relies on the representation and reliability of its supporting material, which at present does seem like a hurdle yet to be overcome. This special issue attempts primarily to show the practical feasibility of realizing Van Leur’s vision of the ‘long eighteenth century’ through contemporary research, while indicating its ability to rectify enduring Eurocentric and teleological historical assumptions and achieve a more comprehensive understanding of our global history. Despite much promise, the contributions appear unable to definitively establish the wider framework due to the aforementioned difficulties. Remarkable promise does, however, exist, as Shimada clearly portrays the scholarly advancements that have been made. The researchers have utilized exciting new sources and research approaches, gradually uncovering a deeper understanding of premodern Asian history. This special issue can therefore best be viewed as a stepping stone. For those involved in maritime and global history, it constitutes a fascinating read with inspiring topics and approaches. Through further efforts like this, a prominent eighteenth century could very well become a reality.