Due to the provisions of the Svalbard Treaty, Russia has kept a presence on this Norwegian archipelago – primarily based on coal mining – and has regularly made it clear that ensuring the continuation of this presence is a political goal. Since the late 2000s, Russia has attempted to revitalise its presence, stressing the need for economic efficiency and diversification away from coal. This includes tourism, fish processing and research activities. In recent years, Russia’s official rhetoric on Svalbard has sharpened, i.a. accusing Norway of breaching the treaty’s provisions on military use of the islands. The article contrasts the statements with the concrete actions undertaken by Russia to preserve and develop its presence. Russia’s policy of presence on Svalbard is not particularly well-coordinated or strategic – beyond an increasing openness to exploring new ways to sustain a sufficient presence. Financial limitations have constrained initiatives. The search for new activities and solutions is driven primarily by the need for cost-cutting and consolidating a limited presence deemed necessary for Russian security interest, not as strategies aimed at increasing Russian influence over the archipelago.

Scholars of critical geography and geopolitics have long noted the intersection between research and strategic interest in the polar areas. This article focuses on how this link is displayed in the case of Svalbard, an Arctic archipelago under Norwegian sovereignty. While Norway' research policy in Svalbard has traditionally been welcoming and supportive of international research activity with little interference in the organization of research, the Norwegian government recently introduced a new policy for the research community Ny-& Aring;lesund. The article reviews the changes introduced as well as the response from involved research organizations. It shows interdependence between political ambitions and research priorities and, given the status of Svalbard, a more complex relationship than is the case for research in polar areas outside national jurisdiction.

Melting sea ice has often been presented as a primary driver for development of Arctic shipping, but what role has it played for policies to develop the Northern Sea Route? It may look paradoxical that Russia has embarked on an ambitious icebreaker construction program, given climate change. In Russia, there have been contradictory assessments of further climate developments in the Arctic. Representatives of the nuclear icebreaker fleet have argued that a new cooling period will soon occur, whereas Russian climate science is dominated by unidirectional climate change. Nevertheless, there is agreement that more icebreakers are needed, since shipping activity is expected to increase, and an extended navigation season is an indisputable goal. Nuances in Russian climate science do not seem to play any role in policy planning for Arctic shipping. Shipping through the Arctic emits less greenhouse gases than navigation on conventional southerly routes, which may be used as an argument in favor of the Northern Sea Route. It is doubtful, though, that this will change priorities of international shipping companies, especially as long as international shipping is not subject to emissions standards. Many other considerations will have precedence. Obviously, Russia’s war in Ukraine and the ensuing international tension is affecting trade patterns and investments in the Russian Arctic. In this situation climate change plays less of a role in the development of shipping in the Russian Arctic. But even before the war climate change was less important than often assumed in the international literature.

Russian science has long warned of adverse climate impacts (also noting some positive effects), but state policies have been lacking. By analysing key policy documents over the last 15 years, this study identifies and explains the development of an adaptation policy. Most recently, a bureaucratic process set in motion by Russia's ratification of the Paris Agreement produced a set of policy documents addressing adaptation to negative climate impacts. These documents employed a bureaucratic-administrative approach, and the effectiveness of expected measures can be questioned. From 2020, a deeper reassessment of climate challenges has evolved, triggered by radical climate changes observed in the Russian Arctic, but also by developments in international climate policies and the energy transition. Economic adaptation to these trends has come to the forefront, raising questions of the need for structural change in the Russian economy. Opposition to reform remains strong, but the scope for discussion of possible pathways has widened considerably. Further development of low-carbon policies in Russia are contingent on international cooperation and integration of Russia in the world economy. The isolation of Russia, following the invasion of Ukraine, will make it difficult to influence Russian climate policies. Key policy insights Unlike the West, Russian climate policy has focused on adaptation, rather than mitigation. But policies have been weak, and adaptation not mainstreamed. Detailed recommendations for adaptation to climate change impacts adopted in 2021 signalled higher political attention, but framed adaptation largely as a technical task. Since 2020, a broader climate change and adaptation discourse entered Russian politics where adaptation to international climate policies and the energy transition is at the centre. Debate on Russia's role in the changing energy market had started, but the invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing international isolation of Russia is likely to reduce Russia's capacity and incentives to carry out low-carbon policies. Western countries will have to consider how they can provide climate policy incentives to Russia in the new international situation, as Russia will remain essential for the success of the climate regime. Science diplomacy may become important.

Russia accords high priority to developing its Northern Sea Route while acknowledging substantial investment needs. China has shown increasing interest in Arctic shipping and has finance and technology. Infrastructure cooperation has been highlighted in the context of the warming relationship between the two countries. Russian scholars express considerable concern regarding China's long-term goals in the Arctic and reluctance to allow China's influence, but expectations of investment remain high. Chinese scholars have been optimistic about prospects for cooperation, although not satisfied with the conditions Russia seems willing to offer. This background may help to explain the almost total lack of Sino-Russian cooperation in maritime infrastructure.

