Research shows that many voters ascribe stereotypical traits and issue competences to male and female politicians - such as viewing women as more compassionate and honest, and men as more competent and decisive - and use these perceptions when evaluating candidates. However, little is known about whether politicians themselves also hold such gender stereotypes. This paper uses data from both a candidate and a citizen survey conducted as part of the Swiss Election Study (SELECTS) in 2019 and 2023 to compare the prevalence of gender stereotypes among political elites and citizens, as well as their individual-level correlates. Our findings show that such stereotypes are not only present among politicians but are even more widespread than among ordinary citizens. The correlates of gender stereotypes are not uniform: they differ between political elites and citizens, vary across trait- and issue-based stereotypes, and affect male- and female-typed stereotypes in distinct ways. Die Forschung zeigt, dass viele W & auml;hlende m & auml;nnlichen und weiblichen Politikern stereotype Eigenschaften und Themenkompetenzen zuschreiben - etwa indem sie Frauen als mitf & uuml;hlender und ehrlicher und M & auml;nner als kompetenter und entscheidungsfreudiger wahrnehmen - und diese Wahrnehmungen bei der Bewertung von Kandidat:innen heranziehen. Es ist jedoch wenig dar & uuml;ber bekannt, ob Politiker:innen selbst ebenfalls solche Geschlechterstereotype hegen. Dieser Beitrag nutzt Daten einer Kandidierenden- und einer B & uuml;rger:innenbefragung, die im Rahmen der Schweizer Wahlstudie (SELECTS) 2019 und 2023 durchgef & uuml;hrt wurden, um die Verbreitung von Geschlechterstereotypen unter politischen Eliten und B & uuml;rger:innen sowie deren Einflussfaktoren auf Individualebene zu vergleichen. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass solche Stereotype nicht nur unter Politiker:innen vorhanden, sondern dort sogar noch weiterverbreitet sind als in der allgemeinen Bev & ouml;lkerung. Die Einflussfaktoren von Geschlechterstereotypen sind dabei nicht einheitlich: Sie unterscheiden sich zwischen politischen Eliten und B & uuml;rger:innen, variieren zwischen eigenschafts- und themenbezogenen Stereotypen und wirken sich auf m & auml;nnlich und weiblich gepr & auml;gte Stereotype auf unterschiedliche Weise aus. Les recherches montrent que de nombreux & centerdot;ses & eacute;lecteur & centerdot;trice & centerdot;s attribuent des traits st & eacute;r & eacute;otyp & eacute;s et des comp & eacute;tences th & eacute;matiques aux politiciens de sexe masculin et f & eacute;minin - par exemple en percevant les femmes comme plus compatissantes et honn & ecirc;tes, et les hommes comme plus comp & eacute;tents et d & eacute;cid & eacute;s - et utilisent ces perceptions pour & eacute;valuer les candidat & centerdot;e & centerdot;s. Cependant, on sait peu de choses sur la question de savoir si les politicien & centerdot;ne & centerdot;s eux & centerdot;elles-m & ecirc;mes partagent de tels st & eacute;r & eacute;otypes de genre. Cet article utilise les donn & eacute;es d'une enqu & ecirc;te aupr & egrave;s des candidat & centerdot;e & centerdot;s et des citoyen & centerdot;ne & centerdot;s men & eacute;e dans le cadre de l'& Eacute;tude & eacute;lectorale suisse (SELECTS) en 2019 et 2023 pour comparer la pr & eacute;valence des st & eacute;r & eacute;otypes de genre chez les & eacute;lites politiques et les citoyen & centerdot;ne & centerdot;s, ainsi que leurs corr & eacute;lats au niveau individuel. Nos r & eacute;sultats montrent que ces st & eacute;r & eacute;otypes sont non seulement pr & eacute;sents chez les responsables politiques, mais qu'ils sont m & ecirc;me plus r & eacute;pandus que chez les citoyen & centerdot;ne & centerdot;s. Les corr & eacute;lats des st & eacute;r & eacute;otypes de genre ne sont pas uniformes: ils diff & egrave;rent entre les & eacute;lites politiques et les citoyen & centerdot;ne & centerdot;s, varient selon qu'il s'agit de st & eacute;r & eacute;otypes bas & eacute;s sur les traits de caract & egrave;re ou sur les comp & eacute;tences th & eacute;matiques, et affectent de mani & egrave;re distincte les st & eacute;r & eacute;otypes typ & eacute;s masculins et f & eacute;minins. Le ricerche dimostrano che molti elettori ed elettrici attribuiscono tratti stereotipati e competenze tematiche a uomini e donne politiche - per esempio, considerare le donne pi & ugrave; compassionevoli e oneste e gli uomini pi & ugrave; competenti e decisi - e utilizzano queste percezioni per valutare candidati e candidate. Tuttavia, si sa poco se gli stessi uomini e donne politiche nutrano tali stereotipi di genere. Questo articolo utilizza i dati di un sondaggio condotto tra candidati/e e cittadini/e nell'ambito dello Studio Elettorale Svizzero (SELECTS) nel 2019 e nel 2023 per confrontare la prevalenza degli stereotipi di genere tra le & eacute;lite politiche e i cittadini, nonch & eacute; i loro correlati a livello individuale. I nostri risultati mostrano che tali stereotipi non sono solo presenti tra i politici, ma sono addirittura pi & ugrave; diffusi che tra i comuni cittadini. I correlati degli stereotipi di genere non sono uniformi: differiscono tra & eacute;lite politiche e cittadini, variano tra stereotipi basati sui tratti e sulle competenze tematiche, e influenzano in modi distinti gli stereotipi tipizzati maschili e femminili.

