Random procedures, such as coin flips, are used to settle disputes and allocate resources in a fair manner. Even though the outcome is random, we hypothesized that people would be sensitive to features of the process that make it seem unfair, that is, who gets to call heads or tails and flip the coin. In 11 studies (N = 5,925) participants competed against another participant for a positive or negative outcome, determined by a physical or virtual coin flip. The independent variable was who called heads or tails and flipped the coin: the participant or their opponent. When participants lost the flip, we found an illusion of unfairness: They reported that the process was less fair, were less pleased with their outcome, and found the other person less likable when their opponent flipped the coin. When participants won the flip, they thought it was less fair, and they felt guiltier when they had flipped the coin. We present evidence that these fairness judgments were based on both illusory procedural control (the person who flips the coin appears to have an unfair advantage by virtue of executing the flip before the outcome is known) and illusory outcome control (the belief that the flipper can influence the outcome of the flip). Further, the illusion of unfairness appears to be a quick, intuitive process that is not easily corrected. We discuss the implications of these findings for research on procedural justice. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).

We hypothesized that people would exhibit a reticence bias, the incorrect belief that they will be more likable if they speak less than half the time in a conversation with a stranger, as well as halo ignorance, the belief that their speaking time should depend on their goal (e.g., to be liked vs. to be found interesting), when in fact, perceivers form global impressions of each other. In Studies 1 and 2, participants forecasted they should speak less than half the time when trying to be liked, but significantly more when trying to be interesting. In Study 3, we tested the accuracy of these forecasts by randomly assigning participants to speak for 30%, 40%, 50%, 60%, or 70% of the time in a dyadic conversation. Contrary to people's forecasts, they were more likable the more they spoke, and their partners formed global rather than differentiated impressions.

Anecdotal evidence indicates that people believe that morality is declining(1,2). In a series of studies using both archival and original data (n = 12,492,983), we show that people in at least 60 nations around the world believe that morality is declining, that they have believed this for at least 70 years and that they attribute this decline both to the decreasing morality of individuals as they age and to the decreasing morality of successive generations. Next, we show that people's reports of the morality of their contemporaries have not declined over time, suggesting that the perception of moral decline is an illusion. Finally, we show how a simple mechanism based on two well-established psychological phenomena (biased exposure to information and biased memory for information) can produce an illusion of moral decline, and we report studies that confirm two of its predictions about the circumstances under which the perception of moral decline is attenuated, eliminated or reversed (that is, when respondents are asked about the morality of people they know well or people who lived before the respondent was born). Together, our studies show that the perception of moral decline is pervasive, perdurable, unfounded and easily produced. This illusion has implications for research on the misallocation of scarce resources(3), the underuse of social support(4) and social influence(5).

We investigated intentional thinking for pleasure, defined as the deliberate attempt to have pleasant thoughts while disengaged from the external world. We propose a Trade-Off model that explains when and why thinking for pleasure is enjoyable: People focus on personally meaningful thoughts when thinking for pleasure (especially when prompted to do so), which increases their enjoyment, but they find it difficult to concentrate on their thoughts, which decreases their enjoyment. Thus, the net enjoyment of thinking for pleasure is a trade-off between its benefits (personal meaningfulness) and costs (difficulty concentrating). To test the model, we compared intentional thinking for pleasure to four alternate activities in three studies. Thinking for pleasure was more enjoyable than undirected thinking (Study 1) and planning (Study 3), because it was more meaningful than these activities while requiring a similar level of concentration. Thinking for pleasure was just as enjoyable as playing a video game (Study 2) or unprompted idle time activities (Study 3), but for different reasons: It was more meaningful than these activities, but required more concentration. We discuss the implications of these findings for what people might choose to do during idle times.

Oxytocin (OT) has been extensively studied with regard to its socio-cognitive and -behavioral effects. Its potential as a therapeutic agent is being discussed for a range of neuropsychiatric conditions. However, there is limited evidence of its effects on non-social cognition in general and decision-making in particular, despite the importance of these functions in neuropsychiatry. Using a crossover/within-subject, blinded, randomized design, we investigated for the first time if intranasal OT (24 IU) affects decision-making differently depending on outcome predictability/ambiguity in healthy males. The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) and the Cambridge Risk Task (CRT) were used to assess decision-making under low outcome predictability/high ambiguity and under high outcome probability/low ambiguity, respectively. After administration of OT, subjects performed worse and exhibited riskier performance in the IGT (low outcome predictability/high ambiguity), whereas they made borderline-significant less risky decisions in the CRT (high outcome probability/low ambiguity) as compared to the control condition. Decision-making in healthy males may therefore be influenced by OT and adjusted as a function of contextual information, with implications for clinical trials investigating OT in neuropsychiatric conditions.

