In this article Chris Higgins considers two works by Jean-Luc Nancy - "On Being Singular Plural" and "Why Are There Several Arts and Not Just One?" - in light of the formative task to do justice to the diverse dimensions of oneself given the offerings and demands of the world, a task made difficult by our finitude and the existence of incommensurable goods. While Nancy helps us appreciate the value pluralism animating the (liberal) arts, Higgins argues, Nancy himself shies away from the full implications of his relational ontology. Rather than follow individual arts and artworks into the local habitations they open - accepting the anguish of the arbitrary as the price of our finite but fulsome excursions into the reticulated real - Nancy retreats to the level of a global account (if a lyrical one) of the local.

To enact democracy, which is to live in communication with difference, requires a formative process that involves an education of the whole person for and through civic life. Drawing on Charles Mills's theory of Herrenvolk ethics and Jonathan Lear's analysis of psychosocial lapses that ail us, Sheron Fraser-Burgess and Chris Higgins pursue a critical, historiographical, and psychosocial reading of our failures to live up to this aspiration, offering (1) a critique of our tendency to saddle ourselves with a false choice between a homogenizing unity and a differentiated but fractured republic; (2) a demonstration of why we must eschew a thin universalism of principles and confront difference as embodied; (3) an argument from the ethics of risk against the urge to reify and compartmentalize difference; and (4) an evocation of how deep pluralism itself might serve as a unifying creed. Civic education is not a matter of informing but of forming and cultivating vision and values. In pursuing the credal deep pluralism that is required to do justice to the prospects and perils of our democracy-in-the-making, the task of the formative educator may be more difficult; but by embracing this creed, teachers may inspire their students to do the same.

What is the relation of philosophy and teaching? Do we start from philosophy and then work to close the gap through a process of application? Do we start from teaching, and work to create a space for philosophical reflection? Is it enough to include philosophical texts and activities in teacher education? Or perhaps we need to include teachers from the start as collaborators in the production of philosophical work. Of, in, for, with: it seems that every preposition has been proposed to join teaching and philosophy–a perennial dilemma that philosophers of education are far too familiar with. These anxious efforts to close the gap only reinforce our narrow, lopsided images of each endeavor. The teacher turns outward; the philosopher inward. Teaching is mired in the quotidian; philosophy prone to pointless abstraction. Called to act, the teacher works within the constraints of institutions; called to question, the philosopher practices principled withdrawal. While there is a grain of truth here, such contrasts obscure a key fact: philosophy and teaching are deeply kindred practices. The contemporary tragedies unfolding in Gaza and Israel serve as an urgent reminder of the costs of cleaving contemplation from action. Indeed, we will argue that the alienation of teaching (a practical endeavor if ever there was one) and philosophy (the contemplative discipline par excellence) damages the integrity of each. In what follows, we explore three conceptual sites—the posing of questions, the act of walking together, and the effort to discover what is at stake—which demonstrate a welcome return, or reunion, between philosophy and teaching.

Once again, teachers are being made into political pawns, where K-12 schools are sites of various culture wars. This chapter frames the contemporary politics of teaching as grappling with the pluralism represented in demographically diverse classrooms. Through historicizing this quest in Gunnar Myrdal's analysis of the "American dilemma" and unifying creed as panacea, it is possible to identify the enduring social, public, and psychodynamic dimensions of an inclusive ideal. Teachers should be prepared to cultivate deep commitment to republican virtues, in principle, while destigmatizing the identity and ontology of the "other." A credal deep pluralism can ground classroom praxis for the relational and ethical tensions that forms of difference engender in a democracy.

As schools of education are currently organized, philosophers of education lead a marginal and furtive existence. As education comes more and more to be understood as social scientific research into "what works'' in the schools, philosophers seem like a poor lot indeed. Even our role in teacher education, once secured by the metaphor of foundations, is now questionable. Debates in teacher education are lively enough: Do teachers need more coursework or more clinical experience? And if they need more coursework, do they need more classes in curriculum and instruction or more background in their ''content area''? Notice, though, that the kind of experience educational philosophers are best suited to provide for teachers is not even in the picture. What is this experience? In a word, it is liberal learning about and for education. If education is a space of humanistic questions, philosophy a love of these questions in their openness, and educational philosophy the craft of keeping alive the texts and conversation that helps us re-open such questions, then philosophical teacher education is an invitation to teachers to be humane intellectuals of their field. It is an invitation to join a conversation of millennial interest. Under the conception I have advanced, educational philosophy is far from marginal. It stands to remind how each positive program of research into what works begs key questions. And it stands to remind the university that, to paraphrase the famous essay by Sartre, education is a humanism. When education and the humanities are reconnected their place at the center of the university becomes clear.

