Around 1 in 5 people of working-age in Britain are out of work or limited in what they can do, a figure which boomed during the pandemic from around 3 million to over 4 million and has not subsided. In some northern towns like Grimsby or Blackpool, economic inactivity among those of working age reaches 1 in 2. This crisis of worklessness is hitting economic growth and sapping the treasury. The new increase may be rooted in a mental health crisis concentrated among those with low education, whites, and individuals who are unmarried or without religion. In what follows, I use a British census analysis tool, combined with AI, to show that a decline of community – broadly construed – best accounts for this pattern.

The rise of the Green Party under its radical new leader Zack Polanski, its resounding victory in the Gorton and Denton by-election and its astounding support level among younger voters is one of the big new stories in British politics. This report fields a new survey to investigate why the Green Party appeals so strongly to young voters. The survey oversamples younger and left-leaning voters to explore their worldview and voting patterns. Beyond this, the study considers what the rise of the new Green vote portends for the next election and the long-term future of British politics. The report finds that young people are considerably more likely than their elders to identify as far left, and that young leftists are far more inclined to vote Green than older leftists. ‘Generation Woke’ does a better job of explaining young leftism than ‘Generation Rent.’ That is, cultural progressive attitudes such as endorsing transwomen in women’s sports help to explain young leftism. Materialist concerns such as being unable to afford a house or endorsing higher taxes and spending are less prominent. While the cost of living is the most important issue for young people, it is also a top issue for most voters and therefore a competence question which is less party-positional. Cultural issues are lower-ranked in importance but more positional and closely associated with strong left-wing ideology, which is the most important correlate of Green voting. Young leftists are more Green-inclined not just because they are more left-wing but because they have not formed attachments to Labour the way older leftists have and are more likely to view the ruling party as responsible for the country’s problems. We see something similar on the right in other countries where younger voters are more likely than their elders to vote for national populists over established conservatives. While the Green Party is unlikely to win the next election, cohort change in the coming decades could carry them toward the centre of power. By 2036 or 2046 the left-wing cast of Britain’s younger electorate may well alter the country’s natural party of government from a right-wing party, as has been the case in the past, to a left-wing one, as in Canada.

This article argues that the Western world is exiting a 60-year era of rising cultural left-liberalism, entering what the author terms a post-progressive period. Drawing on a viral social media thread and an academic paper in Theory and Society, the piece traces the arc of progressive cultural ascendancy from the 1960s and analyses the emerging backlash against perceived woke excess as a structural rather than cyclical shift in political culture.

Nations and NationalismEarly View EDITORIAL Editorial for issue 30.1 Daphne Halikiopoulou, Daphne Halikiopoulou Joint Editors-in-Chief: Nations and NationalismSearch for more papers by this authorJohn Hutchinson, John Hutchinson [email protected] Joint Editors-in-Chief: Nations and NationalismSearch for more papers by this authorEric Kaufmann, Eric Kaufmann Joint Editors-in-Chief: Nations and NationalismSearch for more papers by this author Daphne Halikiopoulou, Daphne Halikiopoulou Joint Editors-in-Chief: Nations and NationalismSearch for more papers by this authorJohn Hutchinson, John Hutchinson [email protected] Joint Editors-in-Chief: Nations and NationalismSearch for more papers by this authorEric Kaufmann, Eric Kaufmann Joint Editors-in-Chief: Nations and NationalismSearch for more papers by this author First published: 16 January 2024 https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.13005 Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Early ViewOnline Version of Record before inclusion in an issue RelatedInformation

This chapter traces the history of left-modernism, a distinct variant of left-wing ideology, from its roots in early twentieth century America. Left-modernism is a hybrid ideology that fuses modernism, an individualist anti-traditionalism focused on diversity and change, with a socialist oppressor-oppressed revolutionary worldview. This ideology was in tension with socialism in the interwar period but emerged victorious as the ideology of the non-communist left. From there, it came to be adopted as part of the 'radical chic' 'BoBo' creed of the 'New Class' of knowledge workers. Taking off in the 1960s, it has gone through three 'Great Awokenings' focused on the sacralization of historically marginalized race, gender and sexual minorities. Each awakening has been consolidated into institutional change, first in universities, and secondarily in media, foundations, publishing and the HR departments of corporations. Institutions where left-modernist radicals are most firmly in control, notably universities, incubate 'liberal fundamentalism' because the dynamics of monocultural spaces encourage fundamentalist entrepreneurs. The ineffectiveness of both moderates and the right in controlling the culture means that left-modernist fundamentalism is poised to dominate not only institutions but even the norms of democracy that govern the parameters of what may be politically contested.