Political surveys are subject to nonresponse bias, leading to overestimated voter turnout and, at times, underestimated support for far-right parties. This study examines whether altering the salience of a survey's topic at the recruitment stage affects survey participation and nonresponse bias, and with what trade-offs. Using the panel survey of the Swiss Election Study (Selects 2023), respondents were randomly assigned to a high-salience condition emphasizing federal elections or a low-salience condition referring more broadly to societal and political issues. Low-salience framing modestly altered the composition of respondents in the first wave, increasing the share of non-voters and Swiss People's Party (SVP) voters, but also led to higher dropout in the second wave. Recruitment framing thus shapes who enters and remains in the survey: while it broadens initial participation, it reduces retention over time. Topic framing is therefore a relevant but constrained tool for addressing nonresponse bias in political surveys. Politische Umfragen unterliegen einem Non-Response-Bias, was zu einer & Uuml;bersch & auml;tzung der Wahlbeteiligung und teils zu einer Untersch & auml;tzung der Unterst & uuml;tzung f & uuml;r rechtspopulistische Parteien f & uuml;hrt. Diese Studie untersucht, ob die Ver & auml;nderung der Salienz eines Umfragethemas in der Rekrutierungsphase die Teilnahmebereitschaft und den Non-Response-Bias beeinflusst und welche Zielkonflikte dabei bestehen. Unter Verwendung der Panelbefragung der Schweizer Wahlstudie (Selects 2023) wurden Teilnehmende zuf & auml;llig einer Gruppe mit hoher Salienz (Betonung der nationalen Wahlen) oder einer Gruppe mit niedriger Salienz (allgemeinerer Bezug auf gesellschaftliche und politische Themen) zugewiesen. Ein Framing mit niedriger Salienz ver & auml;nderte die Zusammensetzung der Befragten in der ersten Welle geringf & uuml;gig: Der Anteil der Nichtw & auml;hlerinnen sowie der W & auml;hlerinnen der Schweizerischen Volkspartei (SVP) stieg, jedoch f & uuml;hrte dies auch zu einer h & ouml;heren Abbruchquote in der zweiten Welle. Das Rekrutierungs-Framing bestimmt somit, wer an der Umfrage teilnimmt und wer dabei bleibt: W & auml;hrend es die anf & auml;ngliche Teilnahmebereitschaft erh & ouml;ht, verringert es die Bindung & uuml;ber die Zeit. Thematisches Framing ist daher ein wichtiges, aber begrenztes Instrument zum Umgang mit Non-Response-Bias in politischen Umfragen. Les sondages politiques sont sujets & agrave; des biais de non-r & eacute;ponse, conduisant & agrave; une surestimation de la participation & eacute;lectorale et, parfois, & agrave; une sous-estimation du soutien aux partis de droite populiste. Cette & eacute;tude examine si la modification de la saillance du sujet d'une enqu & ecirc;te au stade du recrutement affecte la participation et le biais de non-r & eacute;ponse, et avec quels arbitrages. En utilisant l'enqu & ecirc;te par panel de l'& Eacute;tude & eacute;lectorale suisse (Selects 2023), les personnes interrog & eacute;es ont & eacute;t & eacute; assign & eacute;es de mani & egrave;re al & eacute;atoire & agrave; une condition de forte saillance (insistant sur les & eacute;lections f & eacute;d & eacute;rales) ou & agrave; une condition de faible saillance (faisant r & eacute;f & eacute;rence plus largement & agrave; des enjeux soci & eacute;taux et politiques). Le cadrage & agrave; faible saillance a modestement modifi & eacute; la composition des r & eacute;pondant & centerdot;es lors de la premi & egrave;re vague, augmentant la part des non-votant & centerdot;es et des & eacute;lecteurs et & eacute;lectrices de l'Union d & eacute;mocratique du centre (UDC), mais a & eacute;galement entra & icirc;n & eacute; un taux d'attrition plus & eacute;lev & eacute; lors de la deuxi & egrave;me vague. Le cadrage du recrutement fa & ccedil;onne ainsi qui entre dans l'enqu & ecirc;te et qui y reste: bien qu'il & eacute;largisse la participation initiale, il r & eacute;duit la r & eacute;tention au fil du temps. Le cadrage th & eacute;matique est donc un outil pertinent mais limit & eacute; pour traiter le biais de non-r & eacute;ponse dans les sondages politiques. I sondaggi politici sono soggetti a bias di mancata risposta, che portano a una sovrastima dell'affluenza alle urne e, talvolta, a una sottostima del sostegno ai partiti di estrema destra. Questo studio esamina se la modifica della salienza dell'argomento di un sondaggio nella fase di reclutamento influenzi la partecipazione e il bias di mancata risposta, e con quali compromessi. Utilizzando l'indagine panel dello Studio elettorale svizzero (Selects 2023), le persone interpellate sono state assegnate casualmente a una condizione di alta salienza (enfasi sulle elezioni federali) o a una condizione di bassa salienza (riferimento pi & ugrave; ampio a questioni sociali e politiche). Il framing a bassa salienza ha modificato modestamente la composizione del campione nella prima ondata, aumentando la quota di non votanti e di elettori ed elettrici dell'Unione Democratica di Centro (UDC), ma ha anche portato a un tasso di abbandono pi & ugrave; elevato nella seconda ondata. Il framing di reclutamento modella quindi chi partecipa e chi rimane nel sondaggio: se da un lato amplia la partecipazione iniziale, dall'altro riduce la fidelizzazione nel tempo. Il framing tematico & egrave; pertanto uno strumento pertinente ma limitato per affrontare il bias di mancata risposta nei sondaggi politici.