Tal y como están las facultades de educación organizadas actualmente, los filósofos de la educación tienen una existencia marginal y furtiva. A medida que la educación se entiende cada vez más como una investigación científica social sobre "lo que funciona" en las escuelas, los filósofos parecen ser cada vez más inútiles. Incluso nuestro papel en la formación del profesorado, que una vez estuvo asegurado por la metáfora de los fundamentos, ahora es cuestionable. Los debates en la formación del profesorado están bastante animados: ¿los profesores necesitan más asignaturas o más experiencia clínica? Y si necesitan más asignaturas, ¿necesitan más clases de didáctica o más conocimiento sobre la asignatura que enseñan? Nos damos cuenta así de que el tipo de experiencia que los filósofos de la educación pueden ofrecer a los profesores ni siquiera está en el marco de interés. ¿Cuál es la experiencia que los filósofos de la educación podemos ofrecer? En una palabra, es un aprendizaje liberal acerca de y para la educación. Si la educación es un espacio de preguntas humanísticas, la filosofía un amor por estas preguntas en su apertura y la filosofía educativa el oficio de mantener vivos los textos y la conversación que nos ayudan a reabrir tales preguntas, entonces la formación filosófica del profesorado es una invitación a los profesores a que sean intelectuales humanos de su campo. Es una invitación a unirse a una conversación de interés milenario. Según la concepción que he desarrollado, la Filosofía de la Educación está lejos de ser marginal. Nos ayuda a recordar cómo cada programa educativo sobre “lo que funciona” plantea preguntas clave. Y, además, recuerda a la universidad que, parafraseando el famoso ensayo de Sartre, la educación es un humanismo. Cuando la educación y las humanidades se vuelven a conectar su lugar en el centro de la universidad queda claro.

This review article offers a critique of Rene Arcilla's theory of education as destiny in Wim Wenders's Road Movie Philosophy: Education Without Learning. After exploring Arcilla's long-standing interest in developing a dramatic approach to educational philosophy, one that avoids both bloodless theorising and melodramatic kitsch, it is contended that Arcilla's own interpretation of Wenders is melodramatic. Life is lived inside the hermeneutic circle. Breakthroughs are dogged by regret and fresh waves of contingency, uncertainty and disorientation. By contrast, in the destiny narrative articulated by Arcilla, we are released from this daily drama, suggesting the philosophical version of a Hollywood ending.

In "Educational Borderlands: Rigidities, Transparencies, and Porosities," Michael Richardson urges us to pay more attention to boundaries in education.His point of departure is the observation that (Western) education is torn between the aims of socializing and individualizing. 1 Richardson diagnoses this dichotomy as a symptom of a deeper ontological disorder, the tendency to consider individual entities (persons, groups, ideas, things) as either the building blocks or the derivatives of social and natural systems.By

Robert Pippin reads Shadow of a Doubt as offering us the sort of aesthetico-ethical engagement that René Arcilla has described as "existential learning." 1 Specifically, Pippin argues that the film is constructed to disrupt our moral knowingness, to interrupt our sorting of the guilty from the innocent, the good from bad.To be sure, Pippin is not calling for amoral skepticism.He stresses the imperative to lead a good life even as he applauds Hitchcock for inserting doubt about what counts as good conduct in such a life.Hitchcock's films, Pippin suggests, force us to reckon with the question of how we should live with "greatly reduced confidence in our application of moral standards?" 2 In this way, Pippin returns us to an essential question, posing it anew as a felt difficulty.What does a life of integrity, commitment, and open-mindedness look like?How do we confront our own ignorance?How do we navigate the shoals of confusion, paralysis, and spinelessness without running into the reefs of dogmatism and knowingness?In what follows, I offer my own brief exploration of these questions as a complement to Pippin's.I begin with a passage from the lesser known epistemologist, Donald Rumsfeld:Reports that say that something hasn't happened are always interesting to me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know.We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know.But there are also unknown unknowns-the ones we don't know we don't know.… It is the latter category that tend to be the difficult ones. 3 Rumsfeld made these infamous remarks in 2002, not at a philosophy conference but in a Pentagon briefing.It was five months after 9/11 and less than a year before the U.S. would launch the 2nd Gulf War on the pretense that Iraq had developed "weapons of mass destruction" or "WMDs",

Although demographic evidence suggests that, in the developed world, the number of employees who provide both childcare and eldercare is substantial, we know very little about how these “sandwiched” employees differ from those who provide only one form of caregiving (i.e., childcare, eldercare). In this article, we use partial least squares structural equation modeling to examine dual-income employees in households with three different caregiving situations: employees with only childcare (n = 4,129), only eldercare (n = 599), and both childcare and eldercare (n = 767). Findings show that demands contribute to stress more for sandwiched employees than those who provided only one form of caregiving, and more for employees with only eldercare demands than employees with only childcare demands. Results also indicate that control (at work, at home) negatively moderates the relationship between demands (at work, at home) and stress for some employees but not others.