Background Work on whites’ mobility behavior finds that they tend to move to less diverse neighborhoods than minorities. Work on white mobility preferences finds that whites who dislike diversity prefer less diverse neighborhoods. Do liberal whites practice what they preach, and do conservative whites really avoid diversity? Objective Combine data on white ethnocentrism and migration behavior to analyze liberal and conservative white mobility in the United Kingdom and the United States. Method Ordered logit and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) models of destination choice predicted by attitudes toward Brexit, Trump, and immigration. Results Whites select significantly less diverse neighborhoods than nonwhites, but there is little or no racial difference in the destinations that white liberals and conservatives, British Brexiteers and Remainers, and American Trump supporters and opponents move to. Conclusion Ethnicity matters for segregation, but conscious white ethnocentrism is much less important. Future work could explore unconscious ethnocentrism, differing ethnic information about neighborhoods or ethnically divergent amenities as potential explanations.

The New Nationalism in America and Beyond: The Deep Roots of Ethnic Nationalism in the Digital Age. By Robert Schertzer and Eric Taylor Woods. New York: Oxford University Press, 2022. 232p. 29.64 paper. - Volume 21 Issue 3

Do people’s political beliefs alter the emphasis they place on different symbols when constructing their “personal” national identity (Cohen 1996)? Does the content of their national identity affect how they vote? These are the central questions we address in this article, focusing on England but using the United States as a comparative case to demonstrate common dynamics.

In this report we explore findings from a national survey of 1,491 faculty at four-year colleges and universities in the United States regarding their attitudes on free expression and academic freedom. These findings provide a mixed picture on the state of academic freedom among American faculty. On the positive side, a majority of faculty surveyed endorsed broad conceptualizations of freedom of speech and academic freedom, rejected harsh punishment for colleagues who engaged in controversial expression, and opposed deplatforming speakers on campus. Compared to the results of FIRE’s “College Free Speech Rankings” survey, faculty are markedly more tolerant than the students they teach. The vast majority had not been disciplined, or threatened with discipline, by their department or university for their teaching, research, or non-academic expression. Yet, there is serious cause for concern. A majority of faculty worry about losing their jobs or reputations because someone misrepresents their words. A third self-censor out of concern over the responses of staff, students or administrators. Moreover, a significant portion of faculty support punishing their colleagues in softer ways that can chill expression. These restrictions include formally condemning certain views but not punishing someone for expressing them; investigating colleagues for controversial expression; and applying social and professional pressure to get colleagues to take mandatory training they philosophically oppose. The academic freedom glass is, at best, half full.

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This chapter argues that ethnic majorities are set to occupy an increasingly central place in discussions of ethno-political accommodation in western societies. These actors are not well captured by the liberal nationalism or multiculturalism paradigms, which were developed during a period of relative ethnic homogeneity. Ethnic majorities are, in my estimation, advantaged in politics, the economy and in official culture; but are disadvantaged when it comes to recognition of their ethnic identity and demographic malaise, criticism of their collective past, and the treatment of national symbols and narratives that are implicitly associated with them. An increasingly influential cultural left has sought to anathematize majority ethnic groups, which has contributed to populism and polarization as well as silencing important conversations. The cultural left has also engaged in a fallacy of composition by collapsing the distinction between majority group concern over the preservation of ethno-traditions with ethnic exclusion at the individual level. It has celebrated majority decline, producing profound alienation. In combination, this has prevented the recognition of liberal, absorptive ethnic majorities, contributing to our current moment in both political and intellectual terms.