This study analyses the success of populist radical right (PRR) parties in the 2023 Swiss elections using reference group theory. While existing literature emphasizes the influence of objective and subjective group membership on electoral choice, it often overlooks voters' feelings toward groups they do not belong to and their perceptions of parties' associations with these groups. We argue that this framework is key to understanding PRR voting. Like their European counterparts, Swiss PRR parties - particularly the Swiss People's Party - mobilized group-based resentment through a campaign stigmatizing asylum seekers and migrants, and by promoting an anti-gender agenda. Using data from the Swiss Election Study (Selects), we show that negative feelings toward migrants and feminists influenced PRR voting, beyond political preferences and socio-structural factors. This resentment also helped attract new voters who had initially leaned toward centre-right parties. The study highlights the importance of group feelings in electoral behaviour.

Recent research demonstrates that voters who change their perceptions of parties' reputation on specific issues (issue ownership) are also more likely to change their party choice accordingly. This article deals with the sources of such instability, with an emphasis on the accessibility of voters' perceptions as measured by survey response times. We contend that more accessible perceptions are more stable, but that this stabilizing effect decreases over time. Panel data from the 2019 Swiss Election Study strongly suggest that voters who are quick to assess parties' competence and associative ownership are more likely to stick to their judgment, both in the short-term context of an election campaign (which in turn heightens the likelihood that they end up voting for the party they identified as the issue owner) and in the longer run. Hence, political parties may have incentives to continuously reinforce voters' issue ownership perceptions throughout the electoral cycle.

Some surveys ask respondents for consent to be recontacted for follow-up surveys after the initial part of the survey has been completed. Based on an experiment, we compare three options for asking for this panel consent: choice (yes/no), opt-in, and opt-out. We analyse panel consent rates and compare consenters with non-consenters against a comprehensive set of socio-demographic characteristics, political attitudes, and survey-related variables in a probability-based web survey. In a second step, we analyse consenters' actual participation in the first follow-up wave. The opt-out option yields higher panel consent rates than the other two options. Based on socio-demographic variables, panel consenters and non-consenters are most similar to each other in the choice design, and most different in the opt-out design. Based on typically biased variables, such as political interest or how the survey was perceived, the opt-out design performs better than the opt-in design in terms of consent, followed by the choice design. When it comes to actually participating in the first follow-up wave, the three panel consent options work in a similar way to giving consent. Overall, these findings speak in favour of the opt-out design, followed by the opt-in design.

Party–group relations are today characterized by various forms of alignments. These include the persistence of traditional class alignments, the realignment of economic groups due to identity politics and alignments of groups at the centre of identity politics. This study analyses the group-based messaging of parties in relation to these three groups. We argue that, contrary to the catch-all party thesis, positive and negative group appeals of parties are (still) structured by parties’ support among social groups and by groups either liked or disliked by their voters. Our argument is tested through a content analysis of election materials in Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands, combined with survey data. The results indicate that group appeals are indeed shaped by electoral support among social groups and attitudes towards them. Results also suggest that the former effect is present for traditionally aligned economic and identity politics groups, but not for realigned economic groups.

Abstract Although the instruments of direct democracy are increasingly popular in a growing number of democracies, nowhere are they more developed than in Switzerland. Indeed, direct democracy is a fundamental institution of the Swiss political system, and greatly impacts on the legislative process, party competition, and political campaigning. In the last two decades alone (2001–2021), Swiss citizens voted on 166 legislative or constitutional proposals at the federal level. This chapter first describes the use of direct-democratic instruments (compulsory referendum, optional referendum, popular initiative) over time and the evolution of the electorate’s support for the government. Second, it reviews the emerging literature on direct-democratic campaigning, shedding light on the actors involved and varying coalitions, their campaign channels, and their resources, as well as the flux and resonance of their campaign messages. Third, it turns to the individual-level and contextual-level determinants of turnout and highlights the apparent contradiction between low turnout rates at the aggregate level and widespread selective participation at the individual level. Finally, it takes stock of classic and recent studies on opinion formation and voting decisions to assess if and under what circumstances voters can make informed and correct choices. The chapter concludes on a rather optimistic note regarding the quality of direct-democratic decision-making in Switzerland and indicates avenues for future research.

Abstract The remarkable stability of national elections in Switzerland for over sixty years after the introduction of proportional representation in 1919 came to an end with the rise of the right-wing populist Swiss People’s Party (SVP) in the mid-1990s. Overall, party affiliation—and hence stability of the electoral choice—has declined significantly. As a result, situational factors, like issue salience, issue positioning, and long- and short-term campaign priorities, have become significant for electoral choice. These changes have also intensified competition among parties, which have begun to centralize their election campaigns and deploy new campaign techniques. Yet, turnout remains low despite these changes: since 1979, turnout in National Council elections has been below 50 per cent. This is due to the complexity of the electoral system and the high frequency of votes in Switzerland’s direct-democratic system.