This paper presents a curricular justification for teaching undergraduate college students in the United States about the practice of management. This justification turns on a conception of management as the routine, daily practice of seeking just relationships between an organization and distinct constituents of that organization. This search is an act of essay, the verb. With this interpretation of managerial practice as routine justice inquiry, I convene teachers from dozens of academic disciplines in a hypothetical endeavor to re-purpose managerial practice for purposes of General Education teaching. The resulting justification is an alternative to the customary defense that teaching about business and management enhances a college’s cash flow through substantial enrollments in those classes, a defense that stops well short of anything intellectual, much less curricular.

The neuropeptide oxytocin (OT) has been associated with a broad range of human behaviors, particularly in the domain of social cognition, and is being discussed to play a role in a range of psychiatric disorders. Studies using the Reading The Mind In The Eyes Test (RMET) to investigate the role of OT in mental state recognition reported inconsistent outcomes. The present study applied a randomized, double-blind, cross-over design, and included measures of serum OT. Twenty healthy males received intranasal placebo or OT (24 IU) before performing the RMET. Frequentist and Bayesian analyses showed that contrary to previous studies (Domes et al., 2007; Radke & de Bruijn, 2015), individuals performed worse in the OT condition compared to the placebo condition (p = 0.023, Cohen's d = 0.55, 95% confidence interval [CI] [0.08, 1.02], BF10 = 6.93). OT effects did not depend on item characteristics (difficulty, valence, intensity, sex) of the RMET. Furthermore, OT serum levels did not change after intranasal OT administration. Given that similar study designs lead to heterogeneous outcomes, our results highlight the complexity of OT effects and support evidence that OT might even interfere with social cognitive abilities. However, the Bayesian analysis approach shows that there is only moderate evidence that OT influences mind-reading, highlighting the need for larger-scale studies considering the discussed aspects that might have led to divergent study results.

When left to their own devices, people could choose to enjoy their own thoughts. But recent work suggests they don’t. When given the freedom, people do not spontaneously choose to think for pleasure, and when directed to do so, struggle to concentrate successfully. And, people find it somewhat boring and much less enjoyable than other solitary activities. One reason for this is that people may not know how to think for pleasure. Specifically, they may not know what to think about to make this both a meaningful and pleasant experience. We tested this prediction in two preregistered studies, by providing specific examples of meaningful topics (Study 1) or instructing participants to think “meaningful” thoughts (Study 2). Although providing specific examples of meaningful topics boosted how meaningful and enjoyable people found thinking for pleasure (Study 1), asking people to think “meaningful” thoughts (as compared to pleasurable ones) did not, because some of the meaningful topics people thought about were negative (Study 2). In order for thinking for pleasure to be pleasurable, people need to focus on topics that are both meaningful and positive.

Do conversations end when people want them to? Surprisingly, behavioral science provides no answer to this fundamental question about the most ubiquitous of all human social activities. In two studies of 932 conversations, we asked conversants to report when they had wanted a conversation to end and to estimate when their partner (who was an intimate in Study 1 and a stranger in Study 2) had wanted it to end. Results showed that conversations almost never ended when both conversants wanted them to and rarely ended when even one conversant wanted them to and that the average discrepancy between desired and actual durations was roughly half the duration of the conversation. Conversants had little idea when their partners wanted to end and underestimated how discrepant their partners' desires were from their own. These studies suggest that ending conversations is a classic "coordination problem" that humans are unable to solve because doing so requires information that they normally keep from each other. As a result, most conversations appear to end when no one wants them to.