Traffic on the Northern Sea Route along Russia's Siberian coast has increased since 2010. But international transits between the Pacific and the Atlantic have not taken off as anticipated. Instead, the transportation of energy and mineral resources – mainly liquefied natural gas – from fields in Russia's Arctic has come to dominate the sea route. Russian protectionist measures have limited the role of international shipping companies, but alliances between Russian and foreign companies are expected to become important. Russia aims to build infrastructure facilitating year-round usage of the route, but international freight and commodities markets are likely to be decisive for the future volume of shipping.

Analysis of detailed statistics shows remarkable fluctuations in the volume and composition of voyages on the Northern Sea Route (NSR) along the northern coast of Russia since international use began in 2010. There has been strong growth in destination shipping between the Arctic and ports outside the region, but transit shipping between the Pacific and the Atlantic has not experienced the growth many had anticipated. Explanations are found in international market conditions as well as in the management of the NSR, with important lessons for the future development of different shipping segments. Shipping companies from several countries took part in the period up to 2019, but they seem to have become less central in the current phase of NSR shipping, which is dominated by the transport of hydrocarbons out of the Arctic. Russia expects international transit to pick up later. However, Russia alone cannot determine the volume of international traffic: it is the international shipping industry that will assess the balance of factors and conditions, and conclude if and when the shorter Arctic routes are safe, efficient, reliable, environmentally sound and economically viable in comparison with other routes.

Abstract: A Chinese Railway to the Arctic? The Story of Belkomur – so Far The further development of the Northern Sea Route, including the associated logistical chains and infrastructure, enjoys high priority in Russia, and inadequate south–north transportation capacity is recognized as a problem. China has shown increasing interest in Arctic shipping over the past ten years. The construction of a railway from the Urals, with connections to China, to a deep-water port with access to the Arctic Ocean appeared attractive, both as a strategic opportunity for China and as a natural area for Chinese engagement in Russia, given announcements of the close partnership and common interests between the two countries. Since 2012 various Chinese companies have shown interest in investing, and the conclusion of a concession agreement has been announced several times. The Russian federal authorities have voiced support, without committing budget funding. Increasingly, however, critical remarks have been heard from the federal government, although regional support remains strong. As of mid-2021 no firm agreement had been signed, and the project was put on hold. Reviewing the history of the project since Chinese companies were first engaged, this article offers insights on Russian regional authorities’ scope for manoeuvre and the relationship between central and regional power. It also reveals Russian misinterpretations of Chinese interest in the project.

Russia has been trying to create a regular shipping route in the Arctic Ocean for over a hundred years, in the hope that this will help open up the far north. During the Soviet era, the focus was on domestic shipping, until the project was abandoned due to the vast expense involved. It then was restarted in the mid-2000s, with the aim of expanding the Northern Sea Route to create a workable international trade route. However, maritime traffic has remained problematic, despite dramatic changes in the climate that have led the sea ice to melt during the summer months. Only a small section - the Kara Sea - in the west of the region has been successfully developed into an export route for natural gas and crude oil. This project has been characterised by competition between the state-owned company Rosatom and the state supervisory authorities over control of the essential fleet of nuclear-powered icebreakers, as well as over investments in infrastructure; Rosatom has prevailed.

Developments over the last decade have created new challenges for execution of Norwegian sovereignty over the islands. The radical downsizing of coal mining has been rapid and has affected the composition of the Norwegian community that has become increasingly dominated by tourism, with a large share of the employees being non-Norwegian. Russia's fundamental interests on Svalbard are stable: keeping a presence, aiming for special treatment, but not undermining the Svalbard treaty regime. Frictions with Norwegian authorities are related to Russia's plans to diversify away from increasingly loss-making coal mining into tourism and research support, where Norwegian environmental legislation and restrictions on helicopters are obstacles. The positions of various states on the status of the maritime zones and the continental shelf around Svalbard have not changed much, but the appearance of the snow crab - a sedentary species - on the shelf provoked a legal dispute where the EU reluctantly became involved.

Russia has been trying to create a regular shipping route in the Arctic Ocean for over a hundred years, in the hope that this will help open up the far north. During the Soviet era, the focus was on domestic shipping, until the project was abandoned due to the vast expense involved. It then was restarted in the mid-2000s, with the aim of expanding the Northern Sea Route to create a workable international trade route. However, maritime traffic has remained problematic, despite dramatic changes in the climate that have led the sea ice to melt during the summer months. Only a small section - the Kara Sea - in the west of the region has been successfully developed into an export route for natural gas and crude oil. This project has been characterised by competition between the state-owned company Rosatom and the state supervisory authorities over control of the essential fleet of nuclear-powered icebreakers, as well as over investments in infrastructure; Rosatomhas prevailed.