According to the issue ownership theory of voting, voters cast their ballot for the party that they consider to be most competent and most committed to handle an issue of importance to them. This article offers a theoretical expansion of this model, arguing that the effect of issue ownership on vote choice is conditioned by the accessibility of voters' ownership perceptions, as measured by response latencies. Through individual-level analyses of voting in the 2019 Swiss federal election, we demonstrate that the effect of voters' issue ownership perceptions on their voting decisions is strongest when their ownership attributions are highly accessible and when the issue at stake is considered important. Our results also reveal that the effects of accessibility are largely driven by voting decisions for parties that own the issue in the eyes of a large part of the electorate, such as the Greens in the case of the environment.

This Special Issue brings together a large variety of contributions dealing with the influence of issues and issue competition, the structure of attitudes towards immigration and international cooperation and a series of non-policy factors such as campaign consultants and the rise of female representation in Switzerland. In this introduction we place the contributions in the broader framework of current debates in the international literature and stress the substantial and methodological innovations of the articles. Last, we offer some more general thoughts on almost 30 years of Swiss electoral research taking stock of the historical development.

To what extent are negative election campaigns “tailored” to the personality of the candidates? And with what electoral consequences? In this article we tackle these questions by focusing on the 2019 Swiss federal election. We estimate the presence of negativity as a function of the personality profile of competing candidates (Big Five) and the presence of professional consultants. Analyses based on data from a candidate survey (Selects 2019) suggest that campaign consultants are likely to take stock of the character of their candidate, and tailor the content of their campaigns accordingly - more aggressive for more energetic candidates (higher plasticity) and for less stable candidates (lower stability). These results, we argue, support our central claim that the role of consultants is to provide the most adequate campaign for the candidate they are promoting (“tailoring hypothesis”). We fail however to find any convincing evidence that such tailoring is electorally successful.

A growing body of studies shows that the reasons for competing candidates to “go negative” on their opponents during elections—that is, attacking their opponents instead of promoting their own programs or ideas stem from strategic considerations. Yet, existing research has, at this stage, failed to assess whether candidates’ personality traits also play a role. In this article, we bridge the gap between existing work in political psychology and political communication and study to what extent the personality traits of competing candidates are linked with their use of negative campaigning strategies. We rely on candidate survey data for recent elections in three countries—Germany (2017), Switzerland (2019), and Finland (2019). The data includes self-reported measures for candidates’ “Big Five” personality traits (extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, openness) and the the use of attacks towards their opponents during the campaign. Controlling for the usual suspects driving the use of negative campaigning we show that this latter is associated with low agreeableness and (marginally) with high extraversion and low conscientiousness. The role of personality for the focus of an attack (issue vs. character attacks) is somewhat less clear-cut. All in all, kinder and more stable candidates tend to go less negative; when they do, they tend to stay away from character-based attacks and somehow focus on issues.