Harris and Busseri (2019) examined the changes in life satisfaction people predicted vs. experienced for 30-years based on the three waves of the Midlife in the United States (MIDUS) survey. They conclude that "Contrary to the EOHI [end of history illusion], most individuals either were accurate or anticipated too much change into the future, rather than too little" (abstract). Examining these same data we arrive at the opposite conclusion, that people systematically underestimate future changes to their life satisfaction. The discrepancy arises because Harris and Busseri find stability in the average life satisfaction across the entire sample, while we find instability in life satisfaction within individuals. Both of these can happen. Although the average altitude of all the elevators in a skyscraper is remarkably stable over time, the altitude of each elevator changes by the second. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

This chapter is concerned with a type of thinking that has received little attention, namely intentional "thinking for pleasure" - the case in which people deliberately focus solely on their thoughts with the goal of generating positive affect. We present a model that describes why it is difficult to enjoy one's thoughts, how it can be done successfully, and when there is value in doing so. We review 36 studies we have conducted on this topic with just over 10,000 participants. We found that thinking for pleasure does not come easily to most people, but can be enjoyable and beneficial under the right conditions. Specifically, we found evidence that thinking for pleasure requires both motivation and the ability to concentrate. For example, several studies show that people enjoy thinking more when it is made easier with the use of "thinking aids." We present evidence for a trade-off model that holds that people are most likely to enjoy their thoughts if they find those thoughts to be personally meaningful, but that such thinking involves concentration, which lowers enjoyment. Lastly, we review evidence for the benefits of thinking for pleasure, including an intervention study in which participants found thinking for pleasure enjoyable and meaningful in their everyday lives.

Which is more enjoyable: trying to think enjoyable thoughts or doing everyday solitary activities?Wilson et al. (2014) found that American participants much preferred solitary everyday activities, such as reading or watching TV, to thinking for pleasure.To see whether this preference generalized outside of the United States, we replicated the study with 2,557 participants from 12 sites in 11 countries.The results were consistent in every country: Participants randomly assigned to do something reported significantly greater enjoyment than did participants randomly assigned to think for pleasure.Although we found systematic differences by country in how much participants enjoyed thinking for pleasure, we used a series of nested structural equation models to show that these differences were fully accounted for by country-level variation in 5 individual differences, 4 of which were positively correlated with thinking for pleasure (need for cognition, openness to experience, meditation experience, and initial positive affect) and 1 of which was negatively correlated (reported phone usage).

Why do some social problems seem so intractable? In a series of experiments, we show that people often respond to decreases in the prevalence of a stimulus by expanding their concept of it. When blue dots became rare, participants began to see purple dots as blue; when threatening faces became rare, participants began to see neutral faces as threatening; and when unethical requests became rare, participants began to see innocuous requests as unethical. This "prevalence-induced concept change" occurred even when participants were forewarned about it and even when they were instructed and paid to resist it. Social problems may seem intractable in part because reductions in their prevalence lead people to see more of them.

Summary The fact that the earth is constantly bombarded by an isotropic flux of cosmic rays has permitted to develop a new detection method that can only look over the observation point, but powerful enough to detect anomalies in front of a tunnel boring machine (TBM) digging a gallery. To do that, a cosmic ray detector, a muons telescope is set up on a TBM, looking towards. Cosmic radiations generate very short-lived particles in the upper atmosphere, muons, whose diameter is small enough to penetrate the ground to depths of several hundredths of meters. Muons propagate without changing direction and disintegrates when it hits a proton or a neutron. So it’s a mass detector like gamma ray, and is able to measure density variations. It is used to study volcanoes and galleries. Experiments have been occurred in France at Tournemire tunnel and Switzerland in the Mont-Terri underground Laboratory, showing fault and geologic contacts. Since April 2018 a muons telescope is installed on a TBM of the “Grand Paris Express”, moving with the TBM and permanently providing results.

Summary The fact that the earth is constantly bombarded by an isotropic flux of cosmic rays has permitted to develop a new detection method that can only look over the observation point, but powerful enough to detect anomalies in front of a tunnel boring machine (TBM) digging a gallery. To do that, a cosmic ray detector, a muons telescope is set up on a TBM, looking towards. Cosmic radiations generate very short-lived particles in the upper atmosphere, muons, whose diameter is small enough to penetrate the ground to depths of several hundredths of meters. Muons propagate without changing direction and disintegrates when it hits a proton or a neutron. So it’s a mass detector like gamma ray, and is able to measure density variations. It is used to study volcanoes and galleries. Experiments are occurred in galleries in France and Switzerland, especially in the Croix-Rousse tunnel (Lyon). Since April 2018 a muons telescope is installed on a TBM of the “Grand Paris Express”, moving with the TBM and permanently providing results.