Educational TheoryVolume 68, Issue 3 p. 255-267 ORIGINAL ARTICLE From the Editor: Educational Philosophy as Vanguard of the Public Humanities Chris Higgins, Chris Higgins Department of Education Policy, Organization, and Leadership, University of Illinois at Urbana-ChampaignSearch for more papers by this author Chris Higgins, Chris Higgins Department of Education Policy, Organization, and Leadership, University of Illinois at Urbana-ChampaignSearch for more papers by this author First published: 21 January 2019 https://doi.org/10.1111/edth.12310Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Volume68, Issue3June 2018Pages 255-267 RelatedInformation

BACKGROUND:Nursing governing bodies assert that compassion is essential to nursing practice. Despite the relevance compassion has in nursing, and ample theoretical literature, until now, there has been little empirical work conducted to examine the nature of compassion in nursing and how the expression of compassion in nursing practice may be affected.OBJECTIVES:This study aimed to examine the personal and organizational variables that might affect nurses' ability to practice with compassion.DESIGN:A predictive, non-experimental cross-sectional design was used to explore the relationships amongst the variables of structural and psychological empowerment, inter-professional collaboration, and compassion.PARTICIPANTS:191 registered nurses of any age, with any length of experience, in any inpatient or outpatient unit, in any hospital (community, long term care, and teaching) with any education level participated in the study.DATA COLLECTION:Data were collected via surveys sent to randomly chosen registrants from the College of Nurses of Ontario (Canada) Registry.RESULTS:Statistically significant correlations were found amongst all the variables. A simple linear regression was calculated to predict the effect of the independent variables of structural empowerment, psychological empowerment, and inter-professional collaboration on the dependent variable compassion. All three had a statistically significant positive relationship to the dependent variable compassion.DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS:Each of structural empowerment, psychological empowerment, and inter-professional collaboration has been discussed in the literature as a possible predictor of compassion. This study shows that that is the case. This is critical information for both organizations and individual nurses to have, as currently there is an inclination to blame nurses for having insufficient compassion rather than considering there may also be environmental and structural reasons for nurses being unable to practice with compassion. With this study as a beginning, future studies could test for models of how these variables interact in order to make more informed decisions about how to enable compassionate nursing practice. These strategies as it turns out, may be both personal and environmental. This study is a step towards the building of nursing compassion literacy.

This chapter traces some of the shifting meanings of the public and private in educational thought from Plato to the present, with special reference to the United States and the idea of the common school. It identifies two distinct lines of debate: one concerning the nature of public educational goods and the other concerning the fate of individuation and self-cultivation. Reconstructing these debates side by side leads to a surprising conclusion. What looks like ‘public schooling’ can be shown to be the pursuit of merely overlapping private goods. At the same time, what looks like a system prioritizing the individual’s private purposes can be shown in fact to largely stifle individual self-formation. Modern schooling is best described as an expression of what Arendt calls the ‘social’ and thus falls short of cultivating either public or private life.

Educational TheoryVolume 68, Issue 2 p. 139-145 SYMPOSIUM: EDUCATION IN A MINOR KEY Education in a Minor Key Chris Higgins, Corresponding Author Chris Higgins crh4@illinois.edu Department of Education Policy, Organization, and Leadership, University of Illinois at Urbana-ChampaignSearch for more papers by this author Chris Higgins, Corresponding Author Chris Higgins crh4@illinois.edu Department of Education Policy, Organization, and Leadership, University of Illinois at Urbana-ChampaignSearch for more papers by this author First published: 17 August 2018 https://doi.org/10.1111/edth.12302Citations: 2Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume68, Issue2April 2018Pages 139-145 RelatedInformation

Educational TheoryVolume 67, Issue 3 p. 235-240 ORIGINAL ARTICLE From the Editor: Undeclared Chris Higgins, Chris Higgins Department of Education Policy, Organization, and Leadership, University of Illinois at Urbana-ChampaignSearch for more papers by this author Chris Higgins, Chris Higgins Department of Education Policy, Organization, and Leadership, University of Illinois at Urbana-ChampaignSearch for more papers by this author First published: 29 December 2017 https://doi.org/10.1111/edth.12245Citations: 1Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume67, Issue3June 2017Pages 235-240 RelatedInformation