The Covid-19 pandemic has significantly increased the use of knowledge and scientific expertise in policymaking. Governments around the world have relied on epidemiologists and virologists to formulate their non-pharmaceutical responses (e.g., lockdowns) to the massive public health crisis, and to devise and implement their health care and vaccination strategies. However, the Covid-19 pandemic is also a public policy matter. The public health crisis exacerbates economic inequalities, creates new social cleavages, affects party politics and public support for the government, and the stability of the political system. Political science can enhance our understanding of the political, social, and economic implications of the pandemic, and inform policymakers on a large variety of key issues, including the performance of public health systems, the role played by the main political actors in different countries, the evolution of public (dis)satisfaction with governments’ handling of the crisis, and the unfolding of international cooperation in the management of the crisis. So as to stimulate reflection and take stock of ongoing research, we released a call for contributions for the current Swiss Political Science Review (SPSR) special issue on Covid-19 – A Political Science Perspective in September 2020. The call has met an extraordinary success. We received 107 proposals – a number which testifies to the interest and necessity of such an initiative – among which we selected the finest, most pertinent, and most feasible in the short time frame at disposal, while also trying to cover a broad range of topics. The selected format of shorter research notes has been instrumental in ensuring a speedy peer review process and timely publication – also thanks to our external reviewers, who agreed upon and have made themselves available for the accelerated review procedure. The contributions to this special issue point to a number of key insights. Taken together, they depict the outbreak of Covid-19 as a critical juncture that confronted policy-makers with a “super-wicked problem” emerging in a situation of highest uncertainty. Policy responses have frequently been conceived and implemented with an experimental character and have produced a number of unintended consequences. First, various contributions concentrate on the determinants of policy responses to the public health crisis. They have shown how the type and scope of policy responses to the Covid-19 crisis have been affected by policy dynamics and institutional factors. The role of social media has been portrayed as central for shaping the public debate and the spread of (dis)information in the wake of the emergency (Gemenis; Gilardi et al.), especially in a context where policy frames decisively affect citizens’ attitudes and preferences for containment strategies and risk management programmes (Olmastroni et al.). Against this background, independent regulators have become central for the governance of the Covid-19 ‘infodemic’ by gaining control over sectoral expertise in the absence of preexisting policy interventions (Di Mascio et al.). Policy responses have also been partially determined by policies adopted in other jurisdictions, eventually leading to a certain convergence of policy responses over time, e.g., regarding restrictions to internal and cross-border mobility (Rausis and Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik). Yet, a fine-grained calibration of policy interventions is warranted, as perceptions and behaviour, such as vaccine hesitancy, vary across social groups (Knotz et al.) Second, the contributions delve into the far-reaching implications of the pandemic and the political handling of the crisis. They show that the crisis percolates on broader processes that are crucial for democratic policy-making, such