The European Union is the only international organisation that has a parliament where taxation is debated and legislated on. Along with foreign affairs and defense, however, taxation is also one of the few policy areas that is subject to unanimity voting among member-states. This creates a responsiveness-responsibility dilemma that the European Commission has tried to navigate by constructing responsiveness to public demands for tax justice as a political imperative. In this article, I apply the concept of 'political work' to analyse EU tax policy between 2014 and 2019 and show the ways in which the politics of responsiveness partly eroded the institutional constraints of responsibility vis-a-vis member states. As I document, the Commission's political work was initially successful but then lost momentum, as a handful of governments managed to veto efforts in the Council and push the issue to the OECD, where it was stalled by the United States until the election of Joe Biden.
How do EU Commission cabinets function internally and in relation to the Eurocracy? Have they changed over time? In this essay, two sociologists share their ethnographic experience in Commission cabinets at very different points in time: at the end of the Cold War with Jacques Delors (1991) and during the "polycrisis" with Pierre Moscovici (2015-2019). They compare notes on access to fieldwork and research conditions and highlight similarities and differences that have marked the history of French-led Commission cabinets with regards to the sociology of members, the role of politics, insertion in the Brussels bubble, and relations with capitals.
From the 2009 sovereign debt crisis to the 2022 Russian full-scale war in Ukraine, the EU has experienced a succession of intersecting crises, or a 'polycrisis'. We examine how this polycrisis has impacted the EU's role in security and defence. While the EU's competences in security and defence have long suffered from disagreements among member states, they have shown notable developments since Brexit, and most importantly, since the 2022 war in Ukraine. We make a two-step argument to shed light on why the polycrisis has had these differentiated effects over time. The first move we make is to unpack the polycrisis to explain why and when an increase in competences may take place. We single out two crises that offer pathways for positive politicisation, leading to increased cooperation and competences: an external military threat and an internal crisis in the form of the loss of a major veto player. In a second step, we argue that the existence of an alternative organisation, NATO, helps us explain where and what cooperation can take place. Shared military threats can lead to complementary rather than substitutive empowerment at least during the duration of the crisis.
Digital market regulations respond to technological changes and global dynamics, but also to how political actors shape markets. Focusing on the Digital Markets Act, this article explains the EU's marketcraft as the result of a struggle in the policy field between political actors promoting competing economic ideas in a rapidly evolving technological and geopolitical context. We show that significant discursive and policy change in digital market governance has occurred because of shifting coalitions between three constellations of actors, which we call market-correctors, market-busters, and market-directors. Tracking the ongoing campaign to challenge Big Tech and define the meaning of digital sovereignty, we argue that market-directors have ushered in potentially comprehensive policy change.
European Defence Policy-Frédéric Mérand 2008 "This book explains the creation of the European Union's Security and Defence Policy to this day the most ambitious project of peacetime military integration. Whether hailed as a vital step in the integration of Europe or berated as a wasteful threat to U.S. power, European citizens are increasingly interested in the common defence policy. Today, "European Defence" is more popular than the European Union itself, even in Great Britain." "Merand addresses the fundamental challenge posed by military integration to the way we think about the state in the 21st Century. Looking back over the past 50 years, he shows how statesmen, diplomats and soldiers have converged towards Brussels as a "natural" solution to their concerns but also as something worth fighting over." --Résumé de l'éditeur.
While most scholars analyze European Union politicization as a process that shapes public opinion, little attention has been paid to political strategies. In this article, I focus on politicization as an outcome of political work, the practice of carving out a space for agency in an environment that is constrained by institutional rules and intergovernmental power structures. Through an ethnographic analysis of the Juncker Commission's implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact in Italy, Spain, and Portugal in 2015–2017, I make three arguments. First, the Commission succeeded in redefining the rules of the Pact, without however challenging them. Second, this political work was enabled by conservative and social-democrat actors who neutralized each other. Third, political work contributed to a politicization of the Pact. The ethnographic narrative reveals two practices of politicization at play: (1) the purposeful exercise of political discretion vis-à-vis institutional rules; (2) the embrace of ideological and partisan conflict.
Focusing on the services and the cabinets, this chapter analyses the European Commission as a complex organizational, political, and social institution. Organizationally, it describes the Commission as a unique international bureaucracy which puts its French administrative tradition, consensus-based, and law-heavy internal procedures under the growing influence of an Anglo-American style of management. Politically, the chapter shows that the Commission increasingly behaves like a political executive that seeks to establish its own legitimacy vis-à-vis public opinion and member states by addressing partisan dynamics in the European Parliament. In terms of social relations, the chapter draws from the author’s ethnographic work to explore the transnational life of Commission civil servants and cabinet staffers who have made the Berlaymont their home.
Based on four years of embedded observation in the cabinet of a European Commissioner, this book develops a sociology of international political work. Empirically, it offers an insider’s chronicle of the European Union between 2015 and 2019. The analysis traces the successes and failures of Commissioner Pierre Moscovici and his team on five issues that defined European politics between 2015 and 2019: the Greek crisis, budgetary disputes with Spain and Portugal, the rise of populism in Italy, the reform of the eurozone, and the fight against tax evasion. The aim is not to ascertain whether the Commission’s policy was good or bad, but to understand how political work is done in a European Union where the “spectacle of power” is blurred by twenty-four official languages, twenty-eight national histories, a powerful technocracy, and sometimes opaque institutions. As a life-long socialist politician and former French finance minister, Pierre Moscovici was perhaps the most intensely political character in Jean-Claude Juncker’s self-styled “Political Commission.” Brandishing his leftist identity, rejecting technocratic talk, he surrounded himself with staffers sharing his ambition—but also critical of his actions. Shadowing them from the corridors of the Berlaymont, the seat of the European Commission, to Washington and Athens, The Political Commissioner throws light on the partisan struggles that shaped the Juncker Commission, tensions with the Eurogroup and the Parliament, and recurring conflicts with the Member States. It also shows how political staffers operate informally and in their interaction with the media and civil servants, as they craft and sell public policies to the public.