as citizens’ engagement and mobilization, ideological polarization and extremism, and the evolution of political trust. Although pre-existing patterns of political and civic engagement largely persisted during the crisis, crisis-related threat perceptions have further triggered mobilization in the early phase of the pandemic and the crisis created specific mobilization potential for extremist political forces (Borbáth et al.). Voters’ perceptions of the government’s competence in handling public health and the economy during the crisis is influenced by political ideology (Vlandas and Klymak); the latter is negligible, however, for explaining the spread of Covid-19 related conspiracy beliefs and skepticism (Gemenis). Negative emotions such as fear and anger crucially affect citizens’ trust in their governments, but play out in very different ways, leading citizens either to “rally-around-the-flag” or to attribute blame for their situation to the government (Ehrhardt et al.). The crisis also challenges social solidarity. Inter-group and inter-generational solidarity is crucial for popular preferences concerning the distribution of vaccines among different social groups (Knotz et al.), but benefits different groups differently. The particular challenges of Covid-19 for other vulnerable groups such as refugees and migrants whose protection amidst the pandemic hinges on the politicization of their situation, have not yet been met with adequate policy responses (Bohnet and Rüegger). Taken together, these research notes highlight the factors that shape popular attitudes during the pandemic, attitudes which, in turn, crucially inform public policy-making. Thereby, the contributions provide necessary insight for the design of policy interventions. Finally, from a methodological point of view, the special issue shows the diverse uses of survey methodology for political research on unfolding crises. In particular, the use of non-probability online surveys has grown rapidly in social science and policy research over the past decade. Since the outbreak of the Covid-19 crisis, the popularity of online surveys seems to have further increased – as it is also the case for several contributions in this volume. Such surveys offer a fast and relatively cheap tool for collecting real-time information about (changing) public perceptions, beliefs, and behavior during a fast-moving situation. Although the quality of non-probability online surveys is highly variable, and their widespread use is subject to academic debate, they allow researchers to make a virtue of necessity and possibly to draw inferences that would not be otherwise feasible. Moreover, their low turnaround time offers a decisive advantage, especially in times of crises, when the speed in obtaining new scientific knowledge is particularly important. To conclude, we shall mention a few remaining blind spots and potential avenues for further research, starting from the need to put the Covid-19 pandemic in the larger context of the political management of large-scale crises. In such a context, we observe that democratic systems are under strain as they have to strike the balance between political means and goals that involve trade-offs and potential dilemmas, e.g., between the effectiveness and legitimacy of policy responses; the safeguard of civil liberties related to freedom of expression and privacy while also complying with the duty of protecting vulnerable groups and curtailing misinformation; the need for nurturing trust in government but allowing for well-grounded dissenting scientific opinions to inform policy-making; the prospects for a new division of labor between states and markets; and the need for ensuring cooperation and coordination in multilevel and cross-sectoral polities that are reshaped by the crisis.

Abstract This paper analyzes the mutual influence between media and political agendas in the Netherlands and Switzerland. While these two countries share a number of similarities, they also exhibit some important differences (e.g. the frequency of parliamentary meetings) that are likely to affect the patterns of influence. Time-series cross-section analyses of monthly data about issue attention in parliamentary questions and in media coverage for the period 1995–2003 (Switzerland) and 1995–2011 (Netherlands) provide partial support for our hypotheses. Agenda-setting and -building effects are overall stronger in Switzerland, which may be due to differences in the workings of national parliaments and varying degrees of mediatization. Moreover, our analyses reveal more pronounced differences between the coalition and opposition parties in Switzerland. Overall, this study demonstrates that it is important to consider smaller institutional differences when studying political agenda-setting and -building in a cross-national perspective.

For the well-functioning of a direct democracy it is essential that citizens have access to and know about the relevant facts when they are called to vote on policy proposals. In direct-democratic campaigns, however, both proponents and opponents of a policy proposal have incentives to present only selected facts that serve their own position and help sway public opinion in the desired direction. In this chapter, the authors propose a novel typology of how statistics – one of the most often used tools to substantiate arguments with seemingly objective facts – can be (mis)used in direct-democratic campaigns. The typology is based on the distinction between misinformation and disinformation. Whereas the former represents unintentionally false information, the latter refers to the deliberate distribution of inaccurate information. The authors identify four major types of misuse of statistical information: (1) flawed statistics, (2) false predictions, (3) misleading examples, and (4) manipulated numbers. They illustrate each type with an example drawn from recent direct-democratic votes in Switzerland. The examples show that mis- and disinformation in vote campaigns can have far-reaching political and legal consequences.

Issue voting means that voters cast their ballot based on political issues. It is supposed to be on the rise in the U.S. (McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal, 2006; Nie, Verba, & Petrocik, 1999) and also in Europe (Aardal & van Wijnen, 2005; but see: Green & Hobolt, 2008). While the literature on issue voting is substantial, remarkably few studies have examined the multiple ways in which issues are connected to parties (or candidates) in voters' minds. The dominant approach is the spatial framework of voting behavior based on Downs' (1957) model of electoral competition. The idea is simple: Voters cast their ballot for the party (or candidate) that they perceive to hold a position that is closest to their own policy preferences. A second aspect of issue voting can be labelled as the competence dimension of issue voting. Here, the idea is not so much that people vote for parties with whom they agree positionally, but rather that some parties are considered more competent to handle and "solve" specific policy issues. Issue voting, in this line of work, consists of voting for the party that one considers as most competent to tackle issues (problems). Third, and gaining some traction in the literature recently, apart from being perceived as positionally close and competent, parties can be perceived as being especially committed to deal with an issue. Committed parties are supposed to consider the issue a priority for political action. Concerned voters prefer parties that will commit to act on their pet issues.

This chapter describes the Swiss political system and adopts an issue attention approach to explore one of its defining institutions: direct democracy. By means of referenda and popular initiatives, voters regularly decide on the continuity and change of policies. Welfare and education (27%) and environment, energy, and transportation (21%) account for almost half of all the votes during the period 1990–2014. The direct democracy venue is often activated as a result of citizens’ pressure (“bottom-up”). However, the majority of these bottom-up proposals are refused by voters. Policy change through direct democracy occurs more frequently in a “top-down” manner, when political elites are required by constitutional rules to put the fate of some of their most important decisions to the ballot box.

Previous studies have demonstrated that the extent to which media coverage influences the issue priorities of policy-makers is contingent on the type of issues, media, and political agendas. This article contributes to this literature by elaborating on a factor that has been surprisingly neglected so far: the domestic or Europeanized character of the political issue covered in the news. Empirically, we apply time-series cross-section analyses to a dataset on media and parliamentary agendas during the years 1995–2003 in Switzerland. We find that the media’s political agenda-setting power mainly stems from news coverage of domestic issues. News on Europeanized issues have a weak impact on so-called symbolic parliamentary agendas, and no impact at all on the more substantial parliamentary agendas that may initiate decision